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MARTIN TROW

Reflections on the Transition from Mass to Universal Higher Education

Autonomous and Popular Functions of American Higher Education

If we consider American higher education today with any degree of detachment, we are struck by a paradox. On the one hand, the system seems to be in serious trouble and perhaps even in crisis. Almost all major universities and many others as well have been the scene of student disturbances and even insurrections. Events at Berkeley and Columbia, at Harvard and San Francisco State, have become national news; on many other campuses militant blacks and whites and dissident faculty confront their university's authority with bold demands, threats, strikes, and sit-ins. On the other hand, if looked at from another perspective, and especially from a European perspective, American higher education is successful and thriving, and, indeed, provides the model for educational reformers in almost every European country. American research and scholarship make contributions to every field of learning and dominate many. In applied science and technology we are the envy of the world: As Servan-Schreiber has observed, the Americans have worked out "a close association between business, universities, and the government which has never been perfected nor successful in any European country." Our universities are deeply involved in the life of the society and contribute much to the efforts to solve its problems—from social medicine to the inner city. And finally, this sprawling system of some 2,500 colleges and universities enrolls over 40 per cent of the age grade, over 50 per cent of all high school graduates, and those proportions are steadily rising.[1] In some large states like California, where roughly 80 per cent of high school graduates go on to some form of higher education,

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our system of mass higher education begins to be very nearly universal. Whatever one's assessment of those figures and their implications, they must be counted a considerable achievement.

But there must be too much irony in a celebration of the triumphs of American higher education just at present, when scarcely a day goes by without another report of a confrontation or disruption on a campus. There is perhaps more profit in considering its difficulties. I believe these, of which student unrest is only the most visible, can be better understood in light of the heightened tension between the autonomous and the popular functions of American colleges and universities, arising out of the movement from mass toward universal higher education.

American colleges and universities, almost from their beginnings, have performed these two sets of functions. The distinction is between those activities and purposes that the university defines for itself and those that it takes on in response to external needs and demands. The autonomous functions are intrinsic to the conception of the university and the academic role as these have evolved in Europe and America over the past 150 years, and are now shared with universities all over the world. The popular functions, most broadly developed in the United States, are best seen as services to other institutions of the society. The line between them is not hard and fast; ultimately, it can be argued, all university activities are in some sense responsive to societal interests. But the distinction is a useful one, perhaps most clearly to Europeans whose universities until recently have largely confined themselves to their traditional and autonomous functions and have resisted accepting tasks set for them by other parts of the society or the population at large.

At the heart of the traditional university is its commitment to the transmission of the high culture, the possession of which has been thought to make men truly civilized. This was really the only function that Cardinal Newman and more recently Robert Hutchins have thought appropriate to the university. Closely related to this, and certainly central to our conception of liberal education, is the shaping of mind and character: the cultivation of aesthetic sensibilities, broad human sympathies, and the capacity for critical and independent judgment. The second autonomous function of the American university is the creation of new knowledge through "pure" scholarship and basic scientific research. Third is the selection, formation, and certification of elite groups: the learned pro-

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fessions, the higher civil service, the politicians, and (though less in Britain than in the United States and on the Continent) the commercial and industrial leadership.[2] These functions involve values and standards that are institutionalized in the universities and elite private colleges, and are maintained by them autonomously and even in resistance to popular demands and sentiments.

The popular functions fall into two general categories. First, there is a commitment on the part of the American system as a whole to provide places somewhere for as many students as can be encouraged to continue their education beyond high school. For a very long time it has been believed in this country that talented youth of humble origins should go to college. But the extension of these expectations to all young men and women—that is, the transformation of a privilege into a right for all—dates no further back than World War II. In part, this notion is a reflection of the erosion of the legitimacy of class cultures and of the growing feeling in every industrial society, but most markedly in the United States that it is right and proper for all men to claim the possession of the high culture of their own societies.[3] In school and through the mass media, ordinary people are encouraged to send their children to college to share in the high culture, for its own sake as well as for its instrumental value in gaining entrance to the old and emerging elite occupations. Higher education is assuming an increasingly important role in placing people in the occupational structure and, thus, in determining their adult class positions and life chances. Social mobility across generations now commonly takes the form of providing children with more education than their parents had, and the achievement of near-universal secondary education in America by World War II has provided the platform for the development of mass higher education since then. The tremendous growth of occupations demanding some form of higher education both reflects and further stimulates the increase in college and university enrollments. All this shows itself in yet another way, as a marked rise in the educational standard of living of the whole population. Throughout the class structure, already fully accomplished in the upper-middle but increasingly so in the lower-middle and working classes, "going to college" comes to be seen as not just appropriate for people of wealth or extraordinary talent or ambition, but as possible and desirable for youngsters of quite ordinary talent and ambition, and increasingly for people with little of either.[4] We are now seeing what was a privilege that became a right

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transformed into something very near to an obligation for growing numbers of young men and women.

If one popular function is the provision of mass higher education to nearly everybody who applies for it, the second is the provision of useful knowledge and service to nearly every group and institution that want it. The service orientation of American higher education is too well known to need discussion. But the demands on the universities for such service are increasing all the time. In part, they reflect the growth of the knowledge base created by the scientific explosion of the past few decades. Not only is much of this new knowledge of potential applied value to industry, agriculture, the military, the health professions, and so on, but also new areas of national life are coming to be seen as users of knowledge created in the university. We may know more about how to increase corn production than how to educate black children in our urban slums, but it is likely that the universities will shortly be as deeply involved in efforts to solve our urban and racial problems as ever they were in agriculture.

The Academic Division of Labor

How has American higher education been able to fulfill both its autonomous and its popular functions? Put differently, what have been the institutional mechanisms through which the colleges and universities have been able to contribute to the transmission and creation of knowledge, and also serve the variety of other demands the society has made on them?

The chief such mechanism has been the division of labor between and within institutions. A very large number of American colleges are essentially single-function institutions, either autonomous or popular. Swarthmore College, Haverford, and Reed are essentially preparatory colleges for graduate and professional schools. Their faculties for the most part are men who have taken a Ph.D. in distinguished universities, but who prefer a career in a teaching college rather than in a big university. In addition, there are the elite private universities which are highly selective in admissions and which subordinate service to basic research and the transmission of the high culture.

By contrast, a very large number of American colleges are essentially service institutions. The roughly two hundred teachers colleges, the many small, weak denominational colleges, the less

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ambitious engineering schools, the over eight hundred junior colleges—these are serving primarily vocational ends, preparing youngsters from relatively modest backgrounds for technical, semiprofessional, and other white-collar jobs.

There is another group of institutions—most notably the big state universities—which performs the autonomous and popular functions within the same institution. On the one hand, these institutions, along with the state colleges and junior colleges, have taken the brunt of the enormous expansion in enrollments in recent decades. They are centers for community service of every kind; they train the teachers, the social workers, the probation officers, and market researchers, and the myriad other new and semiprofessionals required by this service-oriented post-industrial society. On the other hand, they are also centers of scholarship and basic research, and contribute to the advancement of knowledge in every academic subject. Moreover, they offer, in their undergraduate colleges of letters and sciences, the full range of academic subjects, some of which center on the transmission of the high culture and are concerned less with public service than with the cultivation of sensibility and independence of judgment, a sense of the past, of the uniqueness of the individual, of the varied forms of human experience and expression—in brief, all the desired outcomes of liberal education.

Within such universities, the popular and autonomous functions are insulated from one another in various ways that serve to protect the highly vulnerable autonomous functions of liberal education and basic research and scholarship from the direct impact of the larger society whose demands for vocational training, certification, service, and the like are reflected and met in the popular functions of universities. These insulations take various forms of a division of labor within the university. There is a division of labor between departments, as for example between a department of English or history and a department of education. There is a division of labor in the relatively unselective universities between the undergraduate and graduate schools, the former given over largely to mass higher education in the service of social mobility and occupational placement, entertainment, and custodial care, while the graduate departments in the same institutions are often able to maintain a climate in which scholarship and scientific research can be done to the highest standards. There is a familiar division of labor, though far from clear cut, between graduate departments

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and professional schools. Among the faculty there is a division of labor, within many departments, between scientists and consultants, scholars and journalists, teachers and entertainers. More dangerously, there is a division of labor between regular faculty and a variety of fringe or marginal teachers—teaching assistants, visitors, and lecturers—who in some schools carry a disproportionate load of the mass teaching. Within the administration there is a division of labor between the dean of faculty and graduate dean, and the dean of students. And among the students there is a marked separation between the "collegiate" and "vocational" subcultures, on one hand, and academically or intellectually oriented subcultures, on the other.

Despite the strains that have developed around these divisions of function between and within American colleges and universities, they have worked surprisingly well, surprising especially to observers in European universities who have opposed the encroachment of popular functions on the universities as incompatible with their traditional commitments to increasing knowledge, transmitting the high culture, and shaping the character of the elite strata. American higher education, as a system, has been able to do those things and *also* to give a post-secondary education, often within the very same institutions, to millions of students, while serving every institution of society, every agency of government.

The enormous expansion of American higher education, both in its numbers and its range of activities, is putting great strains on these insulating mechanisms and thus is threatening the autonomous functions of the university.[5] The expansion of the university is involving it more directly in controversial issues and is therefore increasing the number and range of significant publics in the larger society that are attentive to what goes on in the university. This in turn is causing severe problems for boards of trustees and regents and for the over-all governance of universities and the protection of their autonomy. These problems are reflected on campus, in the growing politicization both of the faculty and the student body (which also has other sources). The intrusion of politics onto the campus has many consequences, among them the threat to the procedures by which these institutions govern themselves. At the same time, the growth in enrollments brings to campus large numbers of students who do not accept the authority of the institution's traditional leadership to define the form and content of higher education: Some of these are disaffected middle-class whites, while increasing numbers are militant blacks. The progressive politiciza-

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tion of the campus threatens most the intellectual activities that require the suspension of commitment and an attitude of skepticism toward all received truth and conventional wisdoms. The central question for the American university is whether its indefinitely expanding popular functions are compatible with the survival of its autonomous functions of disinterested inquiry, whether in the classroom or through research and scholarship.

Governing Boards and Their Changing Publics

The role of trustees in American higher education is a peculiar one. They are, by law, the ultimate authority over these corporate bodies: They own the physical resources of the institution; they select its chief administrative officers; they possess the formal authority that is exercised by delegation by the administrative officers and faculty alike. And yet two parallel tendencies have been at work to reduce the actual importance of the trustees in recent decades. On the one hand, more and more power has been drained away from the trustees with the growth of major alternative sources of funds for academic programs over which the trustees have, in fact, had little or no control; and on the other, administrators and faculty have come increasingly to assert that powers that have over time been delegated to them are theirs by right. The growth of the contract grant system has enormously increased the power of the faculty in relation to administration as well as to trustees; and the tight competitive market for academic men, together with institutional ambitions for prestige in the academic league standings, have insured that trustees rarely exercise control over the funds granted to research professors. Trustees have been relatively ineffective in controlling even capital expansion, one remaining bastion of their power, when funds for new buildings come to support new research programs for which professors and administrators have jointly applied. Moreover, administrators are increasingly turning to outside funding agencies, especially to foundations, to support new academic programs, to set up experimental colleges, or to bring more minority-group students on campus. And again, trustees are really not consulted about these. External sources of funds mark a major diminution of the trustees' power to shape the character or guide the direction of "their" institution.

Secondly, the broad encompassing concept of "academic freedom" has meant that both administrators and faculty members

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come to feel that the powers they exercise over instruction, admissions, appointments, the internal allocation of resources, and even, increasingly, the physical design of the campus are all theirs by right. Some of the forces that have led to the extension and deepening of the concept of academic freedom have had to do with the enormous influence of the most distinguished American universities as models for all the others. Characteristically, it is in the most distinguished universities that the academic community has gained the widest autonomy, the broadest control over its own conditions of life and work. Many lesser institutions have come to see faculty power and institutional autonomy as a mark of institutional distinction, to be pursued as part of the strategy of institutional mobility to which so much of the energies and thought of academic men is devoted. The power of the faculties in the most distinguished universities flows precisely from their academic distinction, through the familiar academic transmutation of prestige into power. The faculties of weaker institutions see the relation, but endeavor to turn the causal connection on its head: They mean to gain the power and transmute it into prestige, for their institutions directly and themselves indirectly. Whatever its justification, the growth of faculty power has meant a diminution of the power of trustees and regents.

Boards of trustees traditionally have looked in two directions: inwardly to the government and direction of their universities; outwardly, to the groups and interests which provide the support for, and make claims for services on, the university. On the one hand, as I have suggested, trustees have been losing power over their own institutions: Many things are done and funded behind their backs, so to speak. At the same time (and this applies more to public than to private universities), their constituencies and their relation to their constituencies have been changing. Boards have traditionally dealt with very specific "relevant publics": legislative committees, wealthy donors, alumni organizations. In the leading universities, their job has been to get support from these publics while resisting inappropriate interference. And in this task trustees of public universities have not been so different from those of private universities: In most of their relationships, they have been dealing with people very much like themselves—in many cases graduates of the same state university, men of similar sentiments and values and prejudices. These relations could be, for the most part, cozy and private. Under these circumstances some of

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the leading state universities, such as the University of California, could until recently imagine themselves to be private universities operating largely on public funds, in a relationship to public authorities not unlike that of the British universities.

Today, the constituencies, the relevant publics, of state universities are much wider, more heterogeneous, and less familiar. In part, the growth of relevant publics has accompanied the simultaneous expansion of the universities and of their functions. For example, eleven years ago the University of California consisted of two major campuses, three small undergraduate colleges, and a medical school, with a total enrollment of about forty thousand, operating on a state budget of a little over one hundred million dollars. Today the university consists of nine campuses with over a hundred thousand students and a state budget of over three hundred million dollars, with nearly as much again from outside sources. The student body and faculty are not only bigger, but more heterogeneous, reflecting a variety of interests, many of which touch directly on sensitive and controversial issues. The schools of agriculture still do research on more fruitful crops and more effective pest control, but other students and faculty are active in support of the movement to organize migratory farm workers; the schools of education still produce schoolteachers and administrators, but also provide expert advice to school boards embarked on programs of total integration, while other faculty testify in defense of black militants and invite Black Panthers to give lectures on campus; administrative officers still define and defend academic criteria for admissions, while their colleagues press for the admission of larger numbers of minority-group students outside the ordinary procedures. And California, like many other universities, is now embarking on a major commitment to the solution of urban problems that inevitably will involve it in the most intense and passionate political controversies.

As a result of the expansion of the public universities, both in numbers and in the range of their activities, more and more people have come to take an interest in them and to feel that they have views on them that ought to be heard. In some uncertain sense, the constituency of the University of California, for example, has become the population of the state. But it is out of just this uncertainty about the nature and composition of the university's relevant publics that the Regents' anxieties arise. As the constituency of the trustees has grown, it has become less distinct. It is unclear just

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who the relevant publics are to which the Regents should attend. Moreover, with the disruption of the old cozy relations between the Regents and specific limited publics, they can no longer know their constituents' minds by consulting with them or by reading their own. And as the Regents lose touch with their constituents, so also they come to be less well known and trusted by their new constituents. To this new mass public, they are not people one can telephone or one has talked to; they are merely a remote part of the apparatus of government—the powerful people who need to be pressured. And some unrepresentative part of the anonymous public begins to write letters complaining about the university, and the Regents, for want of a genuine relation to these new publics, begin to read them and become anxious and worried. One important difference between the older specific and differentiated publics and the emerging mass undifferentiated public is that the former reflect specific interests that can be met, or compromised, or educated, or resisted. A mass public, by contrast, does not have interests so much as fears and angers—what it communicates to the trustees is "why can't you clean up that mess at the university—all those demonstrating students and unpatriotic faculty."

These two tendencies—the trustees' sense of a loss of control over "their" university and the emergence of a mass public of uncertain size and composition and temper with whom the trustees have no clear representative or communicating relationship—can undermine a board's conceptions of who they are and what their role is, and generate in them anger and anxiety. And out of that fear and anger, trustees appear to be more inclined to intervene directly in the academic life of the university: its curriculum, faculty appointments, and student discipline. In California where these developments are far advanced, these interventions are creating a serious crisis of authority within the university—what might be called a constitutional crisis—centering on who actually controls the curriculum and appointments of staff, which is not yet resolved. If it is not resolved, or if it leads to bitter struggles between the faculty and administrators and the Regents, or between the university and the state government, then the university's capacity to sustain a climate of intellectual excellence will be gravely threatened, and its ability to perform all its functions, but most especially its functions as an international center of learning, will be seriously weakened.

California is in many ways a populist democracy. The governor

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and legislature discuss and revise the university's annual operating budget in an atmosphere increasingly directly political and responsive to popular sentiments and indignation; and the whole electorate votes directly on proposed bond issues that are required for capital expansion. The Board of Regents, the majority of whose members are appointed to sixteen-year terms, was conceived precisely as a buffer between the university and popular or political pressures, to protect the necessary freedom of the university to explore issues and engage in educational innovations that might not have popular support at any given moment. But the board appears increasingly unable to perform that function. Instead of defending the university to its external publics, it begins to function as a conduit of popular sentiment and pressure on the university. And this, as I have suggested, places all the functions of the university in grave jeopardy.

But the problems I have been discussing are not confined to public state universities and populist societies. The emergence of a mass undifferentiated and angry public indeed poses a special threat to public universities. But the more general pattern in which university expansion creates new and easily neglected bodies of constituencies can be illustrated in the events at Columbia University two years ago. As Walter Metzger has noted, the physical expansion of Columbia, situated right at the edge of Harlem, made of that community a highly relevant and attentive public. Over many years Columbia has been expanding its operations into areas and buildings from which minority-group people have "necessarily" been evicted. But its board of trustees, and unfortunately also its administration, had not begun to see that Harlem was at least as relevant to Columbia's fate as were its alumni, its wealthy donors, and the great foundations. And it was the representatives of the black community, within the university as students, who precipitated the crisis that then was exploited by white radicals and greatly exacerbated by undisciplined police action.

Many of the popular functions of the universities in the past—mass education and public service—have indeed been popular in the other sense of the word and have gained the support or indifference of the general public. But it seems inescapable that the university in the future will be involved much more frequently in highly controversial issues and actions for which mass support cannot always be gained. The expansion of the universities, both

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in size and function, means that we will be living in an environment increasingly sensitive to what the university does, and especially to what it does that has direct effects outside the university. It is not generally recognized how much the university's freedom and autonomy were a function of popular indifference and of the management of special interest groups outside the arena of popular politics. But for various reasons the society is less and less indifferent, at the same time as trustees and regents are less able to perform their traditional function of defending the university through the forms of elite politics. And this is especially clear in the university's relations to the racial revolution.

Black Studies and Black Students

Almost every major college or university in the country is trying, in one way or another, to contribute to the enormous social movement that goes by the name of the "racial revolution." The first and most common response of universities is to increase the proportion of black students in their student bodies; the second is to develop programs or departments or colleges of black or ethnic studies; the third is to increase their commitment to the solution of urban problems.

The way a university responds to each of these challenges conditions the way it will or can respond to the others. How it goes about recruiting minority-group students heavily affects the character of a program or department of black or ethnic studies, and that in turn affects the ways in which an institution can try to approach a wider variety of urban problems. Moreover, how a university deals with all three of those programs will greatly influence how well its autonomous functions—of liberal education and basic research and scholarship—survive the current waves of populist sentiment and pressure.

But much of the discussion surrounding the need to increase the numbers of black students and faculty in our colleges and universities has focused on the mechanisms of black recruitment and the organization of a black curriculum. There has been little discussion of the characteristics and attitudes of black students and of differences among them. But the success of all these efforts may depend greatly on what black students in universities want from the institutions and the extent to which their hopes and desires are compatible with its basic values and processes.

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We can usefully distinguish four positions among black students in colleges and universities today:

1. The revolutionaries, represented by but not confined to the Black Panthers, whose attention and energies are focused primarily on the black ghettos and the larger society, and who see the university chiefly as a base of operations and a pool of resources for revolutionary organization.

2. The radicals, who focus more on the university, but see it in its present form as a racist institution and in need of fundamental reorganization as a part of the radical transformation of society. They reject existing forms of university organization and governance: the way it selects its faculty, admits students, defines its curriculum, and awards credits and degrees. They demand "open enrollment," the abolition of "white" standards for appointments, admissions, and performance, and the full commitment of the institution, or a major part of it, to the racial revolution. They are likely to be separatists, demanding autonomous departments of black studies and special provisions for the recruitment and housing of black students. They differ from the revolutionaries chiefly in being less ideological, less interested in a world revolution along Maoist lines, and more in transforming the university. They are prepared to disrupt the university, to damage its buildings and close its classes, and indeed to destroy it, if necessary, to reconstruct it as an institution devoted to "the welfare of the people." Their hostility to the "racist" university as it exists is so great that they doubt that there is anything useful they can learn from it.

3. The militants, who also focus their attention on the university, but who accept, with some reservations, its basic character as a center for the creation and transmission of knowledge and values through free and objective inquiry. They push hard, however, in an active and organized way for a larger role for blacks in the university, both in numbers of students and faculty and in resources devoted to their special interests and problems. They may support departments or programs of black studies, but are prepared to see these integrated into the structure of the university, conforming (again with some reservations) to its academic norms and standards. They are

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prepared to demonstrate forcefully, but not (deliberately) in ways that threaten to destroy a university that they wish to reform. Most importantly, they differ from the radicals in having a greater interest in gaining an education for themselves in the university.

4. The moderates, who are largely committed to gaining skills and knowledge and training for careers in a multi-racial society. These people often support the demands of the militants, but draw back from confrontations and disruptions, and are little interested in, and indeed may oppose, separatist forms of education represented by departments of black studies. These students are often strongly committed to taking their skills back into the larger black community, where they may in fact be highly militant in relation to the white society and its institutions.

Individual students often straddle or combine two of these positions, shifting tone and emphasis on different issues and in different circumstances. Moreover, individuals will often use the rhetoric and arguments of one position while acting more consistently with another. In the general inflation of rhetoric, black militants often sound like radicals, making sweeping condemnations and demands when in fact their intention is to increase the numbers of black students and to gain somewhat larger resources for them in their institutions. Similarly, often under pressure and out of fear, moderates may sound like militants, expressing support for demonstrations when in fact they want nothing so much as to be allowed to get on with their studies. But this inflation of rhetoric is not merely a personal or group tactic; it has consequences for individuals and institutions. Students are captured by their own rhetoric, committed to positions and actions they may not have intended; the institution and the larger community often respond to the words and not the intentions, adopting either more submissive or more intransigent positions than are appropriate.

The inflation of black rhetoric, coupled with certain illusions and misconceptions among white faculty members and administrators, serves to obscure the actual character of black students on any given campus and the real distribution of sentiments and interests among them. The distortion is usually toward an exaggeration of the importance and influence of the radical and revolutionary blacks, as compared with the moderate and militant reformers.

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A case in point is provided by the events surrounding the strike called by the Third World Liberation Front at Berkeley during the winter of 1968-69 in support of demands for an autonomous department of ethnic studies. The leadership of this organization and of its black component, the Afro-American Student Union, was predominantly radical. It had the support of black and white revolutionaries and also of many militants, though some of those opposed the more violent and destructive forms the strike took. It may be useful to sketch the background and context of this damaging strike.

At Berkeley, as at numbers of other major universities, the decision was made several years ago to increase the number of minority students in the student body. This was to be done both by encouraging black and Mexican-American students who qualified for admission in the ordinary way to apply to Berkeley and also by recruiting others whose high school records did not make them admissible through the ordinary procedures, but who might be admitted under a special rule which allows 2 (now 4) per cent of the student body to be admitted outside the ordinary admissions criteria of the university. At Berkeley an Educational Opportunity Program was set up in 1966 to encourage youngsters from ethnic minorities to attend the university and specifically to admit some of them under this special 2, now 4, per cent rule. The first director of this program, acting under the Chancellor's authority, was a man of great energy and commitment who developed relations with many of the black communities in the Bay Area and began to increase the numbers of students coming to Berkeley from those communities. In fall, 1966, the Berkeley EOP recruited and enrolled 130 students; in 1967, the number doubled to about 260, and in 1968 it doubled again. By January, 1969, there were over 800 EOP students at Berkeley, with the number still growing. His successor has continued this policy with similar energy and devotion. As a result of the efforts of this program and of other programs, and of the ordinary processes of admissions, there were in 1968-69 some 1,200 black students at Berkeley.

I do not believe that anyone ever made a decision about the nature or characteristics of the black students to be recruited to Berkeley. The assumption was that the numbers were small and ought to be larger for many reasons, and that the way to do this was to go into the black neighborhoods and recruit students from substantially all-black high schools. Indeed, the Chancellor himself

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held the view that the university had a special responsibility to the most deprived black students. Increasing numbers of these youngsters have been going on to junior colleges, but, in his view, the university was richer and more powerful than these, and thus carried a larger responsibility to just those youngsters from the most handicapped and deprived backgrounds.

The resulting relationship between Berkeley and its growing numbers of minority students is conditioned by three factors: first, the characteristics of the minority students themselves, especially the values and attitudes that they bring with them to the university; second, the attitudes toward and perceptions of the minority students held by the faculty and especially by the administrators; and third, certain characteristics of the campus itself.

First, the black students recruited to Berkeley by and large have been militant and radical, clearly much more so than the black community as a whole. It may be that they reflect the attitudes of the average minority-group students of college age. It seems equally likely that there is a self-recruitment of more militant and radical blacks to the university, and a special interest in them on the part of the administrative officers who have headed the special program. There is, I think, a widely held belief that radicalism and militancy among young blacks is itself a sign of special energy and intelligence and, indeed, of potential leadership qualities. The youngsters with these characteristics recruited to the campus have brought their values with them and are indeed shaping the continued recruitment of black students to Berkeley.

Second, the romantic view of black militancy by white faculty and administrators is itself a factor of great importance in the present situation. It arises in part out of a generalized sense of guilt among liberal white men about the situation of Negroes in America—a sense that indeed blacks ought to be very angry, and that to be very angry and to express that anger in militant and radical forms are evidence of a certain freedom from older cultural constraints and a mark of being among the leaders of the emerging black community in America.

There is also the sheer ignorance of most white people regarding the distribution of attitudes and values among the black population, as a result of which young militant blacks are taken to be far more representative of their race than they in fact are. It was a source of great surprise and some embarrassment to members of the university community to discover that over 90 per cent of black

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voters across the country voted for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, and that in California the Peace and Freedom Party, which carried the most radical and revolutionary racial slogans on its banners, gained very little support, even in the black ghettos.

The attitudes I am describing have affected the recruitment of black students to Berkeley and have exaggerated the significance of the black militants among the black students on the campus. For example, it was widely assumed that the Afro-American Student Union did, in fact, represent the black students on the Berkeley campus and express their views. It was also widely assumed that all black and other minority-group students supported the strike of the Third World Liberation Front during the winter quarter of 1969, and in their relations with the minority students on the campus the administration carefully dealt with the Third World Liberation Front as their legitimate leadership. But no one really knew how representative that body was, nor indeed how many black and minority-group students did not support the strike and even continued to attend class in the face of considerable fear and intimidation all during the strike. There has been, in general, a marked indifference in the university to the moderate or moderate-militant black and minority-group students, an indifference that in some cases has bordered on contempt.

There are two elements in this that are worth pointing to. The first is the invisibility of the Negro, which Ralph Ellison wrote about in his penetrating novel some years ago. In the university, both faculty and administrators are still inclined to deal with black students as group members, imputing to them a variety of characteristics and attitudes that reflect the guilt and wishes and assumptions of the whites themselves. The black students themselves, as individuals with unique characteristics, are largely invisible. It is in many ways more convenient to assimilate them to an Afro-American Student Union or Third World Liberation Front, where they comprise another political force which has to be accommodated in the university and with which one can negotiate and deal. Whatever the difficulties of that, it is still less difficult than to confront black students as people in all their uniqueness and individuality, differing sharply among themselves in their attitudes and orientation to the university.

In addition, there is the powerful ideological weapon of "Uncle Tomism." Uncle Tom, as an epithet, is assigned by radical and revolutionary blacks to any blacks less militant than they. It is a

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way of dismissing and discrediting the views of those who are still committed to an interracial and integrated society, and who do not in all cases support violent or other militant tactics. The term is reserved especially for moderate black students who want to use the university in traditional ways—to gain an education and increase their skills and opportunities in their future careers. Ironically, the university has accepted the black militants' definition of the non-militant Negro as an Uncle Tom, and has paid little attention to the interests of the very considerable number of black and other minority-group students who have not supported the Third World Liberation Front. This is, I think, in part because of the romantic apotheosis of black militancy among white liberal academics that I spoke of earlier, and in part because the militants can cause more trouble and are more powerful than the non-militants, who by the very fact of their not being organized can be safely ignored. And indeed they are ignored.

The black students recruited recently to the campus have brought their own values and culture with them. Many of them have had painful experiences throughout their school careers and have found schools and teachers unrewarding and punishing. They arrive at Berkeley and often begin to have the same kinds of unhappy and unsuccessful experiences in class that they have had before. Some very quickly cease going to class altogether, and for many the university, which so far as they can see is just another punishing kind of school which offers them little personal reward or psychological support, becomes the object of enormous anger and resentment. Berkeley, unlike some private and residential institutions, has never paid a great deal of attention to the emotional lives of its students, nor has it made any special effort to socialize them to the campus community. Nor has it been greatly concerned with the extent to which students hold the values which are essential to teaching and learning in the university. The university has traditionally concerned itself with the purely cognitive aspects of the student's life, and allowed his social and emotional life and moral development to take care of itself, or to find a home in the extracurricular forms of collegiate life. This was never very satisfactory, but it was not disastrous so long as the university recruited largely middle- and upper-middle-class students who already shared many of the views of themselves and the university that their teachers did, and whose attitudes, if not strictly academic, were at least not hostile to the university as it existed. These assumptions cannot be

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made about young militant blacks from the urban ghettos of the Bay Area,[6] but still nothing much has been done to socialize minority-group students to the university world after they are admitted. Indeed, even to suggest such an attempt is often seen as encouraging them to betray their identifications with their own ethnic communities.

Currently almost the whole of the attention of the university in this area is directed to problems of the curriculum and the organization of black studies. The issues have been autonomy, the recruitment of the faculty, the role of students in decision-making, and so forth. Those who have seen the report of the Harvard committee on black studies (the Rosovsky Report) will remember that the question of black studies there was embedded in a matrix of concern for the individual student and his sense of belonging, concerns that grew out of an awareness of his loneliness and anxieties on the campus. As much was said about the necessity for a black student union and for the integration of black students into the residential houses as about the curriculum of the black studies program.[7] In the Rosovsky Report, we see a sensitivity to the black student as an individual with special difficulties in adjusting to a university community. At Berkeley, as at many large public universities, there is no tradition for this kind of concern; instead, it deals with black students as an organized political force and bargains with them about the forms of a college of ethnic studies. The absence of a concern for the individual and his adjustment to the campus will have the most profound consequences for the relation between the university and minority-group students.

The decision at Berkeley to proceed with a College of Ethnic Studies will have consequences for the university, I suspect, as a source of continuing conflict and turmoil. It will also have consequences for the university's new broad commitment to urban problems. The proposed College of Ethnic Studies, at Berkeley as elsewhere, has in my view less to do with education than with politics. Some of the leaders of the Third World Liberation Front who are centrally involved in the creation of the new college see it primarily as a base for political action in the black ghettos and for the training of revolutionary cadres for the future. The real target, for them, is not the university, which is only incidental or instrumental, but rather the black community itself, which gave the bulk of its votes in the last election to Hubert Humphrey. For the radical and revolutionary Third World leaders, that is the real

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challenge—it is their brothers in the community who must be reached and shown the true nature of a racist society and the true nature of their own interests. And the disputes over the college, not all of which are yet resolved, have not centered on its academic character or curriculum, but on its degree of autonomy, its freedom from the ordinary constraints of the university which might inhibit its primary mission in the black community.

Chancellor Roger Heyns was aware of the problem. In a statement to the Academic Senate at Berkeley, in which he reaffirmed the necessity for the continued application of ordinary university procedures to the new college, he observed:

> I have a protective view about the proposition that the unit should engage in community service. I assume this does not mean service which is useful in the teaching and learning process as in field work or internships—to which there can be no objections. But I am very wary of any unit of the university becoming an instrument of community action.
>
> If the academic community chooses to use the University or any part of it as a base of political action, if it tries to identify the University with its causes, and mobilize the prestige and the resources of the University to goals which it chooses, then it has made the University an important piece of political real estate. And it will follow, inevitably, that others, outside the University, will then regard its control and management as important goals which *they select.*[8]

These are good and strong words. But I think they are illusory. I do not believe the Chancellor will be able to control events after the college has been established. The new college emerges out of a strike marked by many acts of violence and vandalism which the Chancellor himself has enumerated; it will grow and develop under the threat of renewed strikes and violence. The campus is desperate for peace; its faculty committees and its administration will be very reluctant to disrupt fragile agreements and ambiguous understandings by denying the college what it wants, especially if the college is prepared to get what it wants through regular university procedures. I believe the procedures will be defended (though they, too, have been attacked by faculty groups); but they can be operated with enough flexibility to demonstrate that they need not be "obstructive." My doubts on this score apply to staffing, curriculum, and admissions, but also, in the present context, to the college's role in the community. An active role in the ethnic communities is absolutely central to the concerns of many Third World

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faculty and students. The notion that their college will not be allowed to be "an instrument of community action," in the Chancellor's words, is, I believe, quite unrealistic. The further assumption—that such activity will not involve organizing and educating people and groups in that community for political action, but will be merely field work in connection with some course of study—is equally illusory. And, indeed, many of the Third World leaders and their supporters affirm in the strongest terms that the university should change its relation to the community, and precisely be an instrument for change in it. They point to the fact that the public land grant universities have long accepted their role as agents of social change, and merely demand that they broaden their conception of that role and of the forms of change it can effect in the community. The power of this strong tradition in American higher education, coupled with the moral and political power of the militant black movement itself, will make it extremely difficult for the Chancellor, or university presidents elsewhere, to try to prevent directly political activities in the community based in the new colleges of black or ethnic studies.

If my concerns are in fact realized, what are the consequences for the universities' new broad entry into the field of urban problems? The question is almost rhetorical. American universities have had some experience of service in public areas which involve political controversy. But surely the problems in this regard are likely to be greater in the area of urban affairs than in agriculture or medicine. The heart of the matter is whether the university can find a way to approach urban problems without being transformed into a political weapon or arena. I believe it can if the university can remember and respect its own unique qualities as a center for basic inquiry and rational discussion of issues, as a source of new ideas and critical examination of existing policy and practice, and as a training ground for the variety of professions and semi-professions whose skills are in such short supply in the areas of urban problems. At best the university cannot avoid being drawn into areas of controversy, and its autonomy will be further strained by the appearance, if not the reality, of partisanship. Facts are, or quickly become, political weapons, and reports and recommendations, however firmly based on facts, have a tendency to support one position in a debate and not others. But if there is a continued concern for the quality of the knowledge base, a dedication to the effort to illuminate issues and to increase the number and variety of policy options, a scrupulous attention to

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negative evidence, and a sensitive avoidance of the technocratic contempt for the ordinary political processes, then the university may indeed survive its most ambitious program of service to the community.

But these are just the qualities that one can hope for, but not assume, in a college of ethnic studies. Some of its founders *know* what the problems are and know what must be done. "Enough of this endless study and discussion," they say. "After a hundred or two hundred or three hundred years of it, let us now do what needs to be done." However justified this may be for a radical political program, it cannot but complicate the university's broad involvement in the problems of the city, with which it inevitably will be associated in the public mind. As a result, it seems likely to me that the university will come to be seen as the source of direct and radical intervention in the politics of the minority communities themselves. The reaction to political action based in the university, as Chancellor Heyns observed, will be political reaction from the community and the state.

I have suggested that some of the problems at Berkeley have had their roots in the casual and almost unnoticed decision to increase the numbers of minority-group students by recruiting youngsters through special admission directly from the ghetto high schools. This decision has shaped succeeding events at Berkeley, including the strike and the ensuing proposals for a college of ethnic studies. But given a commitment to increase the numbers of minority students on campus, a commitment almost unanimously supported throughout the university, is there any alternative to the way Berkeley went about it? Was all this not inevitable, an inevitability embodying, as I have heard said, a kind of cosmic justice which visits on the university an appropriate suffering for its decades of neglect of the minority groups in the population? I do not believe it was inevitable, nor do I see a divine spirit at work in our current travail. I think there is another way to increase our service to minority groups in the state and nation—and that is by helping to strengthen and expand the strata of black and other minority-group professionals and semi-professionals: teachers, lawyers, engineers, social workers, probation officers, professors, scientists, researchers, students of urban problems. Education in the freshman and sophomore years, after all, is not our strength at Berkeley, nor at many other big state universities; on the whole, we do it badly, and what success we have is with students who come to us already motivated and well-educated, who can use the resources of the university in

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the service of their own self-education. Youngsters from local black high schools need much more than that. But we are ill-equipped to give them the kinds of counseling and personal attention and patient concern that they need and deserve. Ironically we are much closer to being able to provide this kind of education to our juniors and seniors and graduate and professional students. And there, I think, is our special opportunity. The university can recognize and accept its unique qualities as a center for advanced undergraduate, graduate, and professional training, and for scholarship and research, and not use a program of special admissions to compete unreflectively with junior colleges and state colleges for youngsters just out of high school. We might, instead, come to be seen as a place where the minority-group draftsman and technician could return to school to become an engineer; the school aide, a teacher; the teacher, a trained administrator or educational specialist; the advanced undergraduate or graduate, a scientist or academic man. This would mean not a smaller, but a different commitment. It is true that many graduate departments and schools are also making special efforts at recruiting minority-group students. But what is required is a much fuller commitment by the university in this direction. For example, it may mean that we have to find ways of being more hospitable to older undergraduates with broken academic careers, and to use our special admissions programs for the man of thirty-five who left college ten or fifteen years ago, who does not meet the ordinary criteria for admission to the university, but who needs additional training to go beyond his dead-end white-collar job. And we might have to search out such people—in industry and politics, the civil service and community poverty programs and schools—with as much energy and initiative as we now use in looking for youngsters to come as freshmen. It may well be that one way to organize the education of many of them would be in a school of urban studies.

All this implies an effort to broaden and strengthen the black middle class. But somehow middle-class Negroes have a bad name among white academics—indeed, the name is Uncle Tom—and we have come to identify leadership in the minority community with radical militancy. That is not, I think, a service either to the minority communities or to the university.

The question, of course, is not whether public universities should or should not enroll more minority-group students, or develop programs of studies centering on their history and culture and experience and problems, or commit more of their resources and energies

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to such programs. There are many good reasons, moral and intellectual and pragmatic, for making those commitments. The question is the form such programs of special recruitment, ethnic studies, and the like should take; or, more precisely, what criteria we should use in making those decisions—decisions we are in danger of making either unreflectively, as with recruitment, or in direct response to confrontation as a way of gaining peace, as with ethnic studies. The answers lie in a clearer sense of the kinds of programs that are compatible with one's conception of the university. And here, of course, we come to what may be irreducible value preferences. Insofar as one sees the university as merely a political instrument, functioning at present chiefly to arm and legitimate a racist and utterly corrupt society, then indeed one need not worry overmuch about its survival; one may want to use it, or seize it, or, failing that, to unmask and then smash it. But if one sees the university as a vulnerable institution that in some respects can stand apart from politics and society and provide an arena for the critical examination of all views of man and society, then the survival of this function in the university is a matter of some consequence for the way in which the university performs its other, more directly service functions.

"Compulsory" Higher Education

The growth of American higher education and the powerful wave of popular sentiment that accompanies that growth are affecting its relations to its environment, with trustees and regents, at the point of greatest strain. But the same forces, both within and outside the universities, are affecting the internal fabric of the universities: the character of their undergraduates and graduate students and faculty members, and their processes of governance. It begins to appear as if the expansion of American higher education, in numbers and functions, is transforming it from a system of mass higher education into one that will bear responsibility for nearly all of the college-age population—that is, into a system of universal higher education. That development, clear in trends and projections, is obscured by the fact that currently only about half of all high school graduates across the country go directly from high school to some form of higher education. But in the upper-middle classes and in states like California, the proportion of youngsters going on to some form of post-secondary education is already over 80 per cent. For youngsters in those places and strata, universal higher education is

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here: Nearly everybody they know goes on to college. And those strata and areas are growing inexorably. Many of the difficulties now being experienced by American colleges and universities reflect the strains of this transformation from mass to universal higher education.

In the recent past, attendance in our system of mass higher education was voluntary—a privilege that had in some places become a right, but not yet for many an obligation. Whether seen as a privilege, as in certain selective, mostly private, institutions, or as a right, in unselective, mostly public, institutions, voluntary attendance carried with it an implicit acceptance of the character and purposes of the institution as defined by "the authorities." The authority of trustees or administrators or faculty to define the nature of the education and its requirements could be evaded, but was rarely challenged by students. With few exceptions students played little or no role in the government of the institution.

The growth of enrollments and the movement toward universal higher education has made enrollment in college increasingly obligatory for many students, and their presence there increasingly "involuntary." In this respect, in some strata and places, colleges begin to resemble elementary and secondary schools, where it has long been recognized that compulsory attendance increases problems of student motivation, boredom, and the maintenance of order. The coercions on college students take several forms. The most visible in recent years has been the draft, which has locked many young men into college who might otherwise be doing something else. But other pressures will outlive the reform or abolition of the draft: the unquestioned expectations of family and friends and the consequent sense of shame in not meeting those expectations; the scarcity of attractive alternatives for youngsters of eighteen and nineteen without college experience[9]; the strong and largely realistic anticipation that without some college credits they will be disqualified from most of the attractive and rewarding jobs in the society as adults. As more and more college-age youngsters go on to college, not to be or to have been a college student becomes increasingly a lasting stigma, a mark of some special failing of mind or character and a grave handicap in all the activities and pursuits of adult life.

The net effect of these forces and conditions is to make college attendance for many students nearly involuntary, a result of external pressures and constraints some of which do not even have the legitimacy of parental authority behind them. The result is that we are

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finding in our classrooms large numbers of students who really do not want to be in college, have not entered into willing contract with it, and do not accept the values or legitimacy of the institution.

In the past, the relative accessibility of higher education brought large numbers of students to American colleges and universities who had little interest in learning for its own sake, but who had strong ambitions to rise in the world and wanted the degree and sometimes the skills that would help them better their status. We are now seeing large numbers from more affluent homes who similarly enter college without much interest in bookish study, but who also are less interested in vocational preparation or social mobility—who either have little ambition for a middle-class career, or else take it completely for granted, or, as in many cases, both. These students also differ from the members of the old "collegiate culture" who took refuge from the higher learning in the "gentleman's C" and the distractions of college sport and social life. But these students, already securely lodged in the middle and upper-middle classes, were not inclined to challenge any authority, especially when the institution made its own relaxed compromises with their styles and evasions. For the members of the old collegiate culture, as for the vocationally oriented and the serious students with an interest in academic work, a willing contract with the college of their choice was implicit and, for the most part, honored.[10]

The entry of large numbers of "involuntary" students introduces into the university considerable resentment and hostility directed, among other things, to its conceptions of achievement and ambition. There have always been large numbers of people, in this as in other societies, whose ambitions were modest or who felt that the human price of striving and ambition was not worth the problematic gain. But these views are represented more strongly in the university today, where they assert their legitimacy in ways the institution seems peculiarly unable to counter. Part of the attack is on the *ends* of ambition and takes the form of the rejection of academic institutions and programs that threaten to fit people for jobs and careers in a "sick society." Part of the complaint is that academic or intellectual work is *intrinsically* dehumanizing, separating people from one another, destroying their human qualities, authenticity, and so forth. This sentiment sometimes takes the form: "Look, stop trying to put us on your treadmill; your own lives are spent running around doing pointless things. We just want to look at the flowers and love one another." This point of view, in its pure form, is clearly incompati-

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ble with any kind of consistent goal-directed effort. But many students, under the constraints to be enrolled in college, hold views close to this while continuing to attend classes and earn credits. Such students pose a special problem for the university. They are not only bored and resentful at having to be in college, but they are also quite vulnerable to the anti-rational or politically radical doctrines currently available in the university—and especially to those that explain and justify their distaste for formal academic work and their reluctance to get caught up in the patterns of striving and achievement.

There is no doubt that many student complaints have real objects—bad teaching, faculty indifference, and the impersonal people-processing of the big universities.[11] But it is sobering to learn that much the same anger is expressed by students in the most varied kinds of colleges and universities—in small liberal arts colleges as in multiversities, in innovative and permissive colleges as in conservative and traditional ones. Where does all the anger come from? Surely some of it comes from forcing youngsters into college who have no interest in bookish study, at least at this point in their lives. There may be other things for them to do now, and perhaps better times for them to be exposed to the disciplines and pleasures of formal study.

Problems of Graduate Education: A New Breed

There are interesting parallels between developments in undergraduate and in graduate schools. The rapid expansion of higher education, along with other developments in the larger society, has also brought into faculties and into departments young men whose commitments to academic values are weak or ambivalent. In part, this is because increasing numbers of students are entering graduate school who have little interest in the discipline and for whom graduate school is a chance to continue their liberal education, sometimes under more favorable conditions. There are visible among an increasing number of graduate students (and some of the ablest) a sharp recoil from professional training and, indeed, a rejection of that ambition to achieve distinction in one's field that we have always assumed to be a chief motive of our best graduate students, as of their teachers. For these students any ambition or striving, even for a successful academic or scientific career, involves the loss of per-

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sonal authenticity and human qualities, and in social terms is a sell-out to a basically corrupt and sick society. In these respects, it resembles the rejection of ambition and fear of success that are even more widespread among undergraduates. These new graduate students also reflect the enormous growth of higher education and of affluence that allows undergraduate interests to be pursued in graduate and professional schools. They cannot be said to be involuntary students, even in the metaphorical sense in which I have referred to a class of undergraduates. But insofar as their interests and motives are at odds with the purposes of graduate training and the values and expectations of the faculty, tensions and resentments develop among them that are not unlike those we find among the reluctant undergraduates.[12] For these students, graduate study has certain attractions that are quite independent of the department's central function of providing professional training for scholars and college teachers. The university is a pleasant, stimulating, and protected environment that affords the students the leisure to read in areas that interest them and, in a sense, to pursue the liberal education that many feel they did not really gain as undergraduates. It also provides the necessary conditions for the political activities in which some are involved.

Some of these students do in fact drop out of graduate work, especially from departments in vertebrate disciplines that have rigorous professional standards and do not allow themselves to be used as extensions of undergraduate liberal arts colleges. In many other departments, especially in the humanities and social sciences, professional training has always been tempered by the encouragement of the continued general intellectual growth of the graduate students. And, in some, the discipline and the faculty itself are divided on the relative importance of technical training, on one hand, and a broad general education and familiarity with the literature of other fields of study, on the other. This reflects an older struggle within universities between gentlemanly, aristocratic attitudes toward learning and the conception of the discipline as a body of knowledge that grows by patient systematic inquiry employing the technical apparatus of scholarly and scientific research. The disdain for "narrow technical studies" or professional training, as well as for the kinds of research that lead to a successful academic career, is common both to the gentlemanly conception of the university as well as to these graduate students, who would be horrified to be accused of behaving like gentlemen or aristocrats. (And indeed in other re-

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spects they do not resemble those older models.) Many professors of sociology and English, of history and anthropology, would argue that it is precisely the combination of professional skills and broad learning that is the best preparation for a life of scholarship and future work of high distinction. So the students of whom I am speaking often find encouragement from their teachers for studies that in their teachers' eyes are an appropriate part of their professional training, but to the student represent more accurately a rejection of the discipline and of the scholarly or scientific career.

The irony, of course, is that some of these students do in fact "succeed" in their graduate studies, sometimes with the help and sponsorship of faculty members who are themselves least in sympathy with the dominant professional and research orientations of their fields and departments. These students are rarely the most brilliant in their class (that usually requires a serious professional orientation as well as a general interest in ideas), but they are often very able and can meet the sometimes modest professional requirements of their department without too great an effort. These students often also hold teaching assistantships (though rarely research assistantships). And in some departments a very large part of undergraduate education is carried by TA's, many of whom are deeply hostile to their own departments and to the subject as it is taught there. In the sections of large undergraduate lecture courses that they teach, such TA's can effectively sabotage the design of the course, developing alliances with undergraduates who are similarly hostile to the institution in which they are studying. Increasingly these TA's, led or protected by sympathetic (often junior) faculty members, in fact create their own courses, which are explicitly designed to counteract the "conservative establishment" courses offered by the rest of the university. These courses, which as they multiply develop into a kind of shadow university, provide an academic base for dissident and politically active undergraduates.

Some of these students eventually pass their qualifying exams and, for want of an alternative, proceed on to college or university teaching, with or without a dissertation in hand. And some join our own ever-expanding departments as junior colleagues, in many cases with their own values—their sharp and painful ambivalence toward success and an academic career, their hostility to the discipline as a cumulative body of learning, to research, and to the organization of the academic departments, curriculum, and university—unchanged.

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From another perspective these students and junior colleagues reflect a failure of graduate departments to socialize their students effectively or to gain from them a commitment to their purposes and values and conceptions of the discipline and the university. This is in part due to the values these students hold on entry to graduate school, values which are reinforced by currently fashionable cultural and political ideologies and sentiments, and by their peers. It also reflects the loss of confidence of the faculty in its own values and its inability or reluctance to communicate them with conviction. Perhaps most important, these departments are no longer (if they ever were) normative communities. And that, in turn, reflects the growth of the departments, the increasing specialization of knowledge, and the privatizing centrifugal pulls of research (as compared with the centripetal force of teaching and of curriculum design). The core values of a department may still be assumed, but they are not continuously reasserted, redefined, and reinforced by men coming together and acting around them. The breakdown of a department as a moral community reflects these centrifugal forces, and then in turn reacts back on and contributes to them. Academic men are even less likely to interact around the shared work of a department when they discover deep divisions among them about the central purposes and conceptions of the subject and department. All this has marked consequences for each discipline, but it also contributes to the general weakening of academic authority and of the ability of graduate departments to socialize their graduate students to a common conception of the academic and scholarly role.

In short, we are steadily recruiting people to college and university faculties who are deeply hostile to the central values and functions of the department and institution they join. We see them increasingly at scholarly conventions and as supporters or leaders of student demonstrations. We are beginning to see them in growing numbers on departmental and university committees, where the old assumptions regarding the shared unspoken values of academic men, cutting across disciplinary lines, can no longer be sustained. And where these shared values are no longer shared, whether because of political students or dissident faculty, the old forms of university government by discussion and consensus begin to break down. The consequence is the steady politicization of government at every level and in every arena, attended by the withdrawal of men whose sense of obligation to university service does not extend to polemical politics.

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The Management of Internal Conflict

This leads me to the impact of external pressures and student activism on the internal government and climate of universities. A number of forces work to limit the extent and intensity of disputes within the university; these forces tend to mute disputes and press toward compromise and accommodation between differing points of view. One of these is the broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the multiple functions of the university. The practical effect of this conception of the university as multiversity is to remove from dispute the sharpest and fundamentally irreconcilable issues; disputes then can take the form of arguments about the relative emphasis to be given to different views or the relative support to be allocated to different programs. And even those disputes are further diluted in situations in which there is secular growth or expansion throughout the university, and where disputes then become merely questions of priority and time.

Disputes are also softened by a general agreement to conduct them within the regular academic and administrative machinery—the system of committees and meetings through which major universities govern themselves. They are still further softened by the institutional (and often also the geographical) insulation of conflicting views. For example, the humanistic scholars are typically centered in a university's college of letters and sciences, or its equivalent; the service orientations in the professional schools and some of the graduate departments. Historians and engineers may have different conceptions of the primary functions of the university, but they rarely have occasion to confront each other in argument.

Conflict between different conceptions of the university is also minimized by making the department, rather than a college or the university, the unit of effective educational decision. The departments, or most of them, are more homogeneous than the faculty as a whole, and they have their own strong mechanisms for compromise and accommodation, not least of which is to minimize the number and importance of issues involving collective decisions, allowing the privatization of intellectual life, a withdrawal to one's own classroom and research. On the graduate level, the university *is* for all practical purposes the aggregation of departments and professional schools, their satellite research centers and institutes, and the supporting infrastructure of libraries, labs, buildings, and administrative help. The departments effectively govern their own appointments and

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promotion of staff (subject to certain review procedures by extra-departmental committees), admit their own graduate students, and organize their instruction. On the undergraduate level (I am speaking here of the central liberal arts college), there is, of course, the necessity to organize some structure of education that is not confined to a single department. The form this takes at many institutions is a set of distribution requirements—so many units required in fields outside one's major, so many in a major field, the remainder in electives. This system, whatever its failings as education, has the substantial virtue of reducing the amount of academic decision-making that is necessary. This reduces the occasions for conflict involving educational values and philosophies, thus letting men get on with their own work. What we see there is a spirit of *laissez-faire*, within broad administrative constraints set by limitations of space, time, staff, and other resources, that mirrors the broader philosophy of the multiversity as a whole.[13]

This pattern may be seen as an institutional response to the problem of combining post-secondary education for large numbers of students of the most diverse character with the highest standards of scholarly and scientific work. But the events of the past few years have revealed basic weaknesses in the system which are in a sense the defects of its virtues. One of these is the lack of a central, widely shared sense of the nature of the institution and a weakness in its capacity to gain the loyalties and devotion of its participants. This means that the institution operates on a relatively thin margin of error. Closely related to this is its tendency to generate both among students and faculty somewhat diffuse resentments, feelings of frustration and alienation from an institution which provides services and facilities, but which seems singularly remote from the concerns of individuals, responsive only to pressures and problems that are organized and communicated through the regular channels, and not always even to those. It is this kind of institution marked by weak faculty loyalties, vague resentments, and complex administrative arrangements that is showing itself to be highly vulnerable to political attacks from without and within.

These attacks have other consequences than the disruptive demonstrations and sit-ins that are most widely publicized. The attacks, whether from a governor or a radical student group, work to politicize a campus, to polarize a faculty, and to force its members to make choices in an atmosphere of passion and partisanship. The differences that crystallize around the issues I have been describing differ

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from the ordinary issues of academic politics: For one thing, they involve the students more directly; for another, they are more stable, more closely linked to deep-rooted values and conceptions of the nature of the institution. Moreover, at many of the leading universities they are being institutionalized in the form of faculty caucuses and parties, which will persist as permanent elements in the governmental process, further contributing to the polarization of faculty out of which they arise. Perhaps most importantly, these tendencies threaten to disrupt the informal processes of consultation, negotiation, and compromise, among and between faculty and administrators, by which universities are ordinarily governed. And they threaten to break through all the devices for softening conflict that I was describing.

In their place are put forward two powerful democratic models for the government of institutions. One is the model of representative democracy, complete with the party system and judicial review. The other is the model of direct democracy in the self-governing small community. Both models, as well as a combination of the two involving the formalization of the governmental process in addition to the provision of a high degree of participatory democracy, have been advocated for the university. Such systems would require a relatively high and continuous level of faculty involvement in the issues and instruments of university government, as well as a basic decision regarding the extent of citizenship—that is, the role of the students in the decision-making machinery. And, indeed, both of these issues have been raised in a recent student-faculty report on university governance at Berkeley, which calls for a high level of participation by both faculty and students in units of government at every level, from the campus as a whole down to the individual departments.[14]

Many arguments can be made against such a proposal—its cumbersomeness; the impermanence of the students (they do not have to live very long with the consequences of their decisions on a campus); their incompetence to decide certain matters; and so forth. But, in my own view, more important than any of these is the absolute level of political activity and involvement required of teachers and students under these arrangements. The casual and rather informal methods by which faculty members and administrators govern a campus may have many failings, most clearly visible to those who are not part of such a government. But their chief virtue is that they have allowed students and teachers to get on with their work

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of teaching and learning. Some students and faculty who want to radically transform the universities are at least consistent in wanting to change the form of governance by making the process of government itself a central part and focus of a university education. But liberal education, scholarship, and research are not inherently political activities, even when they take politics as their subject. And they are threatened by a highly politicized environment, both by its partisanship and demand for loyalties and commitments, and also by its distractions, its encroachments on one's time and energies. The reactions of academic men who are not much interested in university governance is usually to withdraw their attention and let others govern. But this works only if those others, who *are* interested in politics, share the faculty's basic values and are concerned to create and protect an environment in which the old functions of teaching and research can go on without distraction or intimidation. That is an unlikely outcome of any arrangement that makes its own government a central activity of the university, insures that all disputes pass through its formal machinery, and brings students and faculty with a passion for politics to the center of the governing process. But that is the direction of much student and faculty sentiment at the moment, and of "reforms" on many campuses.

The demand for participatory democracy by those who see it as an instrument for radical change in the university involves a paradox that makes it suspect. Genuine participatory democracy, as those who have seen it at work in university departments or New England town meetings know, is an inherently conservative form of political organization. In these bodies there is a strong pressure for consensual decisions, arising largely out of the potential divisiveness of disputes unmediated by any representative machinery. The anticipation that one is going to have to continue to live and associate with one's colleagues or neighbors outside the political arena is a powerful inhibitor of actions or changes which some of them object to strongly.

But the forms of participatory democracy can be a vehicle for radical action when they involve large aggregates of people who do not comprise a genuine community, and whose relations with one another are not diffuse and continuous, but segmental and fleeting. Under those circumstances, participatory democracy becomes plebiscitary democracy, manipulated by small groups of activists who speak in the name of the passive masses. (And the demand for constant participation insures the passivity of most students and fac-

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ulty, who have other things to do than govern themselves.) For a university government based on the forms of participatory democracy to be used for radical change, it must be captured and manipulated by political activists. The conditions making for this kind of manipulation grow as activist groups among faculty and students gain in strength, tactical experience, and ideological fervor. Those conditions are also strengthened by persistent and, in some universities, highly successful attacks on the legitimacy of existing forms of university governance.

The Quest for Legitimacy

It is widely recognized that events over the past decade, perhaps coinciding with other more fundamental and long-range developments in the society, have greatly weakened the legitimacy of institutional authority. The loss of authority and of confidence in that authority is nowhere more evident than in our colleges and universities. The constant attacks on the universities for their "irrelevance," their neglect of students, their "institutional racism," their implication in the war in Vietnam and in the "military-industrial complex" have deeply shaken the belief of many academic men in their own moral and intellectual authority. Many academic men no longer really believe they have a right to define a curriculum for their students or to set standards of performance, much less to prescribe the modes of thought and feeling appropriate to "an educated man." Indeed, the very notion that there are qualities of mind and sensibility to be gained from experience in a college or university is often treated with amusement or contempt, as merely a reactionary expression of middle-class prejudices.

This crisis of confidence is at the heart of the crisis of university governance. One common response in universities is to try to reestablish the legitimacy of institutional authority not on the older grounds of wisdom, technical competence, or certification, but on newer grounds of responsiveness to democratic political processes. And this coincides with demands from the student left for "more responsive machinery of government which will reflect the interests and sentiments of all the members of the university community," including, most particularly, the student body. And everywhere reforms and changes are under way to increase the role of students in university government—not merely in areas of traditional "student affairs," but directly within the faculty and departmental commit-

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tees that deal with such matters as the curriculum, faculty recruitment, and student admissions. But this has not been done only to gain the perspectives and advice of students on academic issues. That could be done by co-opting students who are especially highly qualified or interested in a given area, and who would be likely to make the most thoughtful and helpful contribution to discussions. Changes currently proposed or being made reflect a greater interest in strengthening the legitimacy of academic decisions than in improving their quality. And that has meant borrowing the legitimacy of student government—its legitimacy as a democratically elected body—by assigning to it the authority for selecting the student representatives on academic committees. This effort to borrow legitimacy by university authorities helps account for the exaggerated importance that they attach to all organized groups and for their relative indifference to the majority of unorganized students, black and white.

One consequence, of course, is to increase greatly the political component in academic decisions; for the student governments in our major universities are primarily political, not academic, bodies. Their leading officers are now often nominated by political groups and parties, representing more or less elaborately articulated positions on general academic-political issues, and they are elected after heated and well-organized campaigns. To be nominated and elected, these students must themselves be highly political men who give to student politics a large part of their time and energy. They are consequently not likely to be students who are most deeply involved in their studies—in nineteenth-century history or solid state physics, for example—and in this important respect they are less likely to share the values and perspectives of the academic men whose committees they join. Moreover, on those committees they see themselves as representing constituencies with attitudes and interests, and this, coupled with the continuing fear of every student politician of being outflanked on the left, makes their position highly resistant, if not impervious, to change through reasoned argument in the ordinary give-and-take of committee discussion. By contrast, faculty members on committees have been more likely to represent no one but themselves and therefore can change their minds or views without concern for a constituency or for charges of "selling out." This may change with the institutionalization of parties and caucuses among the faculty, and that would similarly increase the purely political component of academic decisions.

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In most discussions about student representation in university government two assumptions are made: first, that the student representatives do, in fact, reflect "student" views and perspectives; and, second, that while these may differ in certain respects from those of faculty and administrators (properly reflecting the special experience and age of students), they will arise out of fundamentally common values and conceptions of the university. Students are seen, in these discussions, as junior colleagues or apprentices in a common enterprise of teaching and learning. There is no doubt that many students do, in fact, have the character of junior colleagues, equally concerned from their own special perspectives with an environment in which teaching and learning can most fruitfully be carried on. And faculty members who have served on committees with able and serious students know just how valuable their perspectives can be on many issues, and how important they can be as a corrective to the administrative considerations and research orientations most strongly represented on those committees. But not all students are, in fact, junior colleagues: Some are indifferent timesavers, and still others are hostile antagonists. The nature of the political process surrounding student government in large universities these days makes it likely that student leaders will be far more political and almost certainly more radical than the average student. Moreover, they are likely to be more dogmatic and doctrinaire in rhetoric and action in their official positions than they might be in private. Nor can we safely assume that the leaders of student governments will share basic commitments to learning, scholarship, and academic freedom with the faculty members.[15]

Universities are fragile and vulnerable to disruption; in the face of bitter attacks, academic men and administrators lack confidence in their own authority and want to borrow that of elected student representatives. Both these facts help explain why academic men so rarely criticize student representatives and so commonly make them the objective of fulsome flattery. But by making student government the source of student representatives on faculty and administrative committees, universities may be shredding the very delicate procedures by which they govern themselves, procedures which depend on mutual trust, shared values, rational discussion, civility, and discretion. Insofar as important academic committees become arenas for ideological confrontation, short-run political maneuvers, and immediate exposure to publicity, they cannot function. Under those circumstances, serious scholars and students

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would refuse to serve on these committees,[16] and university government will be carried by political students, the minority of academic men who enjoy polemical politics, and the hapless administrators who have no choice.[17]

Where Next?

The growth of numbers, functions, and political pressures within universities takes many forms and has many consequences. I have touched on only a few of those which I believe are especially serious threats to the university's core functions of liberal education, scholarship, and basic research. I have not spoken of the crisis in undergraduate education arising out of the complete collapse of any generally shared conception of what students ought to learn; nor of the role of teaching assistants in the big state universities, who carry a great part of the undergraduate teaching, begin to see themselves as exploited employees, and organize in trade unions. Nor have I done more than touch on the changing character of our undergraduates, on the boredom of some and the apparently unquenchable anger of others, and on the meaning of their demands for "a relevant curriculum." Merely to point to these issues is to affirm that I do not judge the state of our universities by the conventional measures of success that I mentioned in my opening sentences. But I cannot close without at least acknowledging the most pressing question of all: Given the inexorable movement toward universal higher education in this country, what is likely to happen? How will American colleges and universities respond to the enormous strains and dislocations already visible within them?

I can see a number of possibilities, some of which have already begun to emerge:

Progressively more repressive sanctions by public and private authorities may be enacted against disruptions in the universities and colleges and against people and activities perceived as "radical" or "subversive." These sanctions, if carried very far, are likely to bring teachers and students into direct confrontation with the state or the governing bodies, and result in further disturbances and loss of autonomy, morale, and a measure of academic freedom.[18]

There may be an acceleration of the movement of academic men, especially research scholars in the natural and physical and social sciences, out of the universities and into various public and private research centers which are (or seem to be) better protected

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against attacks from left or right. Certainly there are models for the separation of teaching and research in the continental and Soviet systems of higher education. Although this shift would run sharply against strongly held conceptions of the academic career in the United States, it is likely to be present as one alternative for many academic men in the event of a deepening crisis in the university.

The system may develop an even sharper and more effectively insulated differentiation of character and function within and among institutions. Some universities may self-consciously commit themselves to the primacy of disinterested inquiry in research and teaching, and select students, staff, and service missions with that primary criterion in mind. Parts of other institutions—departments, schools, research centers—may attempt to do the same. It is problematic, and will surely be variable, how effectively universities or parts of universities will be able to insulate themselves against the powerful populist forces afoot in higher education.[19]

There may evolve alternative forms of undergraduate education, breaking radically with the bookish and academic traditions that still link even the more "innovative" efforts at "relevance" with the high literary and scientific cultures. Much of the demand for "relevance" on the part of undergraduates is a revolt against formal learning and a wish to be involved immediately and directly in the society and its problems and opportunities. It is no use telling such students they should not be in college, but in the world and at work; the meaning of universal higher education is that these students have little choice but to be in some college, and that our system of higher education "owns" the years from eighteen to perhaps twenty or twenty-two of most of our youth. What may, perhaps must, emerge are various forms of nonacademic learning and service, organized by colleges and universities, allowing youngsters to define themselves as college students, earning credits for "degrees" and certificates, but off the campuses and free from classrooms, library, and laboratory disciplines. I believe we must reduce the involuntariness of college attendance for many who do not want to study if the college and universities are to survive in recognizable form for those who do. The creation of nonacademic forms of "higher education" off campus may be the most important innovation on the agenda for our colleges and universities.[20]

Finally, a word on the great state university. It is a matter of continual amazement that an institution so deeply involved in pub-

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lic service in so many ways has been able to preserve its autonomy and its critical and scholarly and research functions. The question is whether its new commitments to public service, on campus and off, will seriously endanger that autonomy and the disinterested and critical intellectual life that it allows. One answer, very tentatively is: that depends on *how* it performs these new services. The issue is very much in doubt. But if the autonomous functions of the great state universities are threatened and then crippled by the political pressures arising out of their commitments to service, then those functions, at their highest levels of performance, will be confined to the private universities or forced outside the university altogether. And if that happens, something very precious—the presence within institutions of popular democracy of the highest standards of intellectual life—will have been lost in America.

References

1. *A Fact Book on Higher Education* (American Council on Education: Washington, D. C., 1969), p. 9048.
2. And in Europe the preparation of teachers for the selective secondary schools where the children of those elites are educated and prepared for their own accession to elite status.
3. This is now as much a scientific as a literary culture.
4. For discussion of the forces associated with the growth of mass higher education in the United States, see Martin Trow, "The Democratization of Higher Education in America," *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1962).
5. This essay will focus on the problems of the great American "multiversities," public and private.
6. Nor can it be made about many white undergraduates today. On this, see below, on "compulsory" higher education.
7. *Report of the Faculty Committee on African and Afro-American Studies*, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University (January 1969). The program of black studies recommended by the Rosovsky Committee and accepted by the Harvard faculty has been greatly modified under pressure, and is no longer a model for Berkeley or the country.
8. *Campus Report* (University of California, Berkeley), Vol. 3, No. 10 (March 6, 1969). Italics his.
9. And, of course, the "attractiveness of alternatives" is also defined by social norms held by family and friends.

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10. The contracts and mutual understandings, of course, differed enormously for the great variety of students and the almost equally great variety of institutions.

11. Indeed, one function of political action on campus for many students is to introduce them to other students with similar values and attitudes, and to the pleasures of belonging to a community of like-minded people working together in a common task with common ideals and purposes. The euphoria in evidence in some demonstrations and sit-ins (for example, the occupation of Stanford's Applied Electronics Laboratory in the spring of 1969) is some indication of the deep intrinsic rewards for participants in political activism around issues whose moral content seems to be absolutely clear and simple. It is important that this kind of communal life and action does not seem to be possible within the framework of the university itself; it is difficult and dangerous *outside* the university (for example, in communes or community action programs); it is relatively easy and highly rewarding *inside* but *against* the university.

12. Of course, for undergraduates and graduate students alike who are locked into school by the draft, the term "involuntary" is not at all metaphorical.

13. For a fuller discussion of the triumph of *laissez-faire* over general education in American universities, see Martin Trow, "Bell, Book and Berkeley," *The American Behavioral Scientist* (May-June, 1968).

14. *The Culture of the University: Governance and Education,* Report of the Study Commission on University Governance (University of California: Berkeley, January 15, 1968). See also my "Conceptions of the University," *American Behavioral Scientist* (May-June, 1969).

15. An example of academic discussion (cant is perhaps too strong a word) on this issue is the following from the pen of the Chancellor of the Minnesota State College System: "Let us admit that, despite differences in age, experience, maturity, and background, our students should be viewed as colleagues-in-learning who must be actively and meaningfully involved in shaping all of the institutions of the campus—its curriculum, faculty, social life, administration, learning resources—its total image." G. Theodore Mitau, "Needed: Peacemakers and Social Engineers," *AAUP Bulletin* (Summer, 1969), p. 157.

    This statement shares with many others on this theme these characteristics: a) it imputes to all students the qualities of "a colleague in learning" possessed by only some; b) it recommends a larger role for students in college and university government without either specifying the forms, mechanisms, or possible limits of their participation, or anticipating the probable consequences for the institution; c) it encourages students to make unlimited demands on the faculty which, if (when) not met in full, will surely increase student feelings of frustration and anger.

16. There is already a noticeable withdrawal of participation by academic men from those areas of the university government which are most exposed to student attack. The withdrawal thus far is largely due to changes in the style of "debate," and to a distaste for threats and personal abuse

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in the gutter language sometimes employed by radical students to whom ordinary civility and rational discourse are contemptible middle-class evasions.

17. I am speaking here chiefly of undergraduates and campus-wide government. In the graduate departments and professional schools, a strong case can be made for participation of graduate students in at least some departmental decisions. But what kind of participation, in what kinds of decisions, will properly vary from department to department (depending on its size, the character of its students, and other factors), and should not be governed by any institution-wide formula or policy.

18. Continued campus disturbances may have even more serious consequences for the political climate of the larger society.

19. I suspect that, in the foreseeable future, institution-wide policies and standards in most multiversities will work more to dilute than to defend scholarship and academic freedom. Under great pressures, university administrators will be tempted to take popular positions on academic issues. For example, one of the few issues on which the New Left and the far right agree is that an overemphasis on research embodied in the doctrine of "publish or perish" is the prime enemy of good teaching in our big universities. University presidents can come out squarely on the side of virtue by instructing academic committees to give greater weight to "teaching effectiveness" in the appointment and promotion of faculty. Some will go a step further and instruct these committees that this is the appropriate place for student evaluations to enter the appointment and promotion procedures.

    "Effective teaching" is notoriously hard to assess or even to define. In the present political climate, to stress it further in the assessment of faculty is to put even more pressure on teachers to seek the approval of their students, with subtle but serious implications for academic freedom and the fate of certain controversial subjects. A serious move toward the improvement of undergraduate teaching in the big public universities might start with an improvement in the ratio of teachers to students, which in turn would allow the institution to reduce the very large role of graduate teaching assistants in the undergraduate courses. But that would be expensive, and not nearly so popular.

20. We should also be able to increase the amount and legitimacy *within* the university of "expressive" activities—painting, music, the dance, the performing arts generally—for students prepared to submit themselves to these demanding, though less bookish, disciplines.

    For another approach, the Swedes are just beginning to discuss the idea of an "education bank," under which all citizens would have a commitment from the state for one or two years of further (higher) education which they can take at any time during their lives if they choose to leave school during or on completion of their secondary schooling. The Swedes will very shortly also be bringing nearly all their youth to the point of university entrance; they anticipate mass but not universal higher education. An "education bank" would increase the voluntariness of university entrance and deserves consideration in the American context.

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JILL CONWAY

Styles of Academic Culture

A STUDY of the aims and purposes of the university cannot be separated from an inquiry into its social functions. The question of governance is secondary. It flows from the function of the university; it does not define it. I shall discuss first the general functions of the educational community within American society and then consider those which are specifically discharged by the university in undergraduate and graduate education. This discussion will be developed in historical terms because I do not think that we have adequate theoretical models for analyzing the relationship between the university and society. It is certainly not helpful to analyze the social evolution of the university through analogies to biological organisms or economic structures. Potential for growth or for productivity does not necessarily indicate that an academic institution is serving intellectual ends, nor indeed does it show that human needs are being met within the university community or within the larger society in which the university is lodged. Much of the discussion of contemporary university problems proceeds on the assumption that we do possess satisfactory models of societal change upon which we can base our theories concerning desirable directions for institutional development. Yet the length and repetitiveness of the contemporary debate on the university illustrates that we are incapable of utopian thinking on this subject and that we cannot move beyond pragmatism in trying to imagine forms and goals of the university of the future. In such a situation, we had better have recourse to Clio or to poetry and metaphor because the tools of the social sciences may only dull our perceptions.

Historically, educational institutions have performed functions in American society which have not always been perceived and which are only related to intellectual goals by a combination of

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peculiarly American factors. One thinks of Benjamin Franklin's account of the importance of self-education as a way to wealth and of Thomas Jefferson's belief in popular education as the rock on which to build a stable republic. Although the Founding Fathers clearly understood the economic and political significance of education for American society, not until the nineteenth century was the educational community invested with the function of controlling class conflict and stimulating nationalism in an immigrant population. Horace Mann was the first educational theorist to state clearly that the common schools were as important as agents of social stability as they were for political equilibrium. For him, the advent of industrialization in Massachusetts was not an indication that the social conflicts of European industrial society might also trouble the republic. Instead he wrote in 1848 that "education . . . beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equaliser of the conditions of men—the balance-wheel of the social machinery."[1] By making Franklin's way to wealth available to all in the common schools, Mann believed, the economic and social inequities of Europe would not be duplicated in America. Thus the key to the preservation of social democracy was the development of universal education. The school could also be harnessed to a national goal by teaching its pupils to value the great political heritage of the United States. No matter how diverse the social and ethnic background of students in the common schools, they would all learn "those articles in the creed of republicanism, which are accepted by all, believed in by all, and which form the common basis of our political faith. . . ."[2] The school, therefore, was to be the one institution in America that held the social machinery in balance, preventing grinding class or ethnic conflict and preserving republican beliefs in the face of all competing ideologies.

Mann's expectation that the school could carry out this function while teaching the conventional Victorian literary curriculum rested upon an unexamined assumption that literary culture was the key to economic success. A generation later, John Dewey—recognizing that the system of public education had not functioned as a social equalizer, as Horace Mann had so confidently predicted—was forced to clarify the connection between democracy and education. Dewey's diagnosis of the problem seems curiously inverted to European minds. He felt that the school had not functioned as an agent of democracy in America because it had taught the literary and aesthetic values of a European aristocracy. A redesigning of

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the curriculum was needed to forge a truly democratic educational system purged of aristocratic values and sterile aestheticism. European aristocratic culture had been one of leisure whereas American democratic culture would be one of work. The organizing principle that would define the new function for the school in society would be the development of students' minds in relation to the predominant system of production. In equating consciousness with the system of production, Dewey was adopting a Marxist view of culture and asserting that class conflict could be avoided in American industrial society if the school were used so that all its pupils saw themselves in the same relationship to the means of production.[3]

In this way, the connection between the school and social equality was maintained, but at a cultural loss that has rarely been considered. Because of the mythic dimensions of the school as custodian of the democratic future, the educational community is automatically perceived in America as the community that can resolve all social problems. In fact, the instinctive American response to the perception of a social problem is to devise another educational program to deal with it. Such a response harmonizes the democratic urge with the future-orientation of capitalism. Today, however, this response stands revealed as politically naïve because the mediation of conflict is essentially a political task and cannot always be reconciled with intellectual goals. Indeed, due to the development of serious social and ideological conflict within American society, the institution that normally mediates conflict is subject to extreme stress, but lacks the flexibility for decision-making characteristic of most political organizations. Although it is a truism to say today that the university is being politicized, the historical forces that have led to this development are not often understood.

Another function that educational institutions perform in American society is the recruitment and certification of an elite. American social thought has never come to terms with the problem of elites because the myth of a universally accessible educational community has made it possible to dodge the question. Yet American educational institutions have reached a *de facto* solution to the problem of elites through recruitment by the most vigorous competition. It is the recognition of this function by students today which tempts them to reject the whole idea of competition within the academic community. Similarly, as the ruling profes-

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sional group within American society becomes suspect, the institutions which have recruited and certified that professional elite also become suspect. The route to power, once thought to be subject to a democratic process, is seen to lie through cleverness and intellect—qualities which, as Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, are deeply distrusted in American popular culture.[4]

The political function of mediating conflict and the social function of recruiting and legitimating an elite must be distinguished from the third function of the educational community in America. This is the intellectual function of creating and disseminating knowledge, the task which we usually associate with universities. There are historical reasons why the intellectual function of the educational community is a complicated and ambiguous one in American culture. The university as a Western European institution grew out of an established church which could claim to define and disseminate the truth. Yet in colonial America because there was no clear religious establishment, there was real uncertainty about which religious groups should be authorized by society to transmit their orthodoxies. This ambiguity was resolved by permissiveness so that any religious group which could support a college came to receive a charter from the state. Thus the traditional pluralism of American intellectual life developed from the acceptance of the idea that there was no single body of religious truth which must be conveyed. Once these denominational institutions became secularized, their intellectual functions became even more equivocal within the broader context of American culture.

Two historical forces combined to produce secularization of learning in the late-nineteenth century. These were the foundation of state universities, creations of the secular state, and the adoption of the ideal of pure science from the contemporary German university. By becoming secular institutions, however, American universities became exposed not only to scientific values, but to the commercial values of the dominant business community in the gilded age. The social group which possessed authority and wielded it unquestioningly in post-Civil War America was the business community, and hence lay governance of universities became government by businessmen. This fact is perfectly exemplified in the history of the foundation of the first secular institution dedicated to pure research, Johns Hopkins University. Of the twelve lay trustees of Johns Hopkins, seven were businessmen, none were professional educators, and five were not college grad-

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uates.[5] They recognized that their task was to discover a new idea of the meaning and purpose of the university, and that this discovery could come about only through finding and supporting some great educational statesman as president of the new university. But neither the search nor the subsequent support was thought of as merely enabling the new university to develop. The trustees were determined to "place the Concern in the top rank, if money, experience and hard work on their part will do it."[6] The entrepreneurial attitude could not be more vividly demonstrated, nor could the confidence of businessmen that they had contributions to make to academic life of more than a purely financial nature.

The attitudes of the Johns Hopkins trustees are symbolic of the extent to which lay governance had distinctive and unique consequences for the American university. Because of the entrepreneurial attitude to learning, the great industrial fortunes of the nineteenth century were turned over to the endowment of education. This endowment, however, was not a passive one; it was accompanied by the assumption that industrial capitalism had much to contribute to the way in which knowledge was produced and disseminated in America. A natural consequence of this easy liaison between the university and the business community was that the intellectual function of the university came to be progressively defined as the creation and diffusion of knowledge valued in relation to its technological utility. Renaissance humanism and classical culture played no part in an industrial scheme of values, and they came to occupy a smaller and smaller part of the curriculum in all but the most patrician centers of learning on the East Coast.

As a result, American culture became technological more or less by default. The classical and humanistic traditions were not so much attacked as assumed to be irrelevant. This departure from Western European traditions of learning allowed American universities to lead the world in coming to terms with the machine, but at the cost of becoming efficient machine-like systems for producing a standard product. The expressive, intuitive, emotional aspects of human experience scrutinized in Greek drama and reflected upon by the great humanists did not find an important place in the American college curriculum—in part because, as Marx pointed out, self-expression has no necessary place in an industrial system; and in part because by the logic of American

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cultural development the expressive, intuitive, and emotional sides of the human personality were seen as "soft" aspects of feminine irrationality rather than as masculine intellectual qualities. The definition of separate masculine and feminine spheres of cultural activity has historically been part of the patterning of American society and serves to explain why there was so little resistance to the definition of knowledge as abstract and scientific in the nineteenth century. Part of the rebellion of youth today consists of affirming that intellectual excellence can be demonstrated by intuitive and expressive achievement in a way that has equal validity with the rational problem-solving of the older curriculum. William James adopted the terminology of the frontier to characterize the tough- and the tender-minded. In doing so, he unwittingly demonstrated the extent to which the stereotypes of a frontier society dictated styles of intellectual life. The tough-minded have made the social sciences in America "hard data" sciences that occupy the cultural middle ground between humanistic knowledge and knowledge that is of technological value. The dominant intellectual style dictates that the social scientist may think about man as a social being, but only with a degree of mathematical precision which approximates that of the machine.

Thus special social and cultural factors have given a characteristic American twist to the intellectual function of the American university even though that function was borrowed from Western European culture. All the functions of the university—social, political, and intellectual—can be understood only in the larger context of American society and culture. Today the young radicals recognize what the political and intellectual functions of the American university are. They insist that the political function be made overt, and that the intellectual function be radically changed to develop a more expressive culture. The social function of the university is more in question in society at large than it is among students, faculty, or university administrators. It is difficult, however, to see the ways in which student expectations concerning the university as a political institution can be met since the university can only continue to mediate conflict in society through a process of infinite expansion. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a future orientation should always prevail in resolving social conflict. Time, money, and energy should be directed toward the solution of social problems *now*, rather than continuing the Horace Mann-John Dewey approach to educational reform for

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the next generation. It is also possible to argue that some limitation of university growth might lead to a beneficial redirection of resources and energy on political action. A genuine ideological flowering in the United States might be a welcome departure from the pragmatic tradition in politics. In this way, the breakdown of political consensus is probably essential for the preservation of universities that can perform their essential intellectual services.

The present crisis in universities should not be regarded as the result of a breakdown of authority which brings in its train the politicization of a community which was formerly a-political. It should be viewed instead as a crisis in which the university is no longer able to carry on the political task which it has hitherto managed with some success. If the problem of politics and the university could be considered in this manner, we might be able to move toward some original thought on the problem of elites in American society. Although American thought preserves the fiction that the educational system operates in the direction of abolishing elites, they do exist and the universities create them. What troubles American society today is the irresponsibility of the professional elite which it has created and which claims the classical liberal freedoms to dispose of its skills to the maximum of personal profit. It is one of the ironies of American history that the development of the graduate school and the ideal of pure research meant that scholars could escape to some extent from the dominant commercial culture, but could also avoid social responsibility generally. Certainly some recognition that a university-trained elite exists must be a precondition for defining the responsibilities of its members. Some of these responsibilities are obvious today. Faculty members must refuse to engage in research which might pollute or destroy the human environment. They must also recognize the responsibility to teach and to use their skills with reference to values other than their commercial worth in the market. The assumption of this kind of responsibility seems the only path which exists today toward acceptance and support of the university by the rest of society. A wider social responsibility might, in fact, strengthen the intellectual caliber of the university because it might end the isolation from the rest of society which has been the normal lot of American intellectuals since the rise of the graduate school.

This laboratory-like isolation of academic culture lies at the

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heart of the discontent concerning the way in which the university discharges its intellectual tasks. The curriculum is irrelevant to the young because it does not automatically provide the means for coming to grips with the immediate, pressing problems of human experience. A student who works away at the history of industrialization and intellectual responses to it for two or three years will eventually be able to develop some intellectual stance toward the media and mass culture. But if the quality of mass culture is a deeply felt personal experience every day of his life, he will need some outlet for that emotion before the three years are up. A student who feels daily that industrial technology has endangered the balance of the human environment will reject being made a unit in a rationally designed learning process no matter how efficiently it is administered—not because it is intellectually unsatisfactory, but because it is deeply disturbing emotionally.

This attempt to eliminate emotion from intellectual effort creates the deepest gap between the generations. The young seek to bring the rational and irrational aspects of human experience into significant relationship. Their style of intellectual life is religious. Their elders cling to the identity of the objective scientist and wonder at the storms of emotion raging through the laboratory. One route toward a satisfactory new curriculum would be to redesign it so that man would be at the center once again. Man can be viewed scientifically and religiously at one and the same time since he is both an evolving part of nature and an irrational being for whom reason alone cannot explain experience. Certainly in the humanities and social sciences, we must abandon the rigid programming of knowledge. No discipline in the social sciences today possesses sufficient methodological unity that students need to pass through a three- or four-year program to master some coherent world-view at the end. Any synthesis which our curriculum in the humanities and social sciences conveys should be one built up by the individual student.

In this respect, as in so many areas of thought today, we can benefit from examining the medieval world. We could achieve freedom for the student to synthesize by returning to a medieval notion of study. A faculty member should teach what he is master of to any group of students who are admitted to the university and who want to work with him. A single final examination on a pass/fail basis should elicit the student's synthesis when he feels

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that he is ready to be examined. Much of the boredom of undergraduate life would disappear if we really required students to be self-motivating and obliged them to develop their own intellectual positions rather than training their critical talents. Since the lines of our conventional academic disciplines are blurring, we have less and less justification for requiring students to observe them. Since in the present state of the social sciences and humanities we have no *summa* to offer students, we must encourage them to arrive at one on their own. These remarks refer, of course, to the undergraduate curriculum and the teaching of the humanities and the social sciences. I cannot speak to the problem of the curriculum in science and the proper manner of teaching it. I would only insist that science find its place in the undergraduate curriculum as it relates to man in his human predicament. It must not be taught in an entirely pre-professional manner, as it is in most undergraduate programs today. This intrusion of professional discipline into the undergraduate curriculum requires students to develop one set of intellectual talents at the expense of others which might personally be equally valuable. Professional commitment should remain an adult choice rather than something externally imposed.

Some such rearrangement of the undergraduate curriculum and the examination process should dispose of many of the problems of university governance in undergraduate studies. Student needs would become self-defining. In the realm of undergraduate teaching, salaries could be made commensurate with the capacity and interest of faculty in teaching students. This capacity might or might not have much to do with their eminence as scholars. Departments would be less important if their control of the curriculum were removed and their examining functions much restricted. So far as the curriculum is concerned, students could seek out their own relevance. This would be creative chaos as opposed to the deadening routine which makes the predominant state of mind for the undergraduate one of boredom. Much of our present stress in rigorous training in abstract thought might disappear from the undergraduate curriculum, but students might find themselves engaged in a learning process involving moral and emotional growth as well as training in critical thought.

Such an undergraduate program would, of course, need to be carefully separated from graduate training, and criteria other than undergraduate records would have to be developed for entry

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into graduate school. The whole transition between college and graduate school needs to be much more carefully scrutinized than it is at present. At the moment, the graduate school is simply being given, by extension, all the social, political, and intellectual functions attributed to the educational community by theorists like Jefferson and Horace Mann. In addition, because the graduate school is the last stage of formal education, it is the place at which another uniquely American expectation concerning education comes most strikingly into play. This is the expectation that one's education will be the automatic path to some meaningful social role.

No other society has produced quite the literature of complaint about education that America has. Henry Adams is only the most striking example of the American belief that the mere process of acquiring intellectual skills should place one in a situation where significant social action and power are immediately to hand. This expectation cannot be fulfilled unless there is some underlying harmony between the goals of education and the vocational structure of society at large. During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, professional training was a direct path to a desired social role for men. There was a smooth passage between earning a graduate degree and a place as an entrepreneur of knowledge or skill in the existing hierarchy of professions or in the upper echelons of business management. The situation of women with access to higher education, however, was very different during this period. Indeed, the expectation that higher education would lead women to meaningful social action, when frustrated, led women to become radical critics of American society and culture.[7] Somewhat the same thing is happening today among a significant proportion of men and women in graduate school, because the economy has moved to a stage at which the service industries are of major importance. The role which seems both meaningful and useful to the young has, therefore, become that of service. Consequently many graduate students seek to alter the institution of the graduate school so that there will once again be some underlying harmony between the kinds of training they receive and the kinds of vocational roles which they value. It is questionable, however, whether the graduate school—the institution where knowledge must be generated—is the appropriate place in the educational community for this ideal of social service to be expressed. The concept of service advanced by the young is purely pragmatic and relates only to forms of service that can be per-

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ceived at the moment. While an ideal of social service is consistent with the generation of knowledge, it need not necessarily further that process. We might find that representatives of the service sector of the economy would perform no better as lay directors of universities than the businessmen who first took on the tasks of lay governance. They might be just as likely to influence the university toward intellectual efforts that were focused completely on the present. Certainly the process of generating knowledge cannot be directed solely with reference to the needs of any particular social or economic group without serious loss of intellectual vitality.

The solution to this problem could be found for the present by devising some form of institutionalized service between college and graduate school. The channeling of candidates from undergraduate to graduate school is now an arbitrary process since choice of intellectual vocation can have little reference to life as lived outside an academic institution. There should probably be a two- to three-year period between college and admission to graduate school in which potential graduate students can have actual experience of some form of social service. Those whose temperamental bent was purely intellectual would not suffer from such service. Those who went on to professional schools like law or medicine would quickly bring their service experience to bear on legal and medical problems. Indeed, some of the more harmful trends in recruitment into the medical and legal professions might be reversed by such an expedient. Better still, those talented enough to make real contributions in their field without graduate education would have the opportunity to become effective in society without spending four or five years within a learning process of little benefit to them. By this device, we might counteract the obsession of American society with technical expertise and postgraduate education.

Since the financing of graduate education must become more and more a federal matter, the implementation of such a plan calls for a simple piece of legislation requiring all candidates for financial aid to demonstrate some such period of social service. Graduate schools might then impose the same qualification on applicants who did not receive government grants. This enforced involvement with the outside world is easily defensible. It is no more than a peaceful equivalent of military service, long thought acceptable in Western democracies. At the same time, it would

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insure that vocations to intellectual life were tested in terms of some experience outside the university. At present, students enter graduate school as clerics entered the unreformed religious orders—not because of true vocations, but because they are comfortable places, considering the options in the external world. The monastic orders ceased to be important cultural forces in Western Europe when clerics were chosen that way. This may be the fate of the graduate schools unless we can define what constitutes a real intellectual vocation.

When the trustees of Johns Hopkins began their search for a new idea of the university and for an American Newman to give it form, they were forced to ask what constituted an intellectual vocation. They understood it to be a "search for truth aside from any consideration of practicality or usefulness."[8] The definition sounds naïve a hundred years later because we have lost the happy Victorian confidence that what is defined as knowledge can be pursued aside from some liberal consensus about what is practical and useful. Now that the liberal consensus has gone, who has the right to say what truths shall be pursued in graduate schools? The answer must be that in order to escape a state-imposed syllabus of errors, faculty and students must come to some agreement about curriculum in a manner that gives equal weight to the intellectual concerns of both. The counter-course must be taken into the curriculum no matter how noisy the process may be. To make the definition of truth in our confused times a generational prerogative is to invite the kind of academic turmoil in which we all live. It is also to insist that the scientific and religious styles of intellectual life must inevitably be opposing ones. Yet if the contemporary disillusionment with the promise of science is not to degenerate into an exaltation of the irrational, the two intellectual styles must be harmonized.

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1. See Lawrence A. Cremin (ed.), *The Republic and the School: Horace Mann on the Education of Free Men* (Teachers College, Columbia University: New York, 1957), p. 87.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 97. Both quotations are from Mann's *Twelfth Annual Report* (1848) to the Massachusetts Board of Education.

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3. See John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (Macmillan: New York, 1916). See especially the essay entitled "The Nature of Subject Matter."

4. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (Knopf: New York, 1963).

5. See Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer: A History of Johns Hopkins University* (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1960), pp. 4-7.

6. See James Cary Coale to William Gilman, Nov. 20, 1874, cited in Hawkins, *Pioneer*, p. 7.

7. See, for example, the writing of Jane Addams on women's education and its effect on her generation. Her ideas are most readily available in Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull-House* (Macmillan: New York, 1909).

8. Hawkins, *Pioneer*, p. 292.

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EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG

The University Community in an Open Society

At this stage in our history, the rapidly growing heterogeneity of the university both in function and clientele would certainly have led to trouble and confusion even if there were no inherent conflict among its functions. But there are fundamental conflicts that, though they stem from the heterogeneity of the university community, reflect far more than the ugliness of the kind of academic urban sprawl that has developed. As the size and jumble of the university community have increased, the university's functions have acquired conflicting meanings and value to its various constituencies. The question of governance, I believe, resolves itself into that of whether a morally defensible ordering among those functions can be achieved and made viable under the actual conditions of our society. If it cannot—and this is quite possible—then the passage of the university system should not be greatly mourned, nor unduly delayed by a series of organ-transplants and excisions designed to relieve immediate crises at further cost to the university's integrity.

The central function of higher education in America has always been vocational. Harvard was founded to train clergymen; and as the society has become more a mass, open society, its dependence on the university system for vocational training and placement has, of course, become far greater and more complex. It is well understood that the university serves society by selecting and training a wide range and enormous number of technicians who, granting its present mode of organization, are essential. The university is the instrument of the continuous talent search by which an industrial democracy assures itself that it is not systematically ignoring lower-status social groups as a potential talent-

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source, thereby denying them access to opportunity and itself the value of their contribution.

In a mass, industrial democracy, no function could be more legitimate. Nor could any function be more heavily burdened by ideology. The furious controversy that has recently been aroused by Arthur Jensen's conclusion that there are significant innate differences of cognitive style between blacks and whites that, in this culture, operate to the disadvantage of blacks and especially hamper them in school is, for example, totally ideological.[1] *Any* difference between individuals or between social groups may be either an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances. Stupidity is often a virtue which must be feigned by those unfortunate enough to lack it; while if the Esquimaux had feet a yard long and a foot wide, they wouldn't need snowshoes. Jensen's findings, if valid, certainly establish that blacks are less well adapted than whites to respond successfully to the demands of the dominant institutions of industrial democracy, especially its schools. They leave entirely open the question of whether this is a sign of inferiority, superiority, or neither. But they are nevertheless threatening because the conflict to which they point may be impossible to resolve for a society ideologically committed both to equality of opportunity and to popular sovereignty. Even if Jensen is right, there are two ways in which this resolution could be achieved, but both appear to be politically impossible for a mass democracy. One is to provide equal respect and rewards to people with the kinds of cognitive styles blacks—or poets, or hippies, or mystics, or police, or sexual deviants—possess. There are such people; and they are indeed different from one another and from the norm. This requires, in short, genuine pluralism: a great many small events, some competitive, in which different kinds of excellence could be demonstrated and rewarded.

The second way is for society to respond openly and generously to need, without requiring that the needy—which at different times and in different ways includes all of us—prove anything or win any race at all. Except, perhaps, in its Malthusian aspects, this is now technologically possible through the instrumentality of an enormously high technical level of productivity distributed through a high guaranteed annual income or a universal credit card—instead of a university degree. But our society lacks the political means to make any such commitment. The anxiety and *ressentiment* such proposals arouse among the bitter coalition of the self-

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made, the self-condemned, and the vast number of poor whose sole satisfaction seems to come from the prospect of others more impoverished still; of industrial leaders fearful that too few people would work unless compelled to by threat of humiliation and want, and union officials who fear that a general rise in the standard of living unrelated to membership in the labor force would deprive them of a *raison d'être* make it impossible. Taken together for these and other reasons, the majority of the American people seem incapable of regarding misery as anything but failure; and loathe the most miserable of their number. The major premise of our ideology of opportunity is that each should have an equal chance to succeed; but the minor premise is that only those who do succeed may be rewarded, and that refusal to compete should be punished or subjected to therapy as "dropping out."

The educational system has played a complex and delicate role in mediating among these competitive hostilities and ideological problems. It has, in effect, become a steeplechase in which comparatively few people fail utterly; but the hazards are so cunningly designed that many more fall somewhat behind and are cooled out. The more successful students have been precisely those whose cognitive skills and ideological positions have been most suited to the demands of middle and upper managerial positions in existing institutions; so that the school has served to reify these qualities as characteristics of the worthiest members of society. But, in so doing, it has also established the educational system as the supervisor of legitimate people-racing in our society. It provides the anthrodrome; its staff are the judges and referees; it determines which events shall be accepted as part of the decathlon, which styles of competition are legitimate and which are cheating and hence grounds for disqualification and exclusion from subsequent competition.

All this is familiar enough; but its converse side is less frequently stressed and is more useful in understanding contemporary academic stress. Victories won in and certified by the educational system may be honored by the society with increments of status without arousing much resentment among the underclass, so long as the educational system is thought to operate on universalistic principles. If, in fact, you are admitted to fair competition, you are expected, in our society, to be a good loser. But the educational system, consequently, must become as nearly as possible the sole route to success and recognition; no contender is

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to be seeded out of the earlier events. It is this, I believe, which accounts for the absurd profusion of curricula in American schools and colleges, and the universal insistence on diplomas of various kinds as qualifications for posts and professions not even remotely related to the skills those diplomas reputedly certify. They are not intended to mean anything in themselves, but they have two useful social functions. They do attest that the bearer has been thoroughly socialized in the educational system and knows the score and the name of the game, which insures that life in bourgeois America will not end like a performance of *Turandot:* The name is not "love," though the score may be. And they get society off the hook by ratifying its universalist pretensions: Nobody got anything free, there has been no favoritism or nepotism, the plastic little girl who won the national championship at baton-twirling is really the best. Her mother made her practice four hours a day, and the school taught her how to relate to strangers.

When a social group—ethnic or otherwise—whose characteristics have kept it at a competitive disadvantage becomes strong enough politically to demand a better life in America, it cannot simply demand a bigger reward as an elementary human right. Having previously accepted universalism in principle, it must complain not of *inhuman* treatment, but of *unjust* treatment—that is, of discrimination. The response of the liberal segment of society is not to redress its grievances directly, which would be politically disastrous, but to scurry around trying to think up ways of being sure it wins more events without actually cheating or showing favoritism. My own formal doctoral training happens to have been in that aspect of education called "evaluation"—that is, the design and construction of tests. For the past six or seven years, since whites have become more aware of the American racial crisis, I have, like most others trained in this area, often been called upon to participate in conferences at which funding agencies sought technical help in searching out the academic proficiency which they insisted must lie undiscovered among blacks so that this might be recognized and rewarded. They had already, of course, attempted to provide support for those whose superior promise could be identified by existing academic records or testing techniques.

Urgent as the need for a massive increase in support for black and other "disadvantaged" students was and is, it seems grotesque for these agencies to conceive their problem as a matter of test-

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bias. Indeed, the urgency of the problem makes this preoccupation with tests and contests grotesque. What is needed to respond more adequately to the needs of "disadvantaged" groups is not a more thorough and ingenious canvass among them for the qualities society rewards, but a broader and more adventurous—and more gracious—conception of what constitutes a socially valuable attribute. It is certainly desirable that a much larger proportion of blacks receive National Merit Scholarships than have done so in the past. It is even more fundamentally desirable that awards committees broaden their definition of what constitutes National Merit, to permit them to recognize a variety of individuals, and sometimes without demanding victory in any competition. But this might yet be fruitless if the only consequence of such recognition is to channel the recipient into the educational system, albeit under much more favorable circumstances than he would otherwise have had. A student admitted to the university by such pluralistic devices might still find himself cooled out rather quickly because the university itself was unable to recognize diversity of cognitive style and continued to define any effort to do so as "lowering standards."

Yet there remain only three possibilities, no matter what may be demanded. Unless the university *does* learn to respect a less rationalistic definition of cognition as an acceptable means toward academic achievement, or the society learns to respect personal, idiosyncratic ways of growing up and learning outside degree-granting institutions—those who, whether for ethnogenetic or purely personal reasons, are less adept at competitive striving and linear rationality will lose out in this society, as they have been doing so far. Because the second of these alternatives seems even less likely than the first, the present intense demand for black studies programs, controlled by black personnel, has arisen. The opposition to these as academically unsound reflects, I believe, the recognition of the more conservative faculty that they are indeed intended to provide protected enclaves in which black students with poorer conventional academic skills can survive. In view of the history of the university system, this recognition cannot be accepted as an adequate reason for resisting these programs. Virginity cannot be defended unsuccessfully more than once; and if defended successfully for too long, future development is arrested. The university system has, quite properly, recognized social demand in accepting faculties of engineering, of

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educational studies, and other studies that quite clearly lack the cultural breadth of the humanities. This is the device by which we achieve an increasingly open society. Those trained in these disciplines, too, have a different cognitive style—both because of differences in training and differences in background that are associated with these vocational choices. In any case, the "new men" are different. New black men are no more likely to do violence to the academic tradition than white and may be a little more human.

Once one accepts in principle, then, that the university system is to be maintained as virtually the sole channel of mobility, the university must respond to demands for variation in the definition of achievement needed to recognize the way in which different social groups develop different styles and different merits; and if, in fact, they develop none, illusory merits will doubtless have to be ascribed to them. Society must recognize the claims to dignity and opportunity of all its constituent groups. If the university is to continue to stand astride the only legitimate highway to advancement, it must quit demanding tolls in coins that only some travelers can acquire and calling this "maintaining standards." But the acceptance of more diverse modes of response nevertheless leads to conflict precisely with those groups which have forced themselves most recently and with greatest discontinuity to their earlier experience to make it on the more conventional terms already prevalent in the university system. No datum has more consistently recurred in current conflict within the university than the observation that the students who are least responsive to and most intolerant of the growing demands are whites whose parents never attended college; while those most sympathetic to and often so over-identified with the blacks as to court repudiation by them are higher-status white students who take college for granted, but are unable to tolerate its moral failures. To accede to the demands of blacks is not only to violate prejudices that many first-generation working-class students hold; it is also to change the rules of the game they have learned so laboriously and to discredit as irrelevant and morally fatuous or worse the instrument they have sought, at great sacrifice, for their deliverance. Those who have just been seated at the Round Table after a long and arduous journey are likely to get rather upset when informed that Camelot is no more authentic than Disneyland, and that Excalibur, according to the small print, was made in Hong Kong.

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This, I believe, is the major source of friction between the "jocks" and commuters, who still try to take the university system seriously on its own terms, and the higher-status white activists and blacks who denounce it. The Vietnam war has, of course, infinitely exacerbated this conflict, both because it has discredited the university system morally and, more directly, because the immediate vocational opportunities to which university education leads are so likely to be war-connected. These opportunities are, moreover, *more* likely to be war-connected for lower-status students than for higher; because these, differentially, tend to locate themselves in the technological rather than the humanistic curricula. Concretely, to bar recruiters from war-industry and ROTC programs from campus is to destroy insolently, before their eyes and without their consent, the staircase that conservative students had come to college to climb. On the basis of this social model, I cannot but be convinced that black students, once they find themselves more at ease in what was never Zion, will join the jocks and repudiate their activist supporters, whose style they already seem to find grandiose and rather hysterical. Besieged college and university presidents on recent media presentations have seemed correspondingly less hostile to the blacks whose attacks on the university system, though often more aggressive than those of white activists, are also far more superficial. These men are trying, I believe, to convince black student leaders that the university system is still relevant to them, however strongly their more privileged white dissident colleagues may condemn it.

For these reasons, then, current academic conflict is complexly rooted in the university's function in the transmission of vocational opportunity to members of a society in which personal advancement, or making it, is the major basis for self-esteem. The university, moreover, serves as differential as well as transmitter; it keeps society from being overturned by permitting individuals to move at very different rates and still think they're wheels—which they are at least in the sense that it is they who bear the vehicle's burden. But conflict about the function of the university in contributing to economic and social opportunity, central as it is, is still, I believe, less fundamental a social problem than those which have now arisen *between* its vocational function and other functions less ideologically acceptable in our society and hence less frequently explicitly discussed.

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A major function of the university has been to serve as a community in which many of its members have found intense and protracted satisfaction and have married or formed permanent friendships or taken lovers. This is why college and university life has become a pastoral legend in American folklore, and why alumni continue to attend class reunions in a nostalgic and futile effort to recapture briefly their student experience. Both the nostalgia and the futility have become clichés as aspects of such events. But nostalgia—grief for your own place, the guilt and loss of having uprooted yourself—is an emotion that a great many Americans would be better and more sensitive for having allowed themselves to feel, though it is more agonizing than any other experience that still leaves its victim with a future. Nostalgia is not recognized in America as the kind of suffering that teaches people anything of value, because a culture that sets its highest premium on mobility as a way of getting its business done discounts it in advance as romantic immaturity. But people who have learned to respect this agony are less likely than others to set fire to peasant huts with their cigarette lighters, and this is a desirable form of self-restraint.

The futility, moreover, is ironical, because the university is still, for some of its students, the source of the kind of intense community alumni recall nostalgically; but alumni cannot recognize this because it is these students whose styles they find most repellent and who seem to them to be trying to destroy the university. So some may be; those who love their home would sooner burn it than see it defiled. But it is nevertheless precisely the militants who have found within the university fellows with a common vision of its purpose who care enough about it to risk beatings and imprisonment in the service of that vision and who are currently having the experience the alumni think they remember—not the jocks, at a time when the football hero has become anachronistic, and certainly not the commuters who would just as soon be in correspondence school if you could really make it there and the mail service were better. The more conservative alumni are more likely to be nostalgic than the liberals who, being dedicated to progress, will have gone on through several further stages of their life-cycle without much thought about their college days. But as conservatives they cannot recognize their deeper kinship with the radicals and hippies who make the university their home and not just a stopover on their career-line.

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It must be granted that the fact that college life—as we used to think of it—should have become a basis for community is largely an unintended, and in some ways a paradoxical, development of American life. The educational system is designed to make schooling both a transient and a highly competitive experience, which is highly inimical to the development of a sense of community. At most stages, no such sense develops. A high-school homecoming is, in Kurt Vonnegut Jr.'s word, a real *granfalloon;* though some working-class youth, having been less hung-up than their middle-class peers in academic competition and less oriented onward to college, *do* find the high school a home-from-home and may continue to return to it as a social center for a year or two after they have graduated or dropped out, until their friends have left. But schools, generally speaking, are ill-designed to foster intimacy and a sense of identity among their members. The devices that are intentionally employed to foster school spirit destroy spontaneity and intimacy in the interests of an automatic *esprit de corps* which is anything but homelike.

But the unintended consequences outweigh the intended. College life, though growing continuously more competitive through the years as the educational system grows more universalistic, is still much less competitive than life outside the sanctuary. There is not the constant press for conspicuous consumption. The definition of the student role as impecunious and economically dependent is neither desirable nor just, and fosters the exploitation of students as sweated labor in undergraduate instruction. But it also provides the only enclave in American life in which poverty is not dishonorable and makes it far easier for people to accept one another for what they are, to establish cooperative living arrangements and open expression of feeling. There is a certain *Schadenfreude* to be got from the fact that the custom of exploiting students by making them the university's serfs has backfired into what appears to be a permanent rejection of the middle-class community's more vulgar and driven patterns both of consumption and of uptight family life. The systematic age-grading is harmful in its broad social consequences; the universities are now perceived by the general public as ghettos that are becoming useless because they no longer manage to protect the community from the dangerous young aliens they contain. But this view, too, fosters a sense of identity and empathy among students as such—not strong enough to prevent them from being divided into warring factions by conflicting interests and values, but strong enough to leave them with a viable subgroup even when

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this happens. And, finally, the fact that our society withholds adult status till after the human sexual prime so that the peak of erotic intensity occurs during college years enhances students' impact on one another and the probability that something human and personal, if not necessarily agreeable, will develop. Sexuality in the young, though intensely competitive, resists the control of a competitive society, for the attributes that lead to erotic and economic success are different. The difference tends steadily to lessen, for in every society higher status characteristics come to be defined as erotically desirable: witness the vicissitudes of obesity. The conventional institutions of student life, as John Finley Scott has shown in his studies of the college sorority as a national marriage-brokerage system for conventional girls, function so as to rationalize students' erotic relationships and bring them into the university's total network of transactions.[2] But the fraternity and sorority system is declining and has largely been replaced by informal though enduring relationships; there are more liaisons and fewer conquests. This, too, adds to the confusion and hostility of the alumni who would never have claimed that a sexual relationship could be moral in itself, though marriage might make it legitimate and even obligatory.

For these sound, if accidental reasons, the campus has come to serve the middle-class young as a community and sometimes as the locus of their best real experience of personal relationships. That, despite its growing impersonality and dedication to a competitive *ethos*, our society has not only permitted this, but enshrined it in sentimental myths of college life is explicable, I suggest, largely because the process—as long as colleges were largely highly class-selective in the clientele they served—served the class interests of those who supported the colleges without their having to admit that such a thing existed. Simple and quite genuine patterns of affiliation could be counted on to provide American society not only with the ivy equivalent of an old-boy network at the top, but with lower networks that served both to support and ensnare potential aspirants from lower levels. Catholic universities help educated Catholics to go on feeling Catholic, which helps make subsequent discrimination unnecessary. Similarly, during the period of more than a decade that I taught at Brooklyn College, I came to feel that the college's sustaining vision of itself as the channel of opportunity for poor but bright and often radical students from excluded social groups had become a myth that was exploited rather cynically. In all that time, there were only four or five members of genuinely ex-

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cluded ethnic groups—blacks or Puerto Ricans—among my students. They were not poor; they came, for the most part, from the homes of tax accountants, furniture dealers, or other petty-bourgeois; and their brightness was often nullified by extreme provinciality. My colleagues continued to refer with satisfaction to the college's high academic rating nationally. But Norman Podhoretz's comment in *Making It*[3] suggests that the most alert Brooklyn youth of the kind the college was supposed to serve had already perceived what I came to see more slowly: that the true *national* function of the City College system was not merely to educate academically competent New York City youth and provide them with increased opportunity, but also to provide a reliable drainage system to keep them from flooding out the Ivy League and the western and midwestern state universities, which might have provided access to greater economic opportunity, but which would certainly have responded with ambivalence to the opportunity to provide this service.

There are clearly certain serious conflicts between the university's functions in providing economic opportunity in an egalitarian society and serving simultaneously as a base for community among the young. Competition itself poisons community; and young people for whom intimacy and communion are primary values deeply resent being forced to adopt standardized, competitive patterns of behavior by an impersonal grading system and examinations that are as objective and, hence, as unresponsive to their individualized qualities and feelings as they can be made. But this is what their peers who are using the university as an anthrodrome, and who are more concerned about the rewards to which academic success leads than with the quality of their college experience, need for their purposes. This, surely, is why the demand for ungraded curricula, experimental colleges, and the abolition of many forms of examination so neatly divides the activists and hippies from the more conventional and usually lower-status students who resist it.

But there are less direct but equally important reasons why the function of the university as a base of community interferes with its function as anthrodrome. As I have discussed more fully elsewhere, it is the community function of the university which most antagonizes the larger community outside.[4] Their hostility has several sources: a sense, more flattering than realistic, that student life is "privileged" and libertine compared to their own; the way in which the student-role is defined so that students—about the most sweated labor in America outside agriculture—are perceived as not

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working and as being supported by their parents or the welfare state. But most infuriating of all is merely the fact that a community exists. Below the level at which the corporate network can provide a sense of identity and of membership in a colleague group, most Americans today are bereft of intimacy and belong to very little that has meaning for them. Divided as it is, the university is one of the few institutions that still shelters enclaves of people with common values who can talk to one another; and there is a fine irony in the frequency and bitterness with which its critics complain that it has become irrelevant to human life. They are right; but of what other institution in our society would it even occur to anyone to make this complaint? The Congress, the American Medical Association, the Chase Manhattan Bank? Except for their undoubted capacity to do irreparable mischief, nobody seriously *expects* them to be relevant any longer. Fly Jefferson Airplane, and hope for the best.

This sense of being part of a meaningful coalition and bound by realities of feeling and genuine goals to its other members is, I believe, more coveted, and the source of more bitter conflict—inner and outer—in our society than any other treasure it might, but seldom does, afford. It is this, rather than sexual gratification, that remains the illicit satisfaction; though attacks on satisfying communities are usually directed against their putative licentiousness, which is often the only language in which their detractors can identify what they think they're missing. But the jealousy and sense of deprivation, and correspondingly the hostility, engendered are intense. So far as I know, no hippy commune has been allowed to survive in America; it is either busted by outraged neighbors or destroyed by ogling tourists who move in on it looking for thrills, or both. On campus, such communities enjoy some, though declining, protection. In any case, the presence of a viable community on campus is embarrassing to the students in the anthrodrome. It generates norms of conduct by which they find themselves put down, reminds them that there are satisfactions their commitments to the future forbid them to share, and, more directly, reduces the value of their credential in the community they hope will honor it. It antagonizes and drives away the officials with whom they hoped to negotiate for preferment. The conflict between the university as community and as anthrodrome is an absolutely real one, a conflict of interests as well as tastes; and it seems either fatuous or disingenuous, therefore, to deny that what advances the interests of one is likely to be costly to those of the other.

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Meanwhile, constituencies of the university other than students are, of course, involved in the conflict. Generally speaking, the interests of the faculty and administration coincide with those of the anthrodrome and are opposed to those who would find community in the university. The university is indeed fundamentally involved in the industrial and governmental activities that its critics find most reprehensible and that even its supporters no longer defend. But these activities are not merely the stuff of which academic careers are made and the source of needed financial support. They also provide the upper stages of the anthrodrome itself. The more conventionally ambitious students need them as the next step in *their* careers. And an even more fundamental commitment to the anthrodrome has been made on what may be irreversible epistemological grounds. The very conception of what constitutes knowledge in every discipline; the prevailing empiricism that reduces research even in the humanities to objective and often quantitative terms; the official dominance of "value-free" social science that willingly sells itself to the highest bidder, though now with the hope that the arrangement may be handled with discretion—all these serve the needs of the anthrodrome and have a chilling effect on the community. The self-definition of the college administrator as the broker among the various interests that affect the university, whose professional responsibility actually *precludes* his attempting to exert any moral leadership among the university's various *liaisons dangereuses*, also serves the anthrodrome; as does the university's peculiar orientation to public relations, which leads it to court public support and hence public approval even under circumstances that would clearly favor instead a policy of coolly reminding the public that it, too, is dependent on the university as a major source of revenue and employment and that it might be well advised to avoid excessive harassment even of those it does not particularly like.

So far, I have made no reference to the official functions of the university on which it bases its formal claims to esteem and support: the creation and propagation of knowledge, or, as we now more frequently say, research and teaching. This omission is the more striking since these functions might be expected to support the community within the university and require its support in turn, rather than the anthrodrome. Both teaching and research are in essence, at their best, particularistic activities. No commitment to equality of opportunity can make a teacher as useful to the students

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he does not turn on as he is to those he does; no amount of ambition can help a student learn much of value from a teacher who has no interest in either students or what he is teaching. But the university has evolved a highly effective device to protect universalism under these conditions: rigid control of instruction through scheduling, credits, and the definition of the process as one involving abstract, symbolic communication rather than feeling, touch, or spontaneity. The effect of this is to keep instruction almost entirely in what the great psychoanalytic theorist Harry Stack Sullivan called "the syntactic mode" and so remote from the reality of sense-data and personal experience as to seem quite unreal. This makes academic freedom, defined as the freedom to teach whatever content one wishes provided the content remains turned-off, quite innocuous, especially in a mass democracy on which concepts, as such, have no influence until they have been legitimated by the mass media as what beautiful, or powerful, people believe. It also makes teaching both puerile and detached. An effective college teacher must be more interesting, provocative, and profound than daytime TV, or lose the attention of his students. Many do.

It is true that college faculty neglect teaching in favor of research as leading to more rapid professional advancement. But it is also true that teaching in the mass university of today has become a rather degrading experience; like trying to put on an authentic display of Berber folk-dances in a Casablanca dive into which a group of sailors have been lured on the pretext that other more urgent interests would be satisfied. Neither party to this shady transaction is innocent, and the more authentic the folkloric spectacle is, the more hostile the clientele becomes, since the quality of the performance is in itself a rebuke to its genuine, if base, desires.

The Selective Service Act, with the 2-S deferment, is of itself enough to make a whore of any professor. But for this the anthrodrome might in any case suffice. If freedom of opportunity requires that instruction take place in mixed groups in which those to whom what is being considered can only be an instrument of no intrinsic interest outnumber and swamp those with whose culture it already connects, teaching must remain an unrewarding and inauthentic activity. Liberalism's answer to this is familiar and compelling: Make it connect, find new ways to reach the disadvantaged and the merely uninterested and stimulate their interests. But education can only be planned and organized experience and must build on experience already had; it cannot be grafted onto a lifeless trunk or

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one which rejects it as incompatible with its development. Techniques for "reaching" or "motivating" students to learn something they do not care about initially seem to me most often devices for inducing them to abandon their own past for the sake of a deal with society that will pay off in the future. The anthrodrome is willing enough to do that—that is why it came to the university—but the process of helping it does not feel much like teaching. Nor would curriculum revision intended to adapt to its interests help very much, for students who come to higher education primarily to advance their careers quite often have no interests in either ideas or experience as such—and, indeed, sense that such interests would hamper their advancement in this society. What they want is a degree and the tricks of their trade.[5]

Under these conditions, then, both the significance of teaching as a university function and its potential contribution to the university community diminish, and too massive a claim for support should not be based on it. In the case of research, a quite different set of difficulties arises. There can be no question that our society, unless revolutionized, will continue to support and conduct the kind of research now done in our universities. Whether this is useful or leads to fundamental knowledge is irrelevant. Complex, literate societies usually maintain some costly and prestigious institution in which the kind of knowledge useful to their elites is codified, recorded, and interpreted. Such institutions take on a sacred character, and a threat to them is interpreted by the elite as a threat to the integrity of the society (which, from their point of view, it is). The Alexandrian priesthood must have been at least as outraged and dismayed by the burning of their library as the leading citizens of Canada were by the destruction of the computer at Sir George Williams University last year. When barbarians burn centers of learning, the end of an era may indeed be at hand; and the following era will possibly define knowledge differently and rebuild the library as a tourist attraction, if it recognizes such a social role as "tourist."

Since history is written by and from the point of view of ruling elites, especially before there is mass literacy, the destruction, physical or functional, of centers of learning is automatically recorded as a tragedy—though whether the quality of life in Alexandria was on the whole improved and liberated or impoverished by the burning of the library I do not know; it certainly delayed the birth of Lawrence Durell by nearly two millennia and marked, if it did not cause, the end of Alexandria as a major power.

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If the United States is to continue its present course as a major power, it will continue to maintain knowledge factories whose product resembles that of the current multiversity. Such an institution will do what we call research, because in an open, technically advanced society empirical knowledge, which is the only kind useful for manipulating persons and objects in the environment, is the kind that becomes sacred. When an American speaks of "the advancement of knowledge" or "expanding the frontiers of learning," he almost always means the kind of learning that will enable him or his kind of people to control something or do something effective to somebody else: that is, science.

Scientific knowledge, in our society, is usually defined as morally neutral in itself; moral judgments may be made only about the uses to which knowledge is put, not about knowledge itself. This seems to me absurd. A moral judgment, though not a simple one, may be made about the *kind* of knowledge that makes it possible for me to think of a child as an object to be napalmed or of the manufacture of napalm as productive. It is not just our values nor our place in history that makes us not even wince at the idea that the *value* of our most gruesome armaments is included as part—and a very large part—of our gross national *product*. It is our epistemology as well—the character of what we regard as knowledge and respect as such—that has become an expression of our national character. This conception of knowledge also makes it possible for us to insist that people die later and in a somewhat different way than they would have otherwise, though so far no less frequently; and this, which we call modern medical science, is usually considered good. A complex moral judgment, then; but a moral judgment on the nature of science all the same.

It is clear that Western and especially American culture is locked into this empirical conception of knowledge, and equally clear that this favors the anthrodrome—those who enjoy doing and pushing more than feeling and being and reflecting on the process. The research function, then, is one more function of the university that favors them over the community-seekers. It is less clear, however, that the research function must be carried out within the same institution as the other functions of the university. This function, and this function alone, can dispense with the presence of young persons assigned the transitory and subordinate status of students. In many societies this separation is usual: The research institute has no teaching functions; the teaching institutions do not

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expect their staffs to make what we call contributions to knowledge —that is, to do research and publish it.

This separation, if it were real, would have a great deal to recommend it. Much research done in American universities is done there simply because this is cheaper and keeps it decentralized and out of sight. It is harder for a snoopy reporter to put the pieces together if the answer to what happened to all those sheep lies concealed under the scanty ivy of the University of Utah rather than in the Dugway laboratory itself. Now that such functions have become an awkward source of controversy for the universities, a reverse process has set in, one in which universities divest themselves of formal institutional connection with the research institutes and laboratories to which they now assign their more macabre military contracts—a device which seems hardly sufficient to protect them from complicity and will probably not even save them embarrassment. For this separation is quite unreal and within the context of American life and values probably cannot be made real.

The problem is again epistemological; empirical research is the only knowledge-function that has enough prestige, or is considered useful enough, to command genuine support in America. It is assumed, for example, that in a college devoted to teaching rather than research course-loads should be two or three times greater than in a university where the staff is expected to do research. But this assumption misses the whole point, which is that university teaching has come to be accepted as the kind of half-assed process it is because of the primacy of research; and to do it better means to do it entirely differently and probably in a much more leisurely, intimate, and unstructured way. The gain to be sought is in the quality of the relationship rather than in the number of units to be serviced. But no support for collegiate education on this scale is likely. Even if it were, the results would not be likely to be very promising for reasons Christopher Jencks and David Riesman make clear in *The Academic Revolution*: The highest prestige *colleges* in the country ought to be free to do the best teaching, being relatively less impoverished and having better trained faculty than the more marginal institutions.[6] But, in fact, they function as what Jencks and Riesman call university colleges: that is, they orient their teaching, their grading, and their curricula to the demands of graduate schools and pride themselves on the number of people they send on successfully to the doctorate, which ties them securely to present departmental organization and precludes serious curricular experi-

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mentation which, again, would jeopardize the career interests of their faculty, the ambitions of their more striving students, and the college's prestige.

All the major functions of the university which the society endorses and supports are opposed to its function of providing a home and a place of their own for young men and women in which they can develop a sense of personal commitment and a basis for moral judgment. These, indeed, infuriate our society, which prefers decorum to morality and success to either. They distress and frighten the universities' officials because they threaten the universities' sources of support. These officials avoid the moral issue when they can; those few who have attempted to respond to it with a measure of understanding and respect for their students have often been driven from their posts by outraged and punitive governing boards —sometimes, as in the cases of the excellent Kerr-Meyerson administration at Berkeley and that of John Summerskill at San Francisco State under which the first real experimental college program of the decade was developed, at the point at which these administrations seemed clearly on the verge of a triumphant reconciliation among discordant factions, though on terms more generous than the governing board could stomach. Leadership of this quality is too rare, however, to have been much of a challenge to regents and trustees. Much more often, university officials have redefined attacks on the ethical position of their institutions as empirical problems of governance. This, I suppose, is why the present volume of papers has been commissioned.

Most efforts to solve this problem have taken the form of structural alterations: changes in the composition of policy-making bodies within the university and sometimes token representation of students on the governing board. These measures are desirable as ways of providing more status and dignity for students and more respect for them; indeed, there are few campuses beyond the most parochial in which student sentiment and values are ignored today as they were even at schools like Columbia or Swarthmore until two years ago. But such measures do not touch the heart of the difficulty, because the difficulty is not structural but moral.

The American university system, like Dr. Frankenstein and Dr. Faustus, is in trouble not because it has failed, but because it has succeeded; and succeeded in undertakings to which it would not have committed itself had it not relinquished moral responsibility

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in favor of empirical mastery in the first place. If this is too harsh an indictment, it is so for one reason only: that it attributes too much autonomy to the university. University faculty, especially, are inclined to be taken in by their own traditional, but increasingly deceptive pretense that they run the place. In fact, universities are run as America is run: indirectly, by a power structure that depends on the ambitions of the faculty and the lust of its individual members to be close to sources of power to induce it to organize itself so as to do what is expected of it. Power within the university aligns itself to power outside it.

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2. John Finley Scott, "The American College Sorority: Its Role in Class and Ethnic Endogamy," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (June, 1965), pp. 514-27.

3. In the view Norman Podhoretz attributes retrospectively to his high school English teacher, he soliloquizes: "*Slum Child, filthy little slum child.* I was beyond saving; I deserved no better than to wind up with all the other horrible little Jewboys in the gutter (by which she meant Brooklyn College). If only I would listen to her, the whole world could be mine; I could win a scholarship to Harvard, I could get to know the best people, I could grow up into a life of elegance and refinement and taste. Why was I so stupid as not to understand?" *Making It* (Random House: New York, 1967), p. 10.

4. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "The Campus Community and the Community," *New American Review #6* (New American Library: New York, 1969), pp. 146-62.

5. By far the most vivid and insightful treatment of what such purveying to an aspiring urban proletariat does to the joy of teaching is to be found in Herbert Gold's sadly neglected essay on a crisis in his career as an instructor at Wayne State University a few years ago—a crisis whose illustrative significance has been greatly enhanced by subsequent events in Detroit: "A Dog in Brooklyn, A Girl in Detroit: A Life Among the Humanities," *The Age of Happy Problems* (Dial Press: New York, 1962).

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S. E. AND ZELLA LURIA

The Role of the University: Ivory Tower, Service Station, or Frontier Post?

THIS ISSUE of *Dædalus* deals with the governance of the university. The term governance recalls the word *gouvernail* or rudder: that which steers a vessel toward its goal. One can describe the rudder and its operation without any assumptions as to the destination of the ship. But is that the interesting problem? In dealing with the governance of the university, are we not asking at least as much where it goes as how it gets there?

A more significant, although still imperfect, analogy is that of biological evolution. Biochemistry and physiology tell us how organisms function, whereas evolutionary biology tells us how the organisms that exist came to be, and why they appear to be so well adapted to the existing conditions as to give to evolution its seemingly purposive and to some extent predictable character. The purposiveness of evolution is only an apparent one: It stems from the passive adaptiveness of living organisms to their environment. In social phenomena, including the conduct of the university, a dimension other than structure and history enters the picture: the dimension of conscious purpose. Man sets goals and tries to fit the means to those goals. Thus, the goals of the university at any given stage of society must dictate its structure, even though vestiges of obsolete structures may remain as tokens of the past—such as the pageantry of commencements and of football games.

If the goals of a university must dictate its structure, what determines the goals themselves? Inevitably these goals and the set of values that underlies them reflect the values and goals of the society around the university. The critical question is the nature of the reflection. Is it to be an undistorted, uncritical reflection, like that of a plane mirror whose function is simply to reproduce what is presented to it? Or a protective reflection, like

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that of an insulating surface that excludes external influences from the interior of an object? Or a critical reflection that analyzes the input of external signals and filters it through a discriminating system of evaluative devices?

In less fanciful terms, the key question for any institution, and for the university in particular, is its ethical interaction with the society in which it operates. This interaction may result in acceptance of the predominant values, which become identified as the university's own; or it may lead to a rejection of society's values and a withdrawal into the traditional ivory tower; or it may generate a critical, creative relation between society and university. It is the thesis of this article that the latter kind of interaction both befits the university and ultimately benefits society the most. It is an interaction that requires, on the part of the university, a complex mixture of commitments: commitment, on the one hand, to being a creative force in the historical process, deeply and passionately involved in the affairs of society, and, on the other hand, to providing society with the intellectual stewardship that can come only from rigorous, dispassionate analysis of reality.

Traditionally, our universities have had three functions—education, scholarship, and service. In earlier times, the educative and scholarly functions were closely allied, and the service function was only a minor one. In the complex technological society of today, the service functions have grown enormously, and the educational and scholarly functions (at least in the natural and social sciences) have come increasingly close to the service functions. The university provides society with experts and expertise. The reasons for these changes are to be found not only in the demands of society to which the university responds, but also in the fact that the organization of the university and its sources of livelihood reflect the structural organization of our society itself. This has generated the entrepreneurial system of the American university, in which the policy-initiating bodies—both administrations and faculties—acting in the manner of capitalist entrepreneurs have become actively and competitively involved in seeking out what kinds of intellectual pursuits society could use (and therefore be willing to support) and in developing the corresponding programs of research, education, and service. Unquestionably, this entrepreneurial system has contributed to make the American university the flourishing and effective institution that it is today. In fact, this aspect of the American university

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provides a model for many of the reforms now attempted in Europe and elsewhere to make universities in those countries more efficient and more responsive to social realities.

But the entrepreneurial system, for all its productive activism, has an inherently passive quality. Drawing its inspiration from the surrounding society, it asks itself only what it can do for society as it is, rather than what role it can play in the evolution of society. Yet, many people believe that the university has a critical responsibility to interact with society in an active rather than a passive role. One may even go further and state that, in a society that is losing its traditional religious-metaphysical sources of values, the university, as the institution charged with the intellectual and educational formation of the youth, has the responsibility of stepping into the resulting vacuum and providing the seat of the search for new functional sets of values. In brief, the university must be prepared to be the intellectual and ethical forum of the lay society.

The great religions of humanity—Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Marxism-Leninism—even though they embodied realistic reactions to social situations existing at a given time, inevitably became immobilized in dogmatic, authoritarian codes of intellectual beliefs and moral behaviors because of their metaphysical assumptions. The challenge of technological society, with its rapidly changing objective situations, poses the problem of generating an evolutionary system of values suitable to such an unprecendented social environment. A biological analogy can provide some useful hints.

Biological evolution is an essentially opportunistic process. It selects what is fit (that is, reproductively successful) in *the immediate present.* Yet what is finally selected are those lines of descent that remain fit (in the same reproductive sense) over longer times, even in changing situations. Thus, evolution selects populations for adaptability (the capacity to tolerate a range of situations) and for plasticity (the ability to respond to changing situations with a change in genetic structure). Both of these properties are functions of the range of genetic endowments present in a population. Any biological analogy to social phenomena is bound to be somewhat distorted because social and cultural evolution does not duplicate biological evolution. Cultural evolution is Lamarckian—treasuring its acquired characters—and is deeply influenced by conscious purpose, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and knows only causes, not purposes. Yet both pro-

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cesses have one feature in common: the role of adaptability and plasticity in determining long-run fitness. If a culture and a society are to flourish, their conceptual and ethical frameworks must fit the real and changing environment. Hence, these frameworks must be adaptable, plastic, intrinsically self-critical, and persistently self-revising. No agency in society is better suited to carry out the function of criticism and revision than the university, permeated as it is (or should be) with the spirit of free inquiry and the commitment to factual truth.

There is a danger that the plasticity of social attitudes and ethical values may be interpreted in a purely automatic way. Plasticity can mean several different things: a creative sensitivity and responsiveness to changing environmental conditions, or a passive submission to external pressures, or an aimless swaying with the winds of change. The third interpretation leads to acquiescence with and encouragement of all sorts of faddism; the second, to the very identification with the societal establishment that the entrepreneurial activities of universities tend to foster. Passive acceptance of the goals and values of society deprives the university of the claim to intellectual leadership and encourages its involvement in ventures of dubious ethical and intellectual value.

It is interesting to note here that adoption by the university of a passive attitude toward society as a source of values differs little in its consequences from the opposite choice—to ignore such values and to live in a self-centered illusion of spiritual purity. Withdrawal into the ivory tower amounts in practice to an endorsement of the *status quo*. In fact, by removing a large segment of intellectually alert individuals from the field of actual involvement in the affairs of society, the attitude of the ivory tower encourages the use of rational knowledge for irrational purposes. The scholar who scorns involvement in the life of the commonwealth assumes a burden of responsibility for the misuses to which the products of his scholarship may be put by the society from which he has supposedly kept himself aloof.

The remaining alternative is for the universities to accept openly an active role in social experimentation. Even though to do so represents a departure from some cherished illusions of neutrality and detachment, it amounts only to acknowledging the real situation and making the university's role in society less ambiguous. The university today is a major business enterprise, pre-

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empting facilities of increasing magnitude and competing with other sectors of the community for funds and *Lebensraum.* Moreover, through its service functions, whether carried out institutionally or by individuals, the university plays a much greater role in the affairs of society than many of its members are willing to admit. But this role has too often been a passive rather than a creative one—that of a service station rather than a frontier post. The university will be on sounder ground if it makes its role in social affairs explicit and creative by exploring the problems of society in the spirit of free, critical experimentation that has characterized its involvement in the natural sciences. In fact, such an approach to society's problems is clearly appropriate to the university's mission of intellectual stewardship.

The tasks that face the investigator in the social sciences are, of course, different from those encountered in the natural sciences. The natural scientist searches for the laws that rule events in the world of material objects, inanimate or living. Understanding of these laws allows prediction of future events under defined conditions and permits the evolution of a technology directed to the solution of specific practical tasks. Engineering and medicine are typical technological outgrowths of natural science. In their technical content (not in their applications!), these outgrowths are as value-free and socially neutral as their parent sciences. They are part of the intellectual enterprise of man, which aims both at understanding the world we are part of and at developing means to control and alter it. How these means are then used is where the problem of responsibility comes into play.

The social sciences attempt, in principle, to follow the same patterns, searching for laws that rule human events and deriving predicting schemes, on the basis of which a social technology may evolve. But here the distinctions are more easily blurred. The perception of social events and their interpretation are deeply influenced by the fact that the social scientist is part of the society that he studies. Furthermore, experimentation in the affairs of society can seldom be done under the relatively neutral conditions available to the natural scientist since all experimentation involves active involvement in the process of social change. The question of responsibility cannot be separated from the testing of hypothesis: Studying society in a scientific, experimental way means interfering with the course of events. There can hardly be value-free social inquiry and experimentation. The university has attempted

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to preserve an apparent neutrality and detachment by segregating its own activities in the social sciences into scholarly and service functions. It has carried out supposedly value-free research in its academic departments and has done its practical interaction with society by lending its talents and know-how to outside agencies—government, industry, foundations, or other institutions.

Such segregation of functions provides only the appearance of a value-free, "scientific" atmosphere in the social sciences. Most social science theory and research rests on unstated ethical assumptions. In a stable society, the prevailing unanimity of social values makes it easier to ignore the implicit assumptions. But when the supposed unanimity breaks down and deep divisions become apparent within society, the range of value choices is wider and the implications of these choices are clearer. The illusion of a value-free position becomes untenable.

At such times, many of the service activities of social scientists stand revealed as *de facto* participation in the practices of the social Establishment. Likewise, the academic critics of the *status quo,* hesitant to involve the supposedly neutral university in controversial social experiments, can exercise their role as experts only within agencies or groups committed to social reform. Thus, the insistence that the university preserve a value-free intellectual environment leads to a displacement of the active, creative market place of ideas away from the university.

The consequences of this displacement affect the content and the course of social experimentation. When carried out by agencies committed to specific social theories, it tends to avoid self-criticism and to generate self-fulfilling predictions. If this experimentation were done by diverse scholars from within the university, as an integral part of professional research, it could more easily be carried out in a spirit of intellectual integrity and mutual criticism, with awareness of the underlying assumptions, willingness to accept results that contradict the assumptions, and commitment to full disclosure of findings and conclusions. The findings of experimentation in social affairs done under such conditions would be more easily interpretable to the public at large, who in the last instance must make the relevant choices.

Restraints on the university from open independent participation in social experiment are numerous: faculty tradition of scholarly detachment, administrative concern over financial support, and trustees' conservative interpretation of their responsibility. En-

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couragement of greater participation, on the other hand, comes from many sources: pressures of the local communities reacting to the impact of the universities on their economic and social life; demands of socially deprived groups claiming their share of education and services; and prodding by concerned groups of students and faculty committed to the search for effective solutions to social ills.

Inevitably, students' misgivings against society translate themselves into criticism of the academic community. Interestingly enough, student critics object not only to the university's pretended detachment from pressing social problems and to its actual participation in the activities of society's Establishment, but also to the "neutral," scholarly approach in much of their social science education. These criticisms ought to be heeded because they have much to offer in a constructive direction. At its best, student criticism is not a nihilist reaction to an affluent society, but a demand for integrity of purpose and for more unity between theory and practice, both in the university and in society. In the United States, student unrest is not so much a revolt against traditional values as a revulsion against a society that at times seems to betray its own proclaimed values.

Is it possible for the university to find a response that recognizes the legitimacy of the new challenges and yet preserves both the structure of the university as a viable institution and the integrity of its intellectual and educational mission?

The concept of a critical and constructive experimentation in the area of social inquiry may offer a positive answer by providing a kind of "engagement" (in the sense of the French word *engagement*) different from that of partisan action groups or political parties. The university may use critical experimentation in social situations in order to find out what approaches are effective in altering such situations and what results are to be expected from such actions. Such experimentation may take place within the university itself—for instance, in creating educational and employment opportunities. The recent beginnings toward developing and promoting experimental programs for black and other minority students are obvious examples; much more can be done in this and similar areas. External experimentation may involve, for example, organizing economic or political structures directed at the solution of specific community problems.

Once the university accepts a responsibility to experiment in

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the process of social change, its educational role also takes on new dimensions. In a return to the true humanistic and Socratic traditions, the university can train its students to explore and evaluate, in a meaningful societal setting, the consequences of specific choices and decisions. The insulating partitions between learning, teaching, and acting in the real world become less rigid, and the intellectual enterprise acquires a new, more integrated character.

Factual knowledge obtained in active experimentation and providing a rational basis for decision-making can even contribute a source of personal values. In the same way that being part of the process of biological evolution confers biological meaning to the life of individual organisms, being part of the intellectual enterprise as a rational source of social decision as well as of transmissible knowledge confers meaning to the life of the individual man. By fostering participation of its students in the human enterprise as intellectually trained and socially involved individuals, the university can contribute more effectively to their personal development.

The involvement of the university in social experimentation within the framework of rigorous intellectual inquiry is important in another respect. In the complaints recently raised against the universities, one hears much talk of the need for relevance. This is too often interpreted as a demand that scholars, scientists, and students relinquish the pursuits of "purely intellectual content" and engage in other, more immediately applied tasks. Coupled with this demand is a rising criticism of the natural sciences (as sources of a technology whose anarchistic applications threaten human society) as well as of the humanities (as some sort of bead-game played by parasitic inhabitants of the ivory tower). Criticism of natural science is particularly disturbing when it takes the form of anti-rationalism, rejecting the most valuable content of the intellectual tradition because it has failed to solve the social problems that arise from the technological revolution. Yet it may well be that only a rational application of a scientific social technology tested by experiment can solve the problems that arise from industrial technology.

The university can make a meaningful response to the criticism of its scholarly activities neither by kowtowing apologetically to all faddistic pressures nor by assuming an attitude of supercilious indifference. It must be responsibly involved in the affairs

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of society, in the dual role of scientific experimenter and custodian of the integrity of the intellectual enterprise. Thus the university responds to the challenge by becoming purposefully and actively engaged in the adventure of the social process.

How can the governance of the university foster a lively, critical, constructive "engagement" in the activities of an evolving society? There is a role to be played by every group in the university community. Student involvement in the decision-making process as well as in the actual day-to-day machinery of university operation is already becoming widespread and is needed to make the university responsive to the problems of present and future generations. Faculty initiative is more necessary than ever to preserve in such a university the rigorous process of intellectual integrity and to assure that all university activities retain the educational and evaluative content too often lost sight of in the passive kinds of service activities. The trustees, if their role is to endure and to be a useful one, must see as their trust the preservation of community support to the university even when the latter makes itself a gadfly of society and even an active participant in social experimentation.

We are all too familiar with the concern that radical students may destroy the university in the process of trying to change society, the university being the societal structure most readily available to their criticisms and vulnerable to inside disruption. But, in fact, the university is worth preserving for the very purposes proclaimed by the radical reformers. In our society, the university may be the most effective structure through which intellectual forces can be put to use in influencing the course of social evolution in a rational way. In order to be effective in this role and to prove its critics wrong, however, the university may have to assume responsibilities and attitudes different from its traditional ones.

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PETER J. CAWS

Design for a University

PROBABLY MORE worthless nonsense is written about education than about any other subject except religion. Because of this proliferation of verbiage, it is one of the hardest subjects to write about effectively. Almost anything that can be said is drowned by a hundred other pronouncements on the same point. The best thing to do under the circumstances is to keep quiet until the hubbub subsides; but since there is no prospect that it will ever do so, it is easy to succumb to the temptation to add to it, even though it is more than doubtful that the expenditure of paper or the claim on the reader's attention can really be justified. This is the more true in a journal like *Dædalus;* the sense of futility is increased because one is probably preaching to the converted, most of one's readers have probably thought the same or better thoughts on their own, and few of them are the people in whose hands the fundamental decisions of public policy lie which must eventually be taken if the situation in American schools and colleges is to improve.

Here we all are, nevertheless, united between the covers of a special issue, constrained by events to think broadly once more about higher education. To have posed the problem of the governance of the university betrays the conviction—which by now nearly all of us share—that something is badly wrong with the governance of the university. The same goes for the curriculum, which can hardly be separated from governance when it comes to institutional design. And the attempt to describe an ideal university, which will occupy the latter part of this essay, presupposes that real ones fall short in some fundamental way. Unfortunately we do not always share our perceptions of these shortcomings, and this leads to a paradox in the treatment of such subjects that needs to be confronted if not resolved.

Academic people are trained to follow their own lines of thought,

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and most of them have fundamental convictions about what is wrong, which they are prepared to expound to their colleagues and anyone else who will listen, perhaps in an essay like this one. While each thus satisfies his private whims, the real problems get increasingly out of hand. This kind of individualism, when openly acknowledged, is one of the virtues of the academic mind; the key to the educational process remains the committed teacher and researcher who, in spite of group investigations, team teaching, and a new suspicion of the magisterial attitude, is still most effective when operating singly out of a personal unity of knowledge and outlook. But the problems that face us now are collective, and to make a significant difference in the face of them will take a *common* purpose and an *agreed* strategy. The opportunity of arriving at these must not be allowed to slip away while each of us is coming to terms privately with the scope and implications of the problem.

In spite of the relative pessimism of these opening remarks, there can be no doubt that the conditions for a solution to the current difficulties do exist. These *are* enough talent, enough money, enough intellectual energy in the United States to provide a first-class education up to the capacity of every individual. That is the *sine qua non* of a truly democratic society, and the intuition of the Founding Fathers was correct about its possibility, indeed on a scale more generous than they envisaged. The trouble is, in fact, that there are too many possible solutions. Almost any curriculum, almost any form of governance, adhered to with sufficient intellectual and moral passion, will do. What gets transmitted under ideal conditions from one generation to another, when the details have been forgotten, is a certain standard of scholarship or social behavior—not even a *particular* standard (there can, after all, be honest disagreements about these things), but a conception of what it means to *have* a standard. One may try to justify the content of a curriculum, the form of a system of government, in terms of a psychological or philosophical or political theory, but this activity has very little connection with its acceptance or rejection, which will rest on reactions at a far less sophisticated level. It is probably a mistake, in fact, to attempt the justification in terms of abstract theory of methods which, if they are to be effective at all, will have to be widespread throughout the system. (I would include in this prohibition theories about what is happening now—the generation gap, the black experience, the student radicals, the new or old New Left.)

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What is problematic, then, is not the resources, but their distribution; not finding *the* right solution, but agreeing on *a* right solution; not getting the complex details right, but getting the simple outline right. The point is that the solution, whatever it is, will have to be understood and accepted by faculty, students, trustees, legislators, voters, and so on. So it had better be simple, or at least it had better incorporate a few salient and simple essentials. At another stage in the history of the system it might (if the intuition of the Founding Fathers to which I referred above really was correct) be possible to justify a more complex set of principles, since there might exist the general ability to understand them. Now, alas, it is doubtful whether any general ability to understand even the most simple principles is really widespread in the society; and if all these people are to be convinced, complex justifications are at all costs to be avoided.

I take my point of departure from two principles of an almost frightening banality—which nevertheless, if generally adhered to, might improve things considerably. They are, first, that the curriculum of the university ought to be interesting, and, second, that the government of the university ought to be fair. It will at once be pointed out that there may be disagreement about what is fair or interesting. I therefore add two qualifications designed to resolve such disagreement: The curriculum must be interesting, *as judged by the students who are compelled to follow it;* and the government must be fair, *as judged by the faculty and students who are ruled by it.* If a president makes an arbitrary ruling against a faculty member, and the faculty thinks it is unfair, then it *is* unfair. And if a teacher gives a lecture that students think is boring, then it *is* boring.

There is at first sight nothing striking about these principles, except indeed their banality. But the great thing with principles, as is well known in logic but hardly understood in most other areas, is that from the simplest beginnings, by a sufficient insistence on the drawing out of consequences, unexpected complexities can emerge. And if to the logical development we add an insistence on practical application—which again, in most areas, is hardly ever referred to a starting point of principle—the situation may become truly revolutionary. Imagine for a moment that every class actually became interesting or every decision fair! Of course it cannot be expected actually to *happen;* we can be counted on to keep *theoria* and *praxis* at the usual prudent distance from each other. It is just this comfortable separation—an inexhaustible tolerance of

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discussion, an immovable resistance to genuine change—that has been driving our young revolutionaries into hysteria.

I stress interest, not relevance; the term is of wider scope and lets in many things that the sterner criterion of relevance might exclude. It is not logically impossible, of course, that some irrelevant things might also be uninteresting, and that is most often what is meant when elements of the curriculum are attacked as irrelevant. All would be forgiven if they were interesting. But note that it is impossible for something to be relevant and uninteresting. Interest, again, is the governing category, not (for example) utility. The useful will be interesting to those who care about it.

Also I stress fairness, not participation. The formula does not *entail* student involvement in curriculum planning or faculty participation in government. There are practical reasons why these things are desirable, but they do not follow from the principles. Here as elsewhere one is driven to democracy not because participation is in itself a desideratum, but because there is no evidence that anything else can be trusted. Representative government is not necessary to insure that everybody's interests are served, since they might happen to be served by a benevolent despotism; it is necessary because the benevolence of the despot cannot be guaranteed.

The concept of government implicit in all this is very wide; it runs from the hiring of the president to the grading of a freshman theme. The concept of fairness is very narrow; it involves only that the governed shall not be put at a positive disadvantage by the action of government. And the concepts of interest and of fairness overlap and reinforce each other. The grossest case of unfairness known in the university world—but one which, unfortunately, is all too frequent—arises when a teacher bores a student and then gives him a low mark. Not, of course, that a teacher can be expected to interest everybody; everything is boring to somebody. But if a student is bored, the least that can be done for him is to release him without prejudice, from the course or perhaps from the university. Releasing people from the university without prejudice (and without a degree) is something we have not yet learned to do gracefully, and I will have more to say about it later. If *everybody* is bored and unless strong reasons to the contrary present themselves, the teacher should be released from the university without prejudice. This too is difficult.

Despite its narrowness, the concept of fairness does have one extension that is of some importance. The government of the uni-

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versity must be fair not only to those within it, but also to those outside it. If by a restrictive admissions policy it excludes from participation in its advantages a class of people who might profit from them, then its fairness in the external sense can well be challenged. The thorny question thus raised is in one sense beyond the scope of our present concern, but the university is implicated in society and cannot escape the charge of unfairness if it helps to perpetuate an inequality in that society. In one way it is too great a burden on the admissions apparatus of individual colleges and universities to expect them to solve this problem. The right to an education up to the limit of one's talent, as long as the society has the resources to provide it, is a right the satisfaction of which ought to be more explicitly incorporated in the Constitution than it is. The main point to be made in this context is that there needs to be not just a university here and another there, but a university *system* serving not the values of society, but the aspirations of each member of it without exception.

This preliminary discussion of principles may take on more meaning as we move into the problems of designing an institution to embody them. And that will raise sooner or later the question of what a university really is. One difficulty is that only about a hundred years ago there were no universities in the United States. The institutions which now bear that title, but claim a longer pedigree, started out under other names—colleges, seminaries, and the like. They grew into universities by adopting some functions and abandoning others, and this happened piecemeal, so that in most cases the question of the integral character of the institution was never raised explicitly. Within the last hundred years, large numbers of new institutions calling themselves universities have come into being, but with rare exceptions they have taken their form from established universities either in this country or elsewhere and have not set out to confront the question of what one would create if one could really start from scratch and redesign the educational system as a whole.

Two alternative strategies offer themselves: to take some existing institution and see what would have to be done to it to bring its operation into line with the basic principles enunciated above; or to imagine a new institution expressly created for the purpose of putting these principles into action. It will be objected that both of these lines have in fact been followed. People are always trying to correct the flaws in existing institutions, and a number of new

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ones have been created—are even now being created—with the express intention of avoiding the errors and follies of the past. My criticism of most of these activities rests on two grounds: namely, that these enterprises are usually carried on by committees; and that if theoretical justification is claimed for them, it is nearly always much more pretentious than what I have suggested—new approaches to liberal education and that kind of thing. The trouble with committees is that it is almost impossible for them to arrive at an *integral* view of anything. I have already pointed out one difficulty with complex justifications; another is that if expressions like "liberal education" are used at all, the difficulty multiplies itself since not only the people who are to be convinced, but almost certainly the proponents of the scheme themselves will be unclear about what is meant. The expression "liberal education" should really be stricken from the vocabulary, as (for reasons which I shall suggest below) the liberal arts college ought to be removed from the university.

Let me revert for a moment to the committee problem. Most plans for educational reform fall short not so much because they are not comprehensive as because they are not coherent; they have not been thought through as a whole by a single mind and are likely to show the signs of their joint composition. One of the most bewildering features of the present agitation in the academy is the proliferation of committees, all manfully struggling over essentially the same problems, all producing virtuous documents which shift the emphases somewhat, usually (under the pressure of circumstances) roughly in the right direction, but which fail to signal the radical changes that are genuinely needed. A much better approach would be for institutions to pool their resources—not, heaven forbid, by creating even larger and more synoptic committees, but by offering some kind of prize for the best solution to the problem, whatever it happens to be. One or more out of a large number of submissions in a competition of this sort might come close to being satisfactory; and, starting from the best, a process of modification (perhaps, this time, even by a committee) might really lead to a new and a more hopeful beginning. I offer this suggestion in all seriousness. Given the nature of our present difficulties, it is foolish to insist that problems either of curriculum or government at university X must be solved by a consideration of the matter *ab initio* by the students and faculty of university X. Granted that they have to rule on the acceptability of the proposed structure, still the

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resources of intellect and ingenuity in the country at large are almost bound to be greater than their own resources, and there is nothing shameful in admitting this fact. American education at all levels is bedeviled by this multiplicity of effort. Prodigious quantities of useful time are wasted in the duplication from state to state, from school district to school district, from college to college, of the *constructive* activity of curricular design and the drafting of schemes of government, when local energy should largely be devoted to the *critical* consideration of these matters, starting from the *best* models that can be found anywhere at all.

The design that I shall sketch in the following paragraphs is not intended as a candidate in my ideal competition. To describe a potential university in any detail would require a document comparable to those which describe actual universities—that is, something like a bulletin or catalogue. Also, in spite of the distinction drawn above between constructive and critical activities, the ideal will not have sprung full blown from the imagination, but will take its main lines from the shape of the educational enterprise as it has defined itself in a democratic setting and from the constraints imposed by current problems. Its function, in common with all utopian speculation, is at least in part a negative one, directed against what is actually the case—against certain notable failures of our present system which, as I see it, spring from flaws in its design. Further, there is to be recognized, as always, a whole set of implicit assumptions imposing its own modality on the scheme. Some of these are unconscious; some can be quickly identified. Among the latter, in particular, is the assumption that what we want is an egalitarian and democratic society. If we really wanted a system based on the concept of an elite, instead of just having one by accident (and that is what some people do want), some rather radical changes in design would be needed.

One further assumption needs explicit treatment, since it has to do with the definition of what a university is. This requires a short excursus. Whatever else may be said of them, universities clearly are part of a complex system whose primary function is educational. If the educational system really *is* a system, no part of it can be discussed adequately without reference to the other parts, and any project for reform in one area must take account of its probable impact on the others. This poses a dilemma for the critic of the university who wishes to restrict his attention to the university alone. A first-rate university can only be the apex of a

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first-rate educational system, whereas the rest of the system in America, taken collectively, is at present about fourth-rate. Nobody wants a fourth-rate university, but anything better will overload the system and will be swamped with remedial cases. Our universities, taken collectively, are about third-rate, and the problem is already evident. (I do not deny the existence of Exeter and Groton, of Harvard and Yale, but address myself to the general case.) The critic can only assume that the rest of the system could in principle be reformed, and I shall—in harmony with the optimistic notes struck earlier—assume this, although there will not be space to go into the mechanism for it. The central conception of the university will therefore ignore the defects in the rest of the system. (In order to preserve a semblance of relevance to contemporary society, it will be necessary to have some components of a remedial sort, which might be thought of as dispensable once there was no longer any need for them. It was in this spirit, as I understand it, that the Pentagon was originally constructed.) Assuming, then, a working system of elementary and secondary schools, technical institutes, and the like, I define the university in a negative way: It is the place where people go when they have exhausted the resources of all the other available institutions, but have not exhausted their own capacity for full-time intellectual work in an institutional setting. I mean this definition to be taken quite seriously and to apply to students and faculty alike. Its force will become clearer as we proceed.

I mention in this definition students and faculty, but make no reference to administrators. This reveals another assumption. The role of administrators will be taken up in its place, but I assume as axiomatic that the definition of this role *follows* the design of the university and not the other way around, whereas faculty and student roles are recognizable independently of and prior to their institutional embodiments. To put the same point in another way: There might be a university without administrators, but there could be no administrators without a university; there might, on the other hand, be professors and students without a university, but there could be no university without professors and students—without, that is, persons playing these respective roles.

If a university is to consist of faculty and students, the first question to be raised in designing it is how they get there. This broaches the subjects of admissions and hiring, and appears to require administrators at once. And of course it does—people to ac-

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knowledge applications, sort dossiers, check credentials, make out income tax forms, write checks, and so on. Our main concern, however, is with the criteria according to which some students are admitted and others rejected, some scholars invited to join the faculty and others not invited to do so. The students are comparatively easy to deal with: Those students will be admitted, up to the capacity of the institution (which will be unspecified, but finite), who meet the definitional criterion proposed above; they have been through the elementary and secondary schools and learned what was taught there, they may or may not have spent a year or two doing something else, but they now want to learn more, to devote most of their time to it, and to do it under institutional supervision. They have looked at the other institutions (technical, professional, and so forth) open to students of their age—and they must *really* have looked and be able to show that they have—in the light of their career interests, if any, and decided that none of them are suitable. They bring with them from the last institution they attended a certificate which testifies that they can profitably undertake further full-time education, that they themselves have untapped resources. All students satisfying these criteria must be found a place in a university if the society is to live up to its Constitutional obligations.

Some features of the present system which have to do with the desire of students to enter the university require comment at this point. Students are often driven into college (the obvious point of entry to the university for somebody just leaving school) because an alternative institution does not exist or is not yet ready for them. Or they may be driven into it for social or economic reasons, without any particular desire to profit from it intellectually. An example of the first case is the man who knows he wants to become a doctor, but has to go to college before he can be admitted to medical school; an example of the second is someone who needs a B.A. as a mark of general culture, or as a union card for white-collar work, or as a talisman against underprivileged or minority status. These cases arise because of the belief of outsiders (counting the medical school and its admissions committee as outside for the time being) that something that can be acquired only in the college is indispensable to the training of certain kinds of persons—candidates for medical school, or for a particular job, or even for recognition as educated members of society. This desideratum cannot be of a merely technical nature, which could clearly (at least in the first case) be taken care of by a special course or two or by on-the-job training; on the

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contrary, it is openly admitted to be *general education.* Millions of pages are devoted to it in the literature. But there are several puzzling things about it.

First of all, there is the assumption that the education the student has received outside the university—in the schools and from other people in a less formal setting—is not in fact the required general education; and that, this being the case, it is up to the university through its liberal arts college to remedy the lack. The puzzling thing about this is that by the time the student gets into the college, the schools have had at him for twelve years or so and society at large for seventeen or eighteen. What can they have been up to all that time? Whatever one may say about the slow rate of development of the human animal, there seems to be little reason to doubt that by the age of eighteen it is possible to acquire the chief manual and intellectual skills and to internalize as much of the culture as will ever be held in common. We do not manage it, but it could be done. After eighteen the processes of learning and acquisition continue indefinitely, but again there is little reason to suppose that the years between eighteen and twenty-two constitute, for the general population, a particularly auspicious period for *generalized* intellectual development. They may indeed be almost totally wasted intellectually, since it is in just this period, plus or minus a few years, that all kinds of quite specialized and non-intellectual interests begin to develop.

It may be, of course, that professional schools, employers, and so forth just do not want to take in people who are too *young.* And in this they may be quite right. But young people grow older whether they are in a college or not, and recent events suggest that they often grow more mature in spite of what happens to them in college rather than because of it. There is of course a determinable statistical proportion of the age group, usually with specialized interests formed earlier, for whom these years are ideal from the point of view of intellectual development, and they always constituted one component of the undergraduate population in the older universities. The other component was traditionally made up of students whose primary reason for attendance was *explicitly* social, and that might seem to provide a justification for the liberal arts college, as indeed for some small private colleges it still does. But things are now taken so seriously that it is hardly possible, particularly in large public universities, to admit this: Colleges are always regarded by their presidents, deans, and commencement

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speakers as *educational* institutions, and thousands of students who would much rather be elsewhere continue to flounder through their required courses. The enterprise, which might have been honestly frivolous and sometimes used to be, has become in many cases ponderously fraudulent.

The trouble can be summed up by saying that in the liberal arts colleges too many people are being taught the rudiments of their culture too late. *The entire curriculum of the liberal arts college is remedial,* at least until it becomes specialized. The liberal arts college, as an instrument of general education, ought to be abolished. Of course at present it cannot be just because of the weaknesses of the school system, which almost guarantee a profound ignorance of the major features of their world and their culture on the part of entering college freshmen. The general education component of the liberal arts college, therefore, stands as one of those Pentagon-like features referred to above—invented out of what should have been a temporary necessity, pending the adjustment of what it might have been hoped were temporary troubles, perpetuated because abnormal conditions persisted, until indeed, both in the military and in the educational cases, they have come to seem normal. But the principles of university admission as formulated above can remain constant; the university begins where the rest of the educational system leaves off and can get rid of general education just as soon as the schools take up an honest responsibility for it.

Having raised the question of admissions, it may be as well to go on at once to the related questions of retention ("good standing") and eventual separation, to use the most neutral term possible. The problem of governance arises more acutely here than in the case of admissions; for while admissions are in principle at least covered by a general rule, retention and the decision as to what credentials (degrees and the like) are to be given to the student on separation involve judgments that will have to be made by somebody for each individual case. I will suggest general rules for these also, but their application will be more difficult. The general rule for retention is that, apart from "criminal" cases, the student should be retained as long as he continues to meet the requirements for admission—that is, as long as the teachers with whom he studies are prepared at the end of their association with him to testify that he can profit from further work. (I assume that they will not so testify if, while he has the necessary mental equipment, he has shown no disposition whatever to use it.) And the general rule for

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separation is that the student should be given a certificate stating that he has completed a certain number of years' study at the institution, with such annotations as to special ability as may be appropriate (as discussed below).

The implicit recommendation in this last general rule is that degrees as we now know them should be abolished. One of the most striking features of the American educational system, which has been sharply thrown into relief by recent events, is the extraordinarily narrow range of conditions under which it is possible to leave an educational institution with honor. There are in fact only three major points in the full-time educational career of the average student at which an honorable separation is possible: graduation from high school, marked by a high school diploma; graduation from college, marked by the award of a bachelor's degree; and graduation with some higher degree. The first two of these normally come at the ages of seventeen or eighteen and twenty-one or twenty-two respectively, the last some indeterminate number of years later. Any other mode of termination of the process of formal education marks the student as in some sense a failure. The high school dropout who, six months before graduation, escapes from what is often an incredibly inappropriate mode of life for a person of his age, has by comparison with his less adventurous colleague who completes the year and gets the diploma an academic score of zero, at least in the eyes of many of the people in whose hands his future career will lie.

Diplomas and degrees were originally invented to mark stages in a carefully planned educational sequence and were awarded not only for having reached the appropriate chronological point without academic mishap, but for having met some definite and definitely situated challenge, such as a series of examinations. In America such formal points of transition have long since been done away with, and diplomas and degrees (with the exception of some higher degrees) are gained by a process of accretion of credits, without any of the drama or stress of the old system. Furthermore, only the most simple and sanguine of observers could pretend that the courses leading up to these degrees are integral or even coherent in the sense that every component is indispensable and interdependent with every other. This being the case, there seems to be no real point to diplomas and degrees except, again, a social one, as providing an excuse for a certain amount of pageantry and self-congratulation.

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I would seriously advocate a standard form of credential, uniform in its concept across the entire nation, which would state simply the institution attended and the number of years of attendance, together with qualifications (if any) earned in special fields and attested to by professionals in those fields. This credential would be given to every student leaving the institution, whenever he happened to do so. The number of years might well be cumulative as between different institutions, so that, assuming eight years of elementary and junior high school, a beginning high school senior who dropped out would receive his eleven-year certificate automatically, with no questions asked. The special qualifications would ideally be inscribed not according to the judgment of the local expert in the subject, but according to some system of judgment (perhaps, although not necessarily, by examination) administered on a national scale by professionals in that area. In some fields, of course, this would be much too formal a mechanism; a fourteen-year certificate, awarded to a student getting married at the end of her sophomore year and attesting to some skill in home economics, ought not to require something like a bar examination before it could be awarded. On the other hand, a sixteen-year certificate in mathematics, equivalent to a B.A. with a major in the subject, might well have its specialist notation certified by the American Mathematical Association. Prospective employers, examining such a certificate, would naturally look to see what institution the student had last attended and make a judgment, just as is now done, in the light of its known quality. But a bright student attending a poor college would have a chance of improving his professional standing considerably with such a national certification. Of course, in one sense something like this happens now with the Graduate Record Examination, but under such a scheme it is to be hoped that the professional organizations themselves, rather than a purely administrative testing service, might undertake the burden of judgment.

I would at this point apologize to the reader for these constant diversions from the subject of government, were it not for the conviction that a great many of our present problems in government spring from a failure to understand fully the nature of the enterprise in which we are engaged, and that, this point once clarified, many of them would solve themselves. Government strictly speaking does come into play, as remarked earlier, in cases where the general rule cannot easily be applied—when it is not certain whether a

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student who clearly can profit from further work really will do so, or whether somebody leaving an institution deserves a special local mark of distinction or censure on his certificate. Who should decide these questions? This raises once again the issue of definition.

If the university is a place where people with certain kinds of talent and ambition go, it is also the community of these people, and according to sound democratic principles should be governed by them or—to the extent that they themselves are the governed—by persons exercising power derived from their consent. (They might, in fact, be legally constituted *as* the community; the existence of boards of trustees, which at the moment most often serve as the legal embodiment of the institution, is not really necessary for that purpose, and elected bodies—perhaps with representation from the community—might well take their place.) The community consists of students and faculty; it is surely unnecessary here to repeat that these two classes find themselves in a symbiotic relationship, that each requires the other, and that, except in anomalous cases such as endowed institutes for research, no university exists more for one than for the other. Invoking the elementary principle of fairness, then, it would seem to follow almost with deductive force that decisions about membership in the community or the collective endorsement by the community of the credentials of some departing member should be made by representative bodies of faculty and students. And again, in a discussion which is already becoming too lengthy, it is surely unnecessary to rehearse the steps by which institutions whose origins in Europe were genuinely communal arrived by metamorphosis at the hierarchical structure with which we are all only too familiar, whose model has become the corporation rather than the community.

One might, in fact, pose the question raised at the beginning of this part of the discussion—Where do the faculty and students come from?—as a question about the criteria for membership in the community of faculty and students. In its simplest form, the criterion would simply be acceptance by the other members of the community; the remarks above about admissions, retention, and so forth serve to indicate conditions under which this acceptance ought normally to be forthcoming, at least in the case of students. For the faculty, some other form of departmental or divisional organization is no doubt essential, whether or not along traditional lines, if only because the competence of any one faculty member to judge the professional standing of his colleagues extends only over a contigu-

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ous proper subset of the faculty as a whole. Thus, admission to the faculty—the initial appointment—will not look very different in the ideal university from the way it looks now.

Retention, however, does need some examination. I do not wish to go into the arguments for and against tenure, but the question seems to me to involve two totally distinct issues: the security of the individual as far as earning his livelihood is concerned; and the nature of the services in exchange for which this security is offered. Tenure, as it affects the first of these issues, has been a necessary and desirable institution. On the second point, however, it has led to abuses. Given that membership on the faculty is assured, a periodical re-examination of an individual's status within it, with a consequent adjustment if necessary, would be extremely salutary. The nature of the adjustment might be more or less severe depending on the outcome of the evaluation, and, given the mores of the academic profession, it would only in extreme cases lead to loss of status. But occasionally it might; and the very possibility that it might would go far to correct a situation in which a minority of privileged faculty members on tenure continues to enjoy high salaries and light teaching loads long after intellectual energy and sense of professional responsibility have been allowed to dwindle away.

Still I have said nothing about administrators. There is indeed a whole segment of the university population as now defined, ranging from trustees to janitors, which is left out by this analysis. And it is deliberately left out. Trustees, presidents, deans, registrars, secretaries, janitors, and the like are not, strictly speaking, part of the university at all—not, at least, as these positions are now interpreted and filled in most American institutions of higher education. They are ancillary to the real business of the university, and only the supplanting of the community model by the corporation model has put them in their present dominant position. I do not wish to be misunderstood as casting any doubt at all on the integrity of persons in such positions or on the way in which they have filled them, once appointed (and given that the duties and powers involved had the warrant of historical precedent). But in the ideal university administrative personnel would be appointed only as needed for the day-to-day running of the institution and would be under the *control* of the community of faculty and students. As in the case of the Pentagon, the military analogy may be helpful; the principle involved is that of civilian control, which in the academic case has

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been lost sight of more completely, if that is possible, than in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their respective Secretaries. In that case, at least, the position of Secretary of the Army exists and is occupied by a civilian, however little real control civil government may exercise over the military establishment.

Again, this does not mean that most of the higher administrative positions now common in the university would be abolished, nor that—as at present—most of them would not be filled from the ranks of the faculty. But it does mean that on taking up such positions a more explicit change in status might have to be insisted upon. The life of the university is intellectual, and justification for membership in it should rest on intellectual qualifications and no others. I am aware that the theory of the multiversity makes this sound like a throwback to ivory-tower detachment, a failure to understand the new responsibility of the university to society, and so forth; but the error in such a conclusion is patent. The university, in fact, can only fulfill its obligation to society by remaining rigorously intellectual. That is its *métier*, and although under the umbrella of the multiversity many other activities are sanctioned, they might just as well be carried on by other institutions, and in a properly designed educational system they would be. The point may seem, and indeed to some extent may be, merely semantic: The needs of society are to be served, and if—as now so often happens—the people who have the training and talents to serve it are also university teachers, what is more natural than that the agencies of service should be located where they find themselves? But it is only too clear what difficulties the concept of the multiversity leads to, once it is allowed to lose its center of historical continuity, which resides solely in the coming together of committed persons for intellectual ends. The commitment of its members to the community of learning has been steadily eroded by nonintellectual commitments, not only external but also internal.

Part of this erosion has come about because of historical developments in the society at large that have had an impact on the university unanticipated by those whose official task was, among other things, precisely to anticipate them. The recent necessity—felt first, to their honor, by students and now increasingly by faculty also—of taking the government of the university, to some degree at least, back into the hands of the academic community as I have defined it constitutes an incredibly damaging indictment of American university administration. Under ideal circumstances admin-

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istrative officers would indeed make the decisions at which these committees are struggling to arrive, subject to the approval of the community; there would be (as there has not been) a clearly defined mechanism of accountability, regularly exercised, and the students and faculty would get on with what they ought to be doing—namely, intellectual work—in the confidence that, to repeat a formula already invoked (and one that ought to be familiar enough to Americans), the powers exercised over them were justly exercised and derived from their consent, and that any abuse of these powers could immediately be corrected by their withdrawal of that consent. A certain amount of active participation in government, provided it does not take too much time, will probably always be desirable, if only to prevent a repetition of the scandalous failure of administration to be sensitive and responsive to changing conditions. But if the proportion of this involvement rises too much, as it is bound to do when a faculty member accepts a full-time administrative position, then the status in the academic community of the faculty member concerned must come into question.

In many public institutions there are regulations about the amount of outside work (consulting, additional teaching, and so on) a faculty member is allowed to undertake; these restrictions have always seemed to me rather bureaucratic, but they do suggest a possible criterion of continued membership in the faculty. I would propose that, instead of reporting outside activities, every member of the faculty should report the proportion of time spent in non-intellectual as opposed to intellectual activities. I use the term "intellectual" in its straightforward sense to mean "requiring the exercise of intellect." The key term is *exercise;* it is possible to know many things and even, to some extent, to reason and to understand without *exercising* any faculty at all. Administrative work under pressure (and what administrative work, these days, is not under pressure?) leads often to a kind of habitual or mechanical conduct, to a preoccupation with time and with the *fact* that problems are resolved, rather than to a preoccupation with substance and the *manner* in which they are resolved. I speak from experience, and again do not wish to be misunderstood as criticizing the beleaguered administrator in his person. But it simply cannot be argued—and hardly any administrators do argue—that the work of running the average administrative office in an American university requires the exercise of intellect for more than a small fraction of the day. Most committee work, for example, is non-intellectual and could per-

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fectly well be done by a reasonably intelligent robot if sufficient information could be put at its disposal.

If he devoted more than a certain proportion of his time—say 50 per cent—to non-intellectual work, the faculty member would be put on adjunct status with reduced participation in academic affairs; if more than some other proportion—say 75 per cent—he would cease to be a member of the *academic* community altogether. Not that his voice would cease to be heard—indeed, just as happens now, people in administrative positions would be expected to have great influence with the faculty because of the conspectus of university affairs provided by their vantage point at the intersection of many different academic circles. But if their active intellectual life had in fact shrunk to the degree indicated by my suggested percentages, it is likely that the criteria of judgment according to which they habitually operated would to that extent begin to diverge from those intuitively adhered to by people still in the thick of the intellectual enterprise. Not that administration *need* involve such a shrinkage: In a well-run institution with adequate clerical help, deans and even presidents might very well occupy themselves with intellectual concerns more than half the time. As it is, they always promise themselves they will, but they hardly ever do. There can, in fact, be detected a kind of crisis of authenticity on the part of university administrators, attested to by the indignation with which they privately greet (and not always privately) arguments like this one. The crisis could, of course, be simply resolved by crossing the line back from administration to teaching and research; but just as it is difficult for students to leave the university with honor at any other point than their proper commencement, so it has been made difficult for administrators to sustain their own conception of their prestige or, for that matter, to sustain their salaries through the process of re-entry to the academic community. The only honorable exits for an administrator, at least in the eyes of many of them, are death, retirement, or apotheosis to an even more exalted administrative position. Some manage to sidestep into government or politics, but rarely—although there have been some notable exceptions—is a total rehabilitation successful.

In the ideal university, most high administrative offices would be held by faculty members for short and definitely terminating periods—say, three-year terms with a limit of two such terms consecutively. During their terms of office, they would throw themselves almost completely into administrative affairs, which is virtu-

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ally essential if the full range of possibility is to be realized, but they would cease to be voting members of the academic community. At the end of their term of office, they would be received back into the academic community with honor and gratitude. In the anomalous situation where somebody actually preferred administrative to intellectual pursuits—a circumstance which would cast some doubt on the nature of his original commitment to the intellectual—he might with the consent of the faculty and subject to the mechanism of accountability referred to above continue to exercise his functions, and once in a great while this might turn out to be the best possible thing for the university. Great university presidents have not been absent from the scene, although they have been extremely rare. But the idea that there might be more than two thousand people in the country able and, what is more important, willing to occupy such positions with any dignity at all is grotesque. It is easy to see how the notion of the college or university presidency as a lifetime position came into being, but the proliferation of institutions of higher education should long since have suggested that a different solution would eventually be necessary. With several hundred advertised vacancies in the ranks of presidents, it may at last be realized that the eventuality has overtaken us.

Having got the faculty and students, along with whatever administrative personnel is needed, together into a university community, we have still to discuss how they sustain themselves there, what they do, and what kind of *place* it is. To start with the last of these: Ideally the university is a place not just to work (as though it were an office), but to live and work. Its physical design should reflect the nature of the living and working, and the ancillary services provided should be so arranged as to facilitate a certain quality of life and work. The university should be a community, and it should be an intellectual community; it may also be incidentally, but only incidentally, a community of another sort—social, domestic, and so on. Its members ought to live as close to it and participate as much in it as their own conception of the relation between their intellectual and private lives will allow. In the case of students, this will most frequently mean actually living on the premises; intellectual and private lives seldom coincide totally, but particularly in the case of students the closer the better. It cannot be too much stressed that being a member of a university cannot be much less than a full-time occupation. The separation between intellectual and private life is likely to be greater on the

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part of the faculty than on the part of students, but even they will spend a high proportion of their waking time on the campus, and the phenomenon of the multiversity professor who comes three times a week and disappears will be unknown.

This state of affairs, of course, can only be realized if the physical conditions are right; there must be adequate library resources and study space, adequate laboratories and studios. The general rule should be that material things are as unobtrusive as possible and completely taken care of. Housing, meals, laundry, child-care, and other such mundane details should be in the hands of people professionally equipped to deal with them, and members of the university, whether faculty or students, should simply not have to worry about them. The point of this is not to offer them a life of luxury, but to submerge the practical to the level of habit, so as to make possible a genuine continuity of the intellectual. This condition has hardly ever been achieved in America, although it used to be standard, for example, in the older universities in England. Even there it is giving way. The harassed married graduate student, struggling to make ends meet, is familiar all over the world. His life is the antithesis of what it ought to be. (I am not suggesting that students ought not to be married, just that they ought not to be harassed or have to struggle to make ends meet.)

But how, it will be asked, can the financial conditions for all this possibly be achieved? That brings us to the question of sustaining people once they get into the university. Here it seems to me quite clear that every student ought to be on full scholarship, and that these scholarships should run for reasonable amounts of time—four full years for an undergraduate, three to five for a graduate student. The conditions for retention of a scholarship would be essentially the same as conditions for remaining as a member of the university community. The means of achieving this on a sound financial basis seems to me comparatively simple. A university, in order to be recognized as such, would have the responsibility of laying down the minimal conditions for facilitation of the intellectual life on the part of its members, and a national scheme of financial support would be put in operation. But it would be at least partly self-sustaining if something like the following could be done: For every year of full scholarship support (and everybody, regardless of means, would automatically have such support) a student would be assessed, in perpetuity, and starting immediately after the end of his last year on scholarship, an annual tax of some definite

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proportion of his income—say, .5 per cent. (The figure might have to be higher, or it might be lower; I do not have the actuarial skill to make the computation exactly.) This tax would be collected by the federal government as an integral part of income tax and would be identified on income tax returns. But it would be credited to the college that had originally given the scholarship, on a pro-rata basis if more than one was involved. Colleges whose alumni became prosperous would thereby automatically become prosperous; but no college would be allowed to fall below a certain minimum level of support, according to an agreed formula—a provision which would be extremely important for new institutions having as yet no alumni. The money now given by the foundations, the states, and the government might well continue to be given and would constitute a reserve for cases in which the formula led to inequalities.

The principal drawback to this scheme is that it puts a premium on training students to make large amounts of money. In this, however, it merely accepts a regrettable, but apparently inescapable feature of society as presently organized (and assumes no social revolution of a radical kind). Although it might certainly be hoped that the university would produce some alumni who were comparatively indifferent to such things, most of them would try to make as much money as possible anyway. Since there is, as various studies have attested, a rough correlation between financial success and level of educational achievement, institutions that were better from an intellectual point of view might be expected to reap a corresponding financial reward. The scheme is, in a way, only a formalization of what already happens informally through alumni associations and so on, but it would remove the strong element of charity and patronage characteristic of alumni giving and also the striking differential now to be observed between institutions with a strong alumni spirit and institutions with none. Alumni spirit is characteristic of the kinds of institution mentioned earlier as having a primarily social function, and the wealth of their alumni often has little to do with the educational benefits they received during their college years. A percentage assessment would of course, incidentally, tap private fortunes as well as earned salaries; it would not at once erase the social differential between old private and new public institutions. But it would go a long way toward removing at least part of the problem of educational financing, past the age of compulsory school attendance, from the political arena.

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There remains the question of curriculum, the nature of the central activity of the university. "The curriculum" is, at least, a familiar phrase. But on examination it reveals an assumption about higher education which we have all tacitly accepted, but which is in flat contradiction with the theoretical foundations of our form of government and with what is known about the process of intellectual development beyond the elementary stages. (Not much *is* known, as a matter of fact, since learning theory has taken most of its data from animals and children.) Democratic principles require that adults should be self-determining agents; normal eighteen-year-old humans are adults; therefore, normal eighteen-year-old humans should be self-determining agents. We do not bring them up to be in any but peripheral senses, under the mistaken impression that the education of the young is best understood by the old. But education is the central and most serious part of their lives and by then they ought to be in charge of it. To what extent, then, should we lay down the course it should take?

Obviously education cannot be entirely unstructured, and in certain areas—notably mathematics and the sciences—it may be genuinely necessary to tackle the material in a certain order. At the very early stages, in the schools, there may even be some point in arranging the areas themselves in a certain order. Even in "soft" disciplines, there may be better and worse ways of mastering content, and professors of those disciplines are likely to know these ways better than students do. So the notion of *a* curriculum, leading to some well-defined academic end, is still a useful one; it is *the* curriculum to which I am objecting. Borrowing Kantian language, the point could be made by saying that there is no categorical curriculum, although there may be many hypothetical curricula. But to enter upon one of these, the student must know what end he wishes to pursue, and this is what democratic principles forbid us to decide for him.

But how is the student to choose his academic ends? In order to do so intelligently, he must know what the alternatives are, and this throws us back to the question of general education raised and lamented above. One component of general education does, perhaps, properly belong in the college, although it is hardly ever included. This is what might be called the scope of intellectual inquiry, the interrelation of the disciplines, the "map of knowledge." It consists of what George Sarton used to call "knowledge of the second kind"—not knowing all subjects, but knowing what all sub-

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jects are *about;* not having the facts and theories on the tip of one's tongue, but knowing where to go to find out about them. The first course in the ideal university would in fact be a kind of prospectus of what was available there, taught jointly by the most talented and most lucid minds the university possessed. After that, there would be no required courses. But there would be plenty of opportunity for students to find out, from professors in each discipline, how best to proceed in gaining a mastery of that discipline, supposing that to be what they wished to do.

Something like this, it is true, is beginning to emerge in various universities now. There is great reluctance to turn students loose with their own destinies at such a tender age, but the conviction is beginning to spread that this must be done. In the emancipation of the student, however, we are in danger of overlooking the other half of the academic community. The professor, it is true, is in a slightly different position: The student pays, directly or indirectly, for what he learns; the professor is paid for what he teaches. It is therefore reasonable to assign teachers to courses. But the ideal relationship between students and professors would be a dialectical one, setting what the former want to learn over against what the latter want to teach, and arriving at a synthesis acceptable to both. A teacher would, as now, be hired by his department or by some equivalent (and autonomous) subdivision of the faculty. But there would be no list of courses made up by some third person before he ever came to teach or any student signed up to learn; in consultation with his colleagues (both faculty and student), it would be determined from semester to semester—but as far in advance as prudence required—what the content of his teaching would be.

All this sounds like chaos, like anarchy, like the widespread institutionalization of self-indulgence for students and faculty alike. But is there really any evidence that the population at large would be worse educated under this system than it is now? And would not the responsibility for failures, if any, in the academic system be more readily and more justly attributed than it is now? We can no longer argue—if we ever legitimately could—that young people do not know what is good for them; that we submitted to intellectual discipline, while they want to be entertained. Whatever we submitted to, the conditions of our society were such that we had an interest in doing so, and all my principle requires is that the same conditions be guaranteed to the present generation. That, too, may be a greater challenge than the universities can meet by them-

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selves; whether or not it is will be seen in the event. But what will almost certainly follow—and if the notion of the university as a community is realized, it will follow with much less difficulty than might be feared—is a radical change in the internal organization of the curriculum. None of the habitual features of that organization—courses, hours, grades, semesters, examinations, and so on—should be exempt from scrutiny, and the feeblest imagination that still has life in it can think of alternatives for all of them.

Imagination is, of course, what is needed, and imagination leading to more systematic and coherent projects than the fragment I have presented here. At an earlier point I made in passing a suggestion for tapping the imagination with which the academic community taken as a whole is, I am convinced, more richly endowed than we often give it credit for. There may be other ways of doing it, but it must be done. And it must, I repeat, be done integrally; we need a model for the whole system, not just the university; even one for the whole society, not just the educational part of it. The work involved really has three components: a factual component to tell us exactly where we are; an imaginative component to tell us where we might ideally be; and a political component to indicate how, given the constraints of the actual situation, we might make practical moves toward the ideal. Incredible numbers of factual studies, some of them completely trivial, have been carried out, as have a few political studies, generally of restricted scope; but there have been hardly any imaginative ones. The order should be reversed. As I said at the beginning, there are many possible solutions; we cannot expect to arrive, in the teeth of social and political turmoil, at a unique ideal, ready to be implemented at once. But we might, if we had enough alternative models at our disposal, be able to choose the one most readily implemented and win ourselves some time in which we might see how to move to an even better one. "Imagination seizes power," as the French students, inspired by the Surrealists, cried last May. That is indeed as it should be, but imagination has work to do if it is to prepare itself for this responsibility.

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CLARK KERR

Governance and Functions

THE GOVERNANCE of the American college and university is a residue of traditions and arrangements that are more the gift of history than of conscious thought. This system of governance is now in crisis as never before, and history alone will not dictate the future. The way out of this crisis, if there is a way out, will be extraordinarily difficult because of the peculiarities and complexities of the academic institution. The campus is inherently difficult to govern—even in theory.

One way of looking for solutions is from the perspective of the several functions of higher education which, in their many and changing combinations, affect both the general character of individual institutions and the degree of their internal variety. This functional approach suggests one general strategy for working out the manifold proposed adjustments now in controversy.

The Residue of History

Academic governance in the United States has at least four features that distinguish it from patterns elsewhere. The first is the heavy reliance on a board of trustees, regents, or managers composed of people drawn primarily from outside academic life and from outside governmental authority. There are boards or councils in Britain, Canada, and Australia, among other countries, as well as at some of the private universities of Japan, but they are nearly always much weaker than American boards in their exercised authority and are usually of a more mixed representation, including faculty and sometimes student representatives.

The second special feature is the comparatively strong role of the president, who is appointed without a specific term of office as a

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full-time executive with a relatively large administrative staff. He has considerably more authority and opportunity for initiative, narrow as these limits may be, than his counterpart vice-chancellor or rector.

A third characteristic is the monolithic nature of the campus. To begin with, there is a campus as compared with the scattered endeavors, for example, in Paris or Buenos Aires. And on the campus, the central administrative organization is a single college of letters and sciences or arts and sciences. It includes most of the instruction and much of the research. Residence halls are simply residence halls, and not also academic units. Departments within the college are clearly subsidiary administrative units, as compared with the organization of a series of more or less autonomous faculties in many universities abroad—faculties of science and philosophy and law and medicine. Some of these monolithic colleges of letters and science in the United States are quite huge and have a single curricular policy and a single grading system.

The fourth identifying trait is the importance of external, but nongovernmental forces in the conduct of the affairs of the campus. In the United States, the alumni have an influence found almost nowhere else. Industry, agriculture, and professional associations have their points of contact, their advisory committees, their influence over funds. Private foundations advise about and finance endeavors according to their own systems of priorities.

This system of governance contrasts with others around the world. In Britain, the organized faculty has predominant influence, with the power of the University Grants Committee growing steadily. Universities are generally smaller in size and more divided internally into colleges and institutes (as in London, the largest, which still has under 25,000 students). In France, authority has resided until recently with the separate faculties and their deans and with the Ministry of Education; in Germany, it has rested with the individual full professor directing his area of scholarship and with the State government; in Russia, with the government formally and the Party informally and with the Academy that stands outside the universities with a degree of independence; in Japan, with the organized faculty; and in Latin America officially with the faculties, under their deans, and unofficially and intermittently also with students and heads of states. In Latin America, as elsewhere, Catholic universities give more power to the rector and more influence to the church than do others. As a general rule,

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faculties and governments are the dominating forces outside the United States.

The American system bears the marks of its origins in the Protestant sects of the early colonies. These Protestant sects emphasized the supremacy of the parishioners over the ministers; it was natural that they should also provide control by leaders of the community over the new colleges. If there was a model outside the colonies, it was probably Edinburgh which had a council largely composed of town councilmen and clergy. Similar arrangements existed at Leyden and Geneva. The earliest local councils were established in Italy when faculty members took refuge in the protection of the city fathers from the harsh rule of the students. Thus the rise of the city under control of its burghers was also a precedent for the board of the American college. It would have seemed natural, at a time when the church and the city were being placed under citizen control, to apply the same principle to the college. The populism of the nineteenth century in America added strength to this tradition—the college served the people and the board represented the people.

The president of the early college was like the minister of a Protestant church—in fact, most presidents were ministers drawn from the church. When the corporation became a more dominant institution, the president became more like the head of a corporation.

The single college of letters and science grew out of the unified classical college with its single curriculum and single faculty. Only at the University of Virginia, apparently following the French system, were the professors originally organized into eight separate schools. As the campus grew and departments were established, particularly after the Civil War and after the rise of science as against the classical curriculum, the college of letters and science became the administrative unit for the departments and the central unit for the budget, faculty appointments, approval of courses, and curricular requirements.

The involvement of private groups from outside the campus grew out of the dedication to service by the campus, particularly since the Civil War, the positions of power in society held by industrial and agricultural groups, and also the reliance on the private philanthropy of alumni and, later, of foundations as well.

Changes have taken place. Board members are no longer primarily from the ministry, but from business—as Veblen pointed out and did not like fifty years ago, but then he had not liked the

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ministers either. The president is no longer a minister, but an executive. The college of letters and science is no longer so dominant, with the growth of professional schools, research institutes, and graduate divisions. The outside private forces have shifted in importance from the churches to agriculture, to industry, to the professions, to the contiguous population. Faculty members have organized into senates and increasingly attained dominant power in academic areas, particularly since World War I. Students have gradually gained more freedom through the reduction of *in loco parentis*, the rise of the elective system for choosing courses, and the establishment of extracurricular activities under their own control, mostly in the period since the Civil War.

Changes have taken place, but the basic structural characteristics of a strong board, a relatively strong president, a largely monolithic internal structure, and a large role for private organizations from outside academic life remain about as they were in 1900 and in some respects in 1636.

The Pressures for Change

Substantive issues may or may not be settled easily and peacefully; but redistribution of power is always fought out with difficulty. The campus is currently passing from a concentration on individual issues growing out of interests to a confrontation over power growing, in part, out of principle.

There are more claimants for power than ever before, and there is no more power to be divided. Someone must lose if others gain—a zero-sum game. One gainer is the government, state and federal. The major shift in influence since World War II has been to public agencies. The reasons are clear. More of the institutions of higher education are under public control, and more of the money in both public and private institutions is public money. Public interest in higher education has also risen. More young people attend from more strata of society, and the actions of higher education, in research and service and dissent, increasingly affect more of the population. Higher education has become everybody's business. The campus is no longer on the hill with the aristocracy, but in the valley with the people.

State governments are exercising more fiscal control and more influence over direction of growth, usually through coordinating councils, than was the general situation historically. And, cur-

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rently at least, there is a renewed state interest in the appropriateness of the relationships of students and faculties to political issues and to political action.

But the great new force since World War II has been the federal government. It now supplies one fourth of all funds spent by institutions of higher education. It has contributed more than one fourth of the new initiatives: toward science, toward residence halls, toward more equality of opportunity to attend college, and in many other ways. And it, too, has an interest in the conduct of the campus within the political arena. Federal interest as yet is fractionized among many federal agencies and several congressional committees, contrary to the situation in most other nations and contrary also to that in the fifty states where control is more unified; but this interest is increasingly concentrated in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Less power and less influence on the direction of change now reside on campus; on campus, the big losers, particularly in domination of the budget, have been the board and the president. Their best instrument of control is now shared with others, and the American pattern is approaching the world pattern.

The public campus in disarray internally is particularly open to further intrusions from the state and the federal government. Internal harmony is the price of autonomy, and this price is not now being paid.

Less power on campus is met by new claimants for that power. The great new force is the students. There are more of them; they are more activist; they have more grievances against the campus and against society; and they are already making gains, and they may make more. For the first time, they are challenging the inner sanctum of the campus where the faculty and the administration have ruled supreme, challenging control over the curriculum and the use of the budget. Earlier they had asked for more freedom for themselves; now they wish to reduce the established authority of others. This is a harder challenge. The initial loser before this new force is the dean of students and then the president; before long, it may be the faculty. The sharpest challenges may come to be between the faculty which once supported the students against the administration and the students who, having disposed of the administration as an intervening power, directly confront the faculty. On campus, the students are the new men of power.

The faculty is in a less clear position. It is gaining power from

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the administration in those segments of higher education where it has had little—the state colleges, the community colleges, and the lesser of the liberal arts colleges. About half of all faculty members are at such institutions. Gains take the form of stronger academic senates and faculty councils, but also, and potentially more significantly, of union organization. For the first time, unionization is penetrating higher education on an important scale, sometimes aided by state laws that favor unions and look upon academic senates as company-dominated organizations. When this happens, not only is some power shifted to the faculty, but it also comes to be expressed in the new form of employee-employer relations rather than the older collegial sharing of certain authority. There is a change in locus of power and in the philosophy of its expression.

In some places the faculty will gain power from the administration, often in major ways; but it may also lose to the students, sometimes in major ways. The net effect could possibly be a negative one for the faculty in terms of total power. It should be noted that not only are nearly all faculty members happy to take power from the administration, but also that some of them are happy to turn power over to the students. This is particularly true of younger faculty members who see the power of the older faculty members being taken away, and not their own—for they have little. Thus, while the faculty may lose power on a net basis, this does not mean that it will necessarily be unanimously unhappy about this shift.

The least clear trend in governance is what will happen to faculty power vis-à-vis the students. Students are historically changeable in their interests, and it is not certain how long the drive for influence in traditional faculty areas of dominance will continue. Also, faculties are historically conservative, and their capacity for resistance to change is quite substantial. Additionally, the public backlash against student activism can potentially strengthen the hands of the faculties as it did in Bologna centuries ago (and strengthen the hands of the public authorities at the same time). A crucial question will be the degree of unity within faculty ranks. Student seizure of faculty authority is likely only when it draws substantial support from within the faculty itself. Faculties recently have been on the run in the face of the sudden student attacks. If and when they consolidate their new positions, they may be virtually unmovable.

The two net losers are clearly the board and the president. The board is in an increasingly difficult position. Federal and state

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agencies make decisions it once made. The campus, particularly in the case of the universities and larger state colleges, is now too complex and too dynamic to be subject to detailed decision-making; yet many boards historically have been managerial boards. It is difficult to become a performance review board since nobody knows exactly what kind of performance is being reviewed: There is no quarterly test of profit or loss. The campus concentrates on inputs, not outputs, and performance is concerned with outputs, with value added to inputs. As a consequence, many boards respond to the special interests of their members and the current headlines.

The president loses to everybody, partly because he has had the most to lose originally, but also because he has no firm base of support in the power struggle, no natural constituency of his own. He long ago ceased to have much of what Veblen called "erudition"; he now ceases to be much of a "captain."

New outside groups also seek influence, chiefly the cities and the minorities, and they are not so discreet in their approaches as agriculture and the alumni have learned to become.

Several special situations exist. The Catholic colleges are moving from religious to secular control and from domination by the president to a sharing of authority with the faculty. Negro colleges are seeing the once masterful presence of the president—indispensable ambassador to the white power structure—reduced in stature as both faculty and students are less impressed than they once were. State colleges and community colleges, where the president historically has personally done all the hiring and firing, are witnessing faculty insurgence, and at some places even the commuter students have now become activist. Administrative authority is being reduced particularly in these three segments.

The forces that have the operative influence are those that can get the changes they want. Since World War II, these have been particularly the federal government and now the students. It is their changes which have prevailed and are prevailing. Nor is this surprising. The public interest in higher education has grown, and the methods of influence have always existed. The influence of youth has arrived on the "tidal wave" of numbers and the new tactics of confrontation. So much of the recent history of higher education has been written by federally sponsored science and by rising numbers of students that governance could not well escape these forces.

The nature of the power struggle has changed. Formerly it was the faculty demanding freedom from the authority of the president

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and the board in the name of academic freedom with the American Association of University Professors determining the basic lines that divided freedom from unwarranted control. Now it is the campus asking for autonomy from the government and, as yet, the lines have not been clearly drawn nor the protective agency devised that will differentiate autonomy from undue domination. The battle has moved to another part of the terrain, and there are new contestants.

Another change has been that part of the conflict has been internalized. The administration has always been looked upon as being partially foreign and thus subject to attack. The internal academic community has been viewed as composed of teachers and students. And now there is conflict within that community. Some of the students are against some of the faculty, and the faculty itself is divided. The academic community historically has faced its enemies outside and to the right. Now it finds attacks coming also from inside and mainly from the left. The "community of scholars" is now fighting within itself. The battle is not over a hated fascism without, but rather over a partially cherished syndicalism within.

A Confusion of Forms

The campus is a Tower of Babel in many ways, including governance. And Hell hath few terrors like confusion sharply challenged—which is where higher education finds itself today.

A. J. Muste once wrote that a trade union had a divided soul. It was an "army," but also a "town meeting" and a "business enterprise." It could not be all of these things at once and yet it had to be. So also the university: It is many things to many people and many things to itself. It is a guild where masters train apprentices, where expertise is supreme, a guild run by the masters, by the faculty. It is also a market place where students choose one campus instead of another and move from one campus to another, where they choose one course of study and one professor rather than another. Campuses and professors offer their wares, and students individually express their preferences. The customers pick and choose. The rules of the market place apply, even though the curriculum does provide a good many "tie-in" sales.

The university is also, to some degree, a democracy. Decisions are made that require the consent of the governed; rules are issued; and discipline is exercised. In a democracy, one man has one vote

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and is entitled to a jury of his peers; and the students are in the majority.

It is a corporation with property, endowments, a reputation, a permanent life to preserve as against the difficulties of the moment. A board of directors should have the competence to manage the institution and look out for its long-run welfare. No group that comes and goes has the knowledge or the interest to do so. The directors represent the integrity of the institution.

It is a bureaucracy with rules to be applied impartially, accounts to be kept, and books to be stored as efficiently as possible. The executive runs the administration. It is a series of semi-autonomous service bureaus. Each bureau provides information to interested persons in industry, government, and agriculture. It needs an executive secretary working under a committee of the people being served. It is an agent of the state that spends state money and provides society with the research, skills, and consultation that are so essential to the progress of an industrial economy.

It is a church with a religion. It believes in the unfettered search for truth, in free expression of opinion without fear, in preservation of the past, including all books however offensive they may be currently, and in access on merit and the granting of grace on merit. Its principles are more important than service, or rules, or votes, or consumer preference. It is the keeper of the good, the true, and the beautiful; of culture. It perpetuates a spirit of inquiry and integrity. Its religion is not subject to compromise.

It is also a community, and the essence of community is that it is voluntarily held together by the common standards and interests of its members. Community follows the "will of the meeting" which requires more than a majority vote, and it is based upon a consensus about purpose and process. Traditionally, the academic community has been marked by tolerance among its members in their daily relations and by mutual persuasion as the basis of change; the application of power has been muted in the conduct of its internal affairs.

The university is all of these things, but it is also none of them in total. Perhaps most of all it has been a community with an implicit consensus that the guild of the faculty ran the curriculum and the research; the market choices of the students helped determine which campuses and which areas of study grew and declined; the democracy of the undergraduates governed extracurricular activities; the board watched out for the capital investment and the brand

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name; the president ran the day-to-day administrative affairs; the deans kept the students and the parents and the farmers and the doctors reasonably happy; the society was served in fact, but attacked on principle and expected to keep its distance; and everybody respected the academic faith and showed tolerance toward his fellow believer. Each element had its own domain. All elements had a common concern for the purposes of the community and the welfare of their fellow participants.

Much of this is now being challenged. The consensus is fading, and in some places, at some times, it no longer exists. The new crisis of governance is located in the dissolution of the old consensus. Without consensus, the campus can perish.

If Governance Followed Function

The functions of higher education are diverse, more so than the unholy trinity of teaching and research and service implies. And these functions are not inherently best subject to the same form of governance.

The main groups of functions are these. First are those associated with production: the talent hunt before and during college, the provision of professional and technical training, the conduct of research, and the extension of service. Second are those associated with consumption: the creation of opportunities for a general education, the invention and maintenance of interesting communities for daily living on campus, the provision of custodial services like medical care and counseling and guidance, and the provision of a holding operation where students can drop in and out as they change career and life plans. Third are those associated with citizenship: the provision of remedial work for people deprived at earlier levels of education, the conduct of basic "acculturation" to democratic principles and cultural patterns, and the development of commentary upon, criticism about, and dissent toward the surrounding society.

The faculty would seem to be in a particularly good position to govern professional and technical training, research, and dissent—these are the areas where expertise is or should be supreme—and to consider general policy for "acculturation" (if anyone can). The students are in an advantageous position to share in the governance of general education (with the interested faculty) and of community life (with sympathetic administrators); the administration is

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most suited to govern the talent hunt (with faculty advice), the service activities (with advice from the groups specifically to be served), the custodial functions (with student advice), the holding operations (with faculty advice), and the remedial activities (with faculty advice).

Important qualifications are necessary. As two examples, the balance of research effort and its conduct without secrecy are of concern to the entire community, and community life must be conducted within the limits of the general law applicable to all citizens.

This particular functional distribution of governance would mean major changes from common practice: The faculty would assume authority over the rules governing dissent (such campus rules will only be effective anyway with faculty approval); and students would share substantial authority over the pre-professional curriculum and over community life on campus—authority that now resides with the faculty for the former and the administration for the latter.

Two of these shifts of authority would run counter to current public opinion: that to the faculty on dissent when the public has its suspicions, and that to the students on community life when the public has its fears. But the only viable rules on dissent will be faculty rules and public law, and the only viable community life will be responsive to the students and acceptable to them. One of the problems of governance today is that changes which the campus requires are changes which much of the public abhors; and that the changes affecting political action and styles of life which find broad public support are anathema to the campus.

A missing link in governance in the United States is an over-all council of the total campus community—students, faculty, administrators, trustees, alumni—charged with discussing common concerns, such as academic freedom, institutional autonomy, continuity and integrity of operations, over-all functions, and governance. Such a council would seek to evolve and preserve a consensus about the community as a whole and to protect the academic faith. The Australian universities have done and are doing particularly well in providing such councils.

The board, composed largely of lay members, should, I believe, be kept, with some changes in some situations. The board, when properly constituted, can serve as a buffer against improper external pressures. It can be, and often has been, a dynamic force in assuring progressive change as against the conservatism of the fa-

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culty. Additionally, it brings competence in handling many business and financial matters, and serves as the guardian of the long-run interests of the institution. Its role often needs clarification—particularly as to how it may best review performance; and its membership needs scrutiny—particularly as to how members may best be chosen to assure an understanding of and devotion to the institution in its myriad aspects.

Clarification is also necessary of both the legitimate interests and the limits of interference of state and federal governments.

All the points raised have certain implications for different types of institutions. The faculty would have even more authority over the university; the students would assume more influence over the liberal arts college or the "cluster" college on a university campus; and the administration would maintain much of its predominance in the community college. Nevertheless, the central suggestion is that governance should be related to a careful consideration of functions.

The crisis over governance is due, in part, to the rise in importance of certain functions—the rise of the consumption functions as pressed by the students and the rise of the dissent function as pressed by students and some faculty. The existing system of governance has not been well adapted to these new emphases.

A Pragmatic Pluralistic Strategy

The problems of governance in higher education are so complex that no single solution is possible—situations vary from campus to campus and within a campus from one major function to another. Nor are perfect solutions likely—perfection from one point of view is imperfection from another. Nor are permanent solutions likely—institutions change and the interests and roles of their several constituencies change, and, also, experience accumulates.

Attempted solutions on the basis of ideology—all power to the faculty or all power to the students or all power to the regents who represent the people—are fraught with danger. There can be no clear preference for one solution versus another solution on principle, given the nature of the academic institution; and ideological solutions tend to be absolutist, authoritarian, and across-the-board in a situation that calls for tolerance, a large measure of individual freedom, and the precise fitting of governance to special situations. Attempted solutions on the basis of power alone—on who has the

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money or the votes or mob pressure—can tear a campus apart, and once torn apart it is hard to put together again.

A practical, pragmatic approach seems more sensible. An effort should be made to sort out the general issue of governance into its component parts, and then to approach each part in the light of the total problem. Area by area, the central questions should be who has an interest in the problem and who has competence to deal with it. The test should be performance. If performance is good, the argument for change is reduced. If performance is bad, the argument for change is enhanced. As an example, the undergraduate curriculum for non-majors is a disaster area on many campuses. The faculty as a whole has little or no interest in it, and many students are dissatisfied with it. Here is an area where the faculty cannot be proud of its record, and where the students have a great interest and some competence. Where the faculty has done well, as in some liberal arts colleges, the case for student participation is less persuasive.

This practical, pragmatic approach can lead to a whole series of agreements, area by area, at any moment of time. In fact, this approach is being followed, hesitantly and too slowly, in the United States, but particularly in Britain, Canada, and Australia. France and Germany, by contrast, are searching for across-the-board solutions of one-half power to the students or one-third power to the students in all areas. A more pragmatic series of solutions might lead to the conclusion that power should be total in some areas and zero in others.

Governance problems are best handled function by function. Also, academic governance is best conducted on a face-to-face basis within small communities. This suggests that separate institutions should be created to handle separate functions (particularly when the functions are not compatible—as, for example, specialized research versus general education for the non-majors). Where several functions are combined in single institutions, there should be considerable decentralization of governance. It also suggests that institutions, both in total and in their component parts, should be of modest size. Structure and governance are interrelated.

Massive size is an enemy of effective governance in the academic world with its great variety of activities, interests, and personalities. A campus of large size might best be viewed as a series of communities within a common environment, rather than as a single monolithic community; this is how Harvard is organized.

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Higher education in the United States is now re-examining the system of governance given to it by history. A new series of consensuses is needed—not one over-all "best" solution, not one single preferred form. Variety in solutions should match the variety of situations, and this is almost infinite. Many small agreements will come closer to providing effective governance in totality than will any global approach. An examination of functions is essential to the success of the endeavor. The task is to match the form of governance with the function—to use the guild where the guild works best, democracy where democracy works best, and so forth. We are fortunate in having a variety of forms available to match against the variety of functions. The test of the matching will be found in the performance—let the governance fit the functions. Clarity about functions is becoming essential to sanity in governance now that the consensus which embraced the confusions of the past has disintegrated into conflict.

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MORRIS B. ABRAM

Reflections on the University in the New Revolution

We are currently in the midst of a revolution. The real nature of the profound social movement taking place today has been somewhat obscured because thus far it has been relatively bloodless, but we must acknowledge that it is indeed a genuine revolution. Much of its thrust concerns the distribution of power within the society. Part of its substance we should accept and absorb, but its proclivity toward violence and intolerance must be rejected if the liberal society is to survive.

There is little prospect that the over-all political aims of the revolution will be achieved, for there is no evidence that the society at large is in either a revolutionary or a pre-revolutionary stage politically.[1] But much of the revolution that deals with the arts, life styles, and various matters of personal taste has already been widely accepted. Portions of it—in the area of obscenity law, for example—have even been ratified by the United States Supreme Court.

The university has been the site of a good deal of the ferment and turbulence of the new revolution because it is the present habitation of its most articulate and dedicated leaders—and their followers. The university has come under severe pressure and attack because it is near, tolerant and vulnerable—and because, as an authoritative institution (which it must be), it can be made to appear authoritarian (which a good university certainly is not). I would not go so far as one foreign scholar who recently told me: "The American university has no educational problems—only the intrusion of political problems into educational affairs."

The campus phase of the new revolution has forced a re-examination of the nature of the university, its governance, and its role in society. Important questions have been raised, and many opinions shifted. I want to explore here some of the major issues I have con-

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sidered during my first year in office as President of Brandeis University. Many of these issues were raised by the students; some indicate the perception, sensitivity, and intellectual grasp of our young people, while others evince inexperience and confusion. Harris Wofford, President of the State University College at Old Westbury, Long Island, has said: "Maybe the students' role is as a giant Socrates, beard and all, asking very hard questions. They have stung us very hard, but we need to sting them out of their muddled thinking."

The "Neutrality" Issue

"Neutrality" is a critical campus issue and one on which my views have changed. There is a popular dialogue today that relates to the university's obligation to play a neutral role in our society. In my judgment, this dialogue is largely frustrating and unrewarding. Partisans in one camp describe a university that never was, while those in the other describe a university that never should be.

Of all the institutions in Western society, the independent judiciary has been the one traditionally acclaimed as the most neutral. Yet the Supreme Court is, after all, a court of men and can only aspire to neutrality, at different times rendering different decisions based on essentially the same facts and the same Constitution. But the Justices are not neutral about their commitment to neutrality. They have pledged themselves to use all of their skills and intellectual resources in the attempt to be neutral. One need read only a paragraph or two from a Holmes or Brandeis opinion to be struck by the passion with which these men aspired to dispassionate analysis.

Similarly, a university cannot be a totally neutral institution. As every other corporation, the university, an artificial being created by the law, acts through men. Its mission—education and research—and its commitment to the liberal belief that man is improvable in an ameliorative, evolutionary process comprise a rudimentary sort of constitution to which it is bound. Within these limits and by every effort, the university must—like the independent judiciary—strive to be objective and neutral.

The university plays a central role in transmitting present knowledge and extending the frontiers of truth, preserving what Whitehead termed "the connection between knowledge and the zest of life by uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning."[2] It must remain a focal point from which new knowledge emanates and be a wellspring of criticism of the institu-

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tions of society. And it should encourage innovation in the realm of ideas. Whether the area is the natural sciences, the social sciences, the humanities, or the arts, one essential product of the university is originality. All of these functions constitute the mission of the university.

Since the university can never be neutral about its mission and its commitment, it must always determine whether a possible course of action fits the educational mission of the university and whether the consequences are defensible on educational grounds. The method the university employs to decide such questions must be fair and objective. For example, the draft is obviously not a purely educational issue; in its complexity, it impinges upon all the major concerns of our day. But insofar as the draft affects the educational mission of the university, it is of great concern to the campus community. If the university admits as students young people who perhaps would not ordinarily have been admitted, it is not being neutral; but this course of action surely is consistent with one view of its educational mission. Furthermore, while it is unlikely that we will ever be able to change things so that death no longer is the final resolution of life, our medical schools cannot be neutral in this area, for their responsibility remains to extend life to the limit.

Since the university is not and cannot be totally neutral, should it—as students of the New Left suggest—not only encourage a deep examination of the problems of society, but also become an instrument of social change? Should the university, determined advocate of innovation, be a revolutionary force? A university politicized, compelled to take stands and support political factions, radical or conservative, is a university doomed. The university should be crammed with people who take stands, who think, vote, and participate in every level of life, including politics. Revolutionary concepts in the realm of ideas may well be developed within its gates. But a politically programmed university can destroy the very procedures—freedom of expression and the free exchange of ideas—that make innovation possible; certainly it becomes an inhospitable place for men of wide and divergent views. The consequences of a decision to politicize the university are simply not defensible on educational grounds.

Changes in the Nature of the Student Body

In the past, university neutrality did not seem such a pressing

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issue because many of the students who exerted an influence over the quality and direction of active campus life belonged to a group that might have been called the "trade-off" group. These students, attending the university primarily in exchange for certain social or material rewards that were not related to the acquisition of knowledge, gathered their gentlemen C's. It would rarely have occurred to them to challenge the fundamental mission or position of the university; they wanted to indulge in hedonism under the sheltering arms of alma mater. In England before World War II, many of the "pass" degree students were trade-offs; they went to Oxford or Cambridge primarily for social reasons where, as Wordsworth acknowledged, they "sauntered, played or rioted" day and night. (Of course, there has always been a substantial group of students who recognize the multi-perspective goal of the university and enroll primarily to master the subject matter and to be subjected to the widest possible range of ideas. Many students were motivated by *both* traditional scholarship and trade-off drives so that few students belonged completely to either group. Nevertheless, these groups could be distinguished in a rough way by the *degree* of motivation toward learning or non-learning rewards, including the narrow benefits of a college degree.)

Today, trade-off students have all but vanished in most of the good universities.[3] Even where they do exist, contemporary trade-offs do not seem to have the yeast to cause any trouble or turmoil. They are not engaged with society, even in a general way, as are other students. Counterpoised against the societal concerns of today's turbulent young, the fraternal frolics of the trade-offs of the past look silly. Other groups have now pre-empted the stage with something more appealing to the age.

Replacing the trade-offs as the group most responsible for the prevailing climate among students is a group I would call the "find-out" group. Because the find-out student is an earnest, searching student, the traditional frolics that attracted the trade-offs do not appeal to him. But although his intentions are serious, his attention has not yet been absorbed nor his imagination riveted upon a specific academic discipline.[4] The find-out student does not see the university as a corporate body involving itself, even in its curriculum formation, in those matters that appeal to him.

Find-out students are now demanding several new types of university responses and focusing upon areas of the university never touched in the past. In addition to stating that the university should

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involve itself in the problems of society and become "relevant" to the broader community, they seek more control over the curriculum. Perhaps part of their frustration stems from the fact that, as Norman Birnbaum states: "We no longer have an effective conception of the general core of curriculum."[5] In the past, there was general agreement on what the educated man should know; from the quadrivium and the trivium on, there was a common language spoken in many tongues. Thomas Jefferson could be a man of law and letters, a diplomat, an architect, and an expert on both music and agriculture; today knowledge is so immense and disparate that the find-out feels he is going nowhere—and in the direction of everywhere. He therefore wants courses more "relevant" to his interests, with subjects running the gamut from drugs to sex to witchcraft.[6] His desire for control of the curriculum seems to spring from the wish to make the university more conducive to his quest for meaning in the academic world. (The complaint frequently heard that "a course or curriculum is not relevant" is an incomplete sentence. Something must be relevant to something else. The university, as a whole, is relevant only when it is relevant to society as a university—that is, as an educational institution. The liberal arts college has traditionally been a place where the student is taught not how to do a certain job, but how to attack and think about certain problems. The student is the one who makes what he learns relevant to his life.)

Can the University Meet the Needs of the Find-Out Students?

Universities are delicately balanced institutions designed to deal with delicate problems. Their life styles and independence have developed gradually from the Middle Ages until universities have become complex communities with many interests. Membership in these communities carries reciprocal rights and responsibilities (and those who accept the former cannot morally eschew the latter). No voice or viewpoint should be excluded, and a cardinal principle of the entire community must be acceptance of the rights of others. Given the nature of this community, I see three possible courses of action that universities can take in response to the find-outs.

First, the university can attempt to eliminate or change the find-out group. This course is undesirable and impractical because it would exclude many serious students, create a potentially explosive

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situation at the university, and no doubt quench a vital spark that could produce a better society beyond the campus.

Second, the university can be completely responsive to the new demands of the find-out group, ignoring the needs of other students and eliminating its traditional societal functions. This course is absurd. It would mean defeat for the traditional and classic learning process. Those who wished to learn in the classic sense or wanted to be involved in this process would attempt to go to new institutions in society for this purpose, but it is unlikely that these new institutions would be able to perform the traditional role so well. Society would thus lose those vital functions of innovation and the development of knowledge that are now performed by the university community.

Third, the university can attempt to satisfy both the find-out and structured learning expectations of students at the same time. This would mean integrating within the university innovative methods and curriculum options for one group of students, while maintaining a more or less traditional learning process under the control of an authoritative faculty for others. It is difficult and undoubtedly will produce tension, but I find it our only logical course. Those in the university may have to live with more options than presently exist; some excellent universities, including Oxford, have already done so for more than a century.[7]

This alternative does not mean the end of the conventional learning process, but it will require much additional effort on the part of the faculty, administrators, and students than has heretofore been exerted. Faculty will have to develop far more synthesis among the disciplines. (Generally, good faculties are politically and socially liberal, but they tend to be very conservative with respect to the defense of their own turf.[8]) Norman Birnbaum notes:

> Originally instruments of mastery, the disciplines have become—despite our volition—means of perpetuating the irrationalities inherent in contemporary society's use of knowledge.[9]

Who knows but that the rigorously trained generalist in the wide overlaps of his primary field of interest may not be a better scholar and a better teacher than the intense specialist within a constricted field? This is not to deny the necessity of the latter, but only to suggest that in a great university the former may also have a value and an honored place.

If some of the best students in our society are simply not turned

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on by traditional isolated disciplines, perhaps a more engaging curriculum could be developed that is academically just as valid. For example, suppose we offered a course on "sovereignty" in which students explored such questions as: How did the concept of sovereignty develop? To what extent does it unify or separate people? Why is it preserved? What are its virtues and its effects? What are the conditions for real independence? What are the relationships of sovereignty to economic growth? Does it play a role in the poverty or wealth of nations? Such a course could require a deep study of politics and economics, history and international relations. In addition, it would call for intensive work in anthropology and related disciplines. In fact, a course on "sovereignty" could require a study of war.

Obstacles to Revitalization of the Undergraduate College

A course on "sovereignty" would undoubtedly grip the interests of many contemporary students. The necessary interdisciplinary approach cannot, however, be presented from retreads of old lecture notes with little addenda; it will require effort to organize. Many lectures will have to be reconsidered, and old thoughts examined and synthesized. An interchange will have to be developed among colleagues from related but departmentalized disciplines. This is a small price to pay, however, to engage students. Too many professors feel obliged to augment the body of learning, and sometimes their efforts serve primarily to increase the area that must be learned, adding little that is important to seminal knowledge. The university is said to gain luster through their preoccupations, but the pressing needs of students are sometimes not met. Many members of the faculty must redistribute their energies and talents. These demands are not mutually exclusive.

Unfortunately, the great rewards of academia stem mainly from research and publication, not from giving time and attention to students. Professors consider themselves primarily responsible to their professional disciplines—their standards and requirements—rather than to any university administration, for it is the former that rewards them and thus shapes their incentives. The traditional slogan "publish or perish" must be modified to operate thus: "Publish and prosper; teach and prosper; teach and publish and prosper doubly."

I do not deny the need to recharge the academic battery, for nothing is worse than the teacher with an exhausted intellect. But

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such recharging should not deprive students by causing the absence or detachment of the scholar from teaching over an extended period of time. Moreover, as Whitehead pointed out, great scholarship is not always defined by research and accompanying publication:

> It must not be supposed that the output of a university in the form of original ideas is solely to be measured by printed papers and books labeled with the names of the authors. Mankind is as individual in its mode of output as in the substance of its thoughts. For some of the most fertile minds composition in writing, or in a form reducible to writing, seems to be an impossibility. In every faculty you will find that some of the more brilliant teachers are not among those who publish. Their originality requires for its expression direct intercourse with their pupils in the form of lectures, or of personal discussion. Such men exercise an immense influence; and yet, after the generation of their pupils has passed away, they sleep among the innumerable unthanked benefactors of humanity. Fortunately, one of them is immortal—Socrates.[10]

Faculty tenure cannot be ignored in any discussion of university reform. Tenure produces rigidities and limits options, particularly in institutions that do not have the money to employ detours around existing roadblocks. Yet it would be unfair to suggest that any institution, be it a law firm or corporation, is free of *de facto* tenure. Nor should a university for many reasons (including that chief societal value, academic freedom) be without a basic tenure principle. But the present rules did not come down from Sinai and are not necessarily the best ones for these times. Too frequently young men are forced out of a university where they would prefer to remain for a few years more by the rigid "up or out" rule whose provisions may have better fitted another decade. It would be impossible in this article to do justice to the complex problems involved in the role of tenure at the modern university, but I do want to record my support of the Dunlop Committee's statement: "We do not believe that the outside period [established by the Committee of Eight from the Ph.D. degree to the decision on tenure, actually only six and one-half years], should be further reduced."[11]

The University and Society

Students have repeatedly charged that the university is the handmaiden of the Establishment. They assert, for instance, that the university is training them to fit into an existing and unjust social order.

Recently, a chemistry major at Brandeis announced to one of his professors that he was through with the subject because he did not

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"want to learn to make napalm." Aptly, the professor inquired: "Who is asking you to do that? Why don't you plan to use your chemistry in cancer research?"

Although the student had confused pure knowledge with its practical application, his impetuous indignation points up a pressing problem: Our society is not assigning priorities and resources so that knowledge may be applied primarily in what some of the best of our young people feel are morally and socially acceptable ways. Billions of dollars are consumed by war, while funds for cancer research dwindle. But by frequently directing his energies and indignation against the wrong targets—in the case of the Brandeis student, chemistry and himself—the sensitive student defeats his own ends.

The student often sublimates his outrage by demanding that the university become his instrument to reform society. Aside from the fact that the university is a weak lance, such efforts will, if successful, certainly further undermine its independence and objectivity. I say "further" because, as I have already stated, the university is not totally neutral.

Since the university operates in the world, there are forces constantly pushing it and pressures constantly exerted upon it. As Talcott Parsons has pointed out, there is a complicated relationship between universities and society. Universities depend upon support from society, but criticism of society is part of their basic role. In discussing "the underlying importance of strict observance of the *procedural forms* of intellectual discussion" and other factors, Parsons explains:

> The above considerations concern an important "interface" between the academic system and the more turbulent aspects of society as a whole. They involve a kind of "dialectic" relation in that the academic system is differentiated from the rest of the society, and to a degree "withdrawn" from the more immediate social pressures, while the results of its activities constitute major influences on the society, not least on its processes of change.
>
> The academic system is not primarily an "engine" of change (or reform) in the sense either that government strove to be in the New Deal or, more extremely, that Communist governments attempt to be in undertaking the radical restructuring of their societies. In a "lower key," however, a strong and prominent academic system is by no means a bulwark of the status quo, but very much a source, through many channels, of impetus to societal change. The development of the secular intellectual disciplines, which now lie at the core of the academic system, has been intimately involved with the three "revolutions" that have underlain the emergence of modern society—the industrial revolution, the democratic revolution,

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and the educational revolution. Indeed, it is the focus of the present phase of the educational revolution.[12]

The university achieves continuity and sustains itself by changing. It is a social system, and, as is true of any social system, the boundaries of its concern change according to the forces that provide support and act upon it. At the present time, major constituent groups include students, faculty, administrators, alumni, trustees, parents, financial donors, government agencies,[13] private corporations, professional associations, and a number of other private pressure groups that may from time to time make their voices heard within the university community. University administrators, although they make demands themselves, are also involved as "conversion mechanisms" in dealing with the demands of the different groups. Responsible administrative authorities must take the demands of these various groups and balance them in accordance with political realities and the general operational ethic to which they adhere in running the university. That ethic must at the very least include a resolve to be objective and an adherence to an educational mission. Thus, despite well-intentioned student pressures, there is no justification for the financially-pressed university to give land or resources to the underprivileged unless an educational purpose is served. The university's service to the deprived should be education.

The University as an Operating Model

The existence of various constituent groups, autonomous to varying degrees, constantly making demands upon and supporting administrative authorities, makes the university a microcosm of the political world and unlike a business firm. The "theory of the firm" is not generally appropriate to university administration. The university should not be envisioned as a hierarchical business-like structure in which managerial techniques can be used to deal with the various political controversies that arise among constituent groups. Straight-line authority is not an appropriate method of university governance. Top authority should not and cannot designate all-inclusive goals. The process of university governance is one of negotiation, compromise, and adjudication. It is more legislative and judicial in nature than executive. This does not mean that executive techniques are not highly appropriate under certain circumstances. But during this year of campus turmoil, the most successful university administrators have clearly been those who understand the

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subtle processes of negotiation and recognize the need to build a viable university legislative system in which appropriate interests are represented and a judicial system capable of acting independently and rendering fair judgments.

Performance of the university's mission cannot, as in the firm, be measured by unit costs or formulae of cost effectiveness. Who knows the relative value of the isolation of DNA as against the education of a dozen technocrats? Who can be sure that one JFK was not worth one hundred average professors of political science?

Universities cannot be run by administrative edict, nor can they be ruled by majority opinions. A university organized to pursue scholarship in the social sciences on a theory preferred by the majority would always take the field against innovators who may discover and proclaim tomorrow's truth. In science, too, the majority is frequently wrong, and the man who refuses to believe what seems obvious may actually see more clearly than those who espouse and teach the obvious. Copernicus' theory, opposed by many scientists for over a century, was fought even by some of the Jewish communities which prohibited the teaching of the heliocentric system, and Galileo's telescopic observations were spurned by men agreeing with Francesco Sizi, the Florentine astronomer who declared that the satellites around Jupiter "are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can have no influence on the earth and therefore would be useless and therefore do not exist."

The Strengths and Weaknesses of "the Estates" of the University

A university has four estates with a close day-to-day relationship with the campus: faculty, students, administration, and trustees. (The alumni might be considered a fifth estate.) Even within the accepted traditions of the academy, the present structure of the university involving the powers and responsibilities of these estates is imperfect. No universities are ideal communities; all can and must change as the various roles of these estates are assessed and examined.

Faculties, for instance, have much power, albeit essentially negative power, but they do not have the accompanying responsibilities. Individual faculty members who see beyond their immediate personal and departmental needs and are "institution-minded" are a source of great influence and strength, particularly in these times of

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crisis. If numerous, faculty members who submerge individual preferences and act as adult role models for confused adolescents can stabilize the university in the midst of the new revolution.

The administration may also need to be changed in emphasis and approach. The basic problem of most administrations is that they have great responsibility without the accompanying power over the causes of discontent in the university community. These causes originate largely in the outside world; the university president can rail against them, but seldom has the capacity to change them. Not since Woodrow Wilson and Nicholas Murray Butler have governments shaken at the thundering of a university president. Nor does the administration have much control over many aspects of the internal affairs of the university—over the failures of teachers, over department heads, or over the organization of the curriculum. In relation to the faculty, administrators are restricted by tenure and because faculties are generally self-disciplined, discipline almost always being dispensed by the peer group. Moreover, disciplinary action from the administration is likely to be perceived, often unjustifiably, as an infringement on academic freedom. Nevertheless, administrations have a large role. The president who does not regard himself as a leader of the faculty, as a problem-solver, and as a source of innovation and renewal in academic matters is failing both faculty and students.

The power of university trustees is a vastly overworked subject. Trustees have all the trappings of power, yet they have even less power than the administration and little capacity to rationalize and control. In the statutes of the university, the power of the trustees appears absolute; in fact, it closely resembles that of the monarchs of England, without whose signature no bill can become law, but whose signature has not been withheld since 1703. The function of the trustees is, nevertheless, indispensable. They serve as a shield for the institution, guarding it against outside influences that could destroy it. They interpret the university to the community, which frequently is hostile to its aims, and nourish and sustain it with the resources that it requires in ever-increasing amounts. When the trustees function properly, they are the unsung heroes of academic freedom and excellence. There are too many instances, however, in which trustees in public institutions interpret their political appointment as the license to use the office for the exercise of political power; such efforts are bound to complicate enormously the task of university governance. The problem is different in the private insti-

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tution where financial competence and communal influence must be delicately melded with the wise counsel so useful to the president. Not all boards can sufficiently furnish these abilities. The trustee who has expertise in solving the problems of the university, financial or otherwise, and who works hard within the self-imposed limits on his ultimate legal powers deserves every honor associated with such service.

Students today have become a particularly vocal constituency and must never be dismissed on the ground that they happen to be four-year transients. They form a group that has increasing power of persuasion, but is often unable to realize the importance and significance of that power. The power of persuasion within the university community is the primary leverage of initiative and veto, yet most students do not know this or will not believe it. They would be surprised to learn that in most institutions few decisions in the board of trustees are ever taken by a vote, but are arrived at after a modification of various viewpoints by the erosion of debate and the introduction of new elements into their consideration.

Both faculty and students should participate on boards of trustees. (Young people should serve not only on university boards, but on the boards of most associations and corporations where they should be turned out to pasture at age twenty-five.) Students add a new and essential perspective for university boards. The administration, for example, may look at the university through one end of a telescope; the students turn that telescope around, and the university looks quite different. With young people on boards, there will be a different chemistry. The discussions will be livelier; although when the facts are in, most decisions may ineluctably be the same. (Perhaps some of the decisions that really count will indeed come out differently. In any event, the change will have occurred not through coercion, but by consensus.)

The classic function of the university precludes student control of the curriculum, conduct of courses, appointments, and promotion. But students should participate in "educational" matters—the degree and mode depending on what the matter is and the extent to which student involvement is relevant. In no case should students be placed in a position in which they have a conflict of interest with the faculty that teaches and examines them.

Certainly, in such areas as parietal rules and control over dormitory life, systematic procedures for student involvement should be worked out that will recognize their legitimate interests. The ra-

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tionale behind most parietal rules now is that the university stands *in loco parentis*. Today this position is ridiculous for a number of reasons. First, a substitute parent should enforce rules consistent with the standards of the actual parent—but then the university, as surrogate parent, should be strict with the students who come from strict homes and permissive with others who come from more permissive homes. A wide variety of rules could thus follow, creating confusion and exposing the university to the justified criticism of being one of the most arbitrary and inequitable institutions in society. There is another difficulty. In this day of the automobile and the open campus, the university cannot pretend that its effective writ runs much further than the classroom. It is ridiculous for a university to claim to stand *in loco parentis* to some young people while the Congress, representing national policy, makes all eighteen-year-old males in the country eligible to be drafted and sent to live away from home—with a first sergeant instead of a dean of students. First sergeants do not take the rules of parents as their standards for discipline—at least not the first sergeants I have known.

Some rules governing campus environment cannot be primarily the province of the students. Various elements of the university do, after all, share a common community. In certain areas, the interest and competence of each group must be made to meld with that of others. The rules governing demonstrations, for example, affect the entire community. To be effective, such legislation must have the presumptive legitimacy that comes from participation of all campus elements in the legislative process.

The University as a Free, but not Necessarily Democratic Institution

As a society, we have been able to agree upon fundamental concepts in government; we should be able to transfer some of these principles to the governance of the university, especially those Constitutional traditions that protect freedom of speech and press, freedom to assemble peaceably, and freedom to petition appropriate authorities for a redress of grievances. Freedom from religious domination over all secular institutions is another vital principle highly appropriate for the university world. (Another concept in the Western philosophic and political tradition—the democratic ethic—may also be drawn upon, but within the university it has more limited usefulness than the procedures that guarantee freedom of expres-

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sion.) Some agreement must now be reached on what these great principles mean in a university setting.

The fundamental societal purpose of the university does not require—in fact, it may exclude—participatory democracy. The university does, however, need a strong emphasis upon the protection of the rights of individuals to operate freely within the boundaries of their responsibilities. In their governing of themselves, universities should advance, strengthen, and fortify those basic beliefs of society accepted as fundamental for the preservation of the free expression of ideas. There must be freedom not only from *external* forces—be they politicians, trustees, parents, donors, alumni, or members of any other group—but also from *internal* factions that seek to distort the processes of rational debate and discussion. The ideal university, where total freedom exists within certain boundaries and the learning process is responsibly conducted by all elements of the university, can never be realized, given the nature of the external and internal pressures that exist. It is to be hoped, however, that reasonable men will agree on the basic rules of operation for the university just as they must for the political realm and the community. By adhering to fundamental *procedural* principles, the conditions for substantive innovation will be established.

Basic to the university's mission is its commitment to the right of the professor to challenge orthodoxy and to express his views freely, regardless of their content or their unpopularity. The university can never be neutral about the concept of academic freedom.

Yet what should administrators do when faced with demands from constituent interests—radical or conservative—that a professor be fired for his actions? (He should never be fired for his views.[14]) This becomes a delicate political situation. How is it possible to reconcile the need of universities for "constitutional government" and procedures to advance freedom of expression with the reality of constituent interests that often make the implementation of such procedures extraordinarily difficult? There is a principle which should be followed, but which, if followed, may produce an explosion.

In this dilemma, the general principle must be upheld or the entire *raison d'être* of the university will be destroyed. Its societal function will be sacrificed to political exigency, and it will become no more than the political instrument of the most powerful external or internal pressures. (Unfortunately, the events of the last years indicate that professors are subject not only to outside investigation of their beliefs, particularly if they happen to teach in public insti-

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tutions, but must now teach in an increasingly politicized *internal* university environment. As groups of all kinds make known their dissatisfactions with professors ranging from "racist" to "communist," it seems reasonable to assume that without tenure the position of the professor might become tenuous indeed.)

The University's Defense Against Forceful Acts

Clearly, every good university is a combustible mix. It contains not only bright kinetic youth who are disenchanted with society, but also small numbers of revolutionaries who—perhaps by deliberately co-opting their fellow students on the basis of contrived issues—may put the university in the position of having to determine how to defend itself against the attacks of extremist groups. In any constitutional democracy, this problem has always been one of the most difficult. The Weimar Republic, for example, was in part destroyed because of the unwillingness of democratic groups to take "undemocratic" action against nationalistic and fascist groups. Democracies have a responsibility to preserve their institutions, and universities have a responsibility to society to preserve themselves. The procedures for the acquisition and transmission of knowledge must be sustained and respected by all elements of the university. These must be set forth clearly by responsible authorities who have the courage to respect the procedures in the face of the most trying of circumstances. Although silent in times of crisis, the majority of faculty and students rely on the administration to uphold the rules of the community. They declare their views by teaching and going to class. When the administration wavers, they are disappointed and deprived of deserved protection.

I would propose that the university community adopt, with some modification, the doctrine of "clear and present danger" first developed by Justice Holmes. In the *Schenck* case in 1919, he stated in general terms that a government has the right to protect itself against acts that seek to destroy it. By the same token, radical groups must not be allowed to use the procedures of the university—especially the traditional freedom to speak out—to destroy it. Freedom of speech is not a license to shout a speaker down. The freedom to speak must not be allowed to encroach upon the freedom of speech. As Holmes pointed out in the *Schenck* case: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect a

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man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force." Just as the courts are used as independent judges to determine whether or not a clear and present danger exists in the broader political community, so also could they be brought into university conflicts. Injunctions and other appropriate judicial writs could be sought to curb action considered by the administration to be against the basic interests of the university.

The issue of "clear and present danger" should be taken to the courts only in the most extreme cases, and there administrative authority may be tested and judged. Internally, the university must, of course, develop an independent judiciary capable of rendering fair and reasonable judgments in disciplinary matters. The judiciary must not be a captive of political groups, and it must be so structured that it is capable of making independent decisions. This is difficult because if it is composed of various groups within the university, each will have an interest in the outcome of the case. Tenure of the judiciary is a fundamental principle, but it certainly cannot exist in any university's judicial body that has student and administrative representatives. Nor would faculty, regardless of whether or not they have tenure, feel entirely free to render unbiased decisions on such a university court. Nevertheless, in this all-too-imperfect world it seems clear that university judiciaries should be representative of major university groups.

Universities must be able to deal with destructive elements in the community through internal processes constructed in such a way that their legitimacy will be recognized, if possible, by all elements of the university community. Unilateral executive action should not be final in nature, although it might be entirely appropriate to suspend anyone who seems to present a clear and present danger to the university, pending judgment by an independent board.

The universities are in crisis because the society is in crisis. Activist students perceive the crisis in sharper outlines because it will affect them longer and they have had less experience with tolerating the unthinkable and living with the human tragedy that generations have shrugged off as "the human condition." These students feel the university is theirs. They wish to change it and to govern it, but not to be governed by it. They give obeisance to its mission of structured learning through frenzied efforts for admission, but once within its gates cry out against its intellectualism in a burst of romantic es-

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capism. Although they reject the university as a moral tutor, they seek to use it as their moral instrument.

Yet these students are the nation's hope for tomorrow just as they are the university's troubled and troubling inhabitants today. We must understand them, engage them, and preserve for their own sakes the vital elements of the university. Finally, we must listen to what the best of them are telling us: We had better attend now to the dreadful problems threatening this planet.

The university must not be so pretentious as to think it can exorcise the looming disasters of nuclear war, overpopulation, pollution, and famine. But we must do all we can, as individuals and learned men and women, to resolve those problems we can in the time we have left.

As we look outside the campus, let us not neglect the university. If the university is ever distorted or converted into something else, we should still have to face the same problems, but our intellectual resources and skills to master these—if possible—would be fewer, our morale and commitment diminished.

References

1. An America where Richard Nixon is elected President and George Wallace is given support (and the combined Nixon-Wallace vote totals over 56 per cent of the vote), where 88 per cent of whites and 76 per cent of Negroes express satisfaction with their jobs, is not poised to move in a revolutionary direction politically. (See report of the Gallup poll in *The New York Times*, May 11, 1969, p. 25.)

2. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education* (Macmillan Co.: New York, 1929; Mentor Edition), p. 97.

3. Recent news reports describe "a party-throwing organization trying to create an atmosphere of revelry at New York University" which speaks of itself as a "radical political organization." Its activities, however, are remarkably similar to those of the trade-offs of the past, perhaps indicating that there may be an upswing in this group. See *The New York Times*, September 22, 1969, p. 25.

4. The find-out group is to be distinguished from the large percentage in college who are goal-oriented, with definite careers in the professions and academia already in mind. Find-outs are in college for the legitimate purpose of a liberal education, which will presumably help them in the choice of a career. Frequently, of course, find-outs discover what they seek during college. At Brandeis, about 70 per cent of all undergraduates eventually go on to graduate or professional schools.

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5. Norman Birnbaum, "The Arbitrary Disciplines," *Change* (July-August, 1969), p. 20.

6. The influence of the find-outs undoubtedly is indicated in a recent poll conducted by Daniel Yankelovich in April 1969, which reports 63 per cent of college students strongly or partially agree that "what is taught in universities is not relevant."

7. It is interesting to note that in the last fifteen years, despite increased enrollments, the number of pass degrees awarded by universities in England and Wales has remained substantially the same, while the number of students receiving honors degrees has increased dramatically. In England, for instance, in 1953-54, the number of men and women receiving honors degrees was 8,676; in 1965-66, this figure rose to 20,019.

8. This has been well documented in a recent report issued by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California, Berkeley. See *The New York Times*, "News of the Week in Review," August 17, 1969, p. 9.

9. Birnbaum, "The Arbitrary Disciplines," p. 21.

10. Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*, p. 103.

11. *Report of the Committee on Recruitment and Retention of Faculty*, Harvard College (May 1, 1969), p. 65.

12. Talcott Parsons, "The Academic System: A Sociologist's View," *The Public Interest*, No. 13 (Fall, 1968), p. 195.

13. The increasing role of the federal government in education and in the expanding research programs deeply involves it in the determination of many of the research activities of the university. Some extremists, both of the left and the right, feel that there should be no connection between government and the university because the former corrupts the latter. A more reasonable view surely is that government agencies rightly exist and thus are entitled to fund research. Any attempts by government or anyone else to control the expression of ideas (including suppression of knowledge) and the content of courses must, of course, be firmly resisted. Students, faculties, and administrators should as citizens work within the political processes for increasing emphasis upon the funding priorities as they perceive them. As for financial aid, universities should be free to decide for themselves about it, always relating their decisions to the real purposes of a university.

14. Paradoxically, radical students, who may be the first to raise the banner of academic freedom at the stroke of an administrative pen, sometimes demand that professors be retained or promoted because of views associated with their own. There is the famous Daniel case at the University of Chicago.

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RALPH A. DUNGAN

Higher Education: The Effort to Adjust

A COLLEAGUE of mine recently returned from a working visit to a number of European universities observed: "If you think we are having troubles, you should see them." Hard-pressed as he has been at his own institution, the solace that he found in the plight of others is understandable. At the same time, the reality of what he saw underscores two contemporary phenomena.

The first is the obvious world-wide dissatisfaction either with the character of higher education or with the role of the university in society, or both. The second is the confusion and contradiction among those most concerned within the higher education community about the central questions that need to be faced.

It seems important to recognize that the university is caught like other institutions in the maelstrom of rapid social change. This recognition should lead to an understanding that to some extent the pressures on the university are external and relatively uncontrollable. In the United States, because of its role as socializer, credentialer, producer of technicians, scholars, politicians, and soldiers, the university stands in a pre-eminent position among contemporary institutions. Because of the image it has projected and which often has been forced upon it, the university has become the church of a modern secular and technocratic society. It has been touted as the solver of all problems, the reservoir of all ideas, and to a large extent it has accepted these various roles. In fact, it often has assiduously and aggressively sought them.

It is no wonder in these circumstances that the university becomes a focus of social and political criticism, the object of attack by all who are dissatisfied with society as it is. This situation is not likely to change and probably should not, and universities are going to have to recognize that they are on the political stage, actively in-

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volved in the political drama with its unpleasant as well as its rewarding aspects. This has been true for some time, but, generally speaking, the reality has not been reflected either in the structure of the institution or in its mode of operation. For example, universities, unlike most other institutions, seem torn and indecisive when confronted with the basic issues of protection of life and property. Admittedly, universities have often had good reason to hesitate in such matters; the point is that there is a built-in reluctance to view such disruptions as at least partly political phenomena that need to be dealt with in political ways.

Colleges and universities were never intended merely to reflect the society in which they exist. Because the academic environment is properly among those most tolerant of ideas and behavior uncommon to society-at-large, it is not surprising that a good deal of the social protest has been concentrated on the campus. Nor is it surprising that outraged legislators (and some educators) are devoting a corresponding amount of energy to suppressing social protests on campus and elsewhere. No doubt ill-conceived legislation will be enacted in order to curb "the excesses of the disruptive minority." This sequence of events fits a pattern which has occurred over the past forty years.

But however great the similarities with the past, there are today at least two elements both new and significant. The first has to do with the confusion, conflict, and contention within the higher education community itself as to what the current discontent is all about and what should be done about it. The academic community has been rocked into asking itself the root (and therefore radical) questions: Education for whom and for what? At what cost and out of whose pocket? Who shall set the standards, and what do they or should they mean anyway? And, by the way, to whom does the college or university belong, and who should govern it?

The other major factor not present before is a kind of headlong, practically unplanned dash into universal higher educational opportunity. This kind of growth poses great problems for educators who must create new institutions and shape existing ones in response to the pressure of aspirations and numbers. The scale of resources required to support such growth will be enormous and will impose responsibilities heavier than ever before on those who must weigh the wisdom of such expenditures.

Obviously there are no definitive answers to the many questions —moral as well as educational, social, and political—that presently

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occupy the minds of educators and their clients. Indeed, the identification of the most important problems is an awesome task in itself. To select one factor, such as governmental structure, and to place undue stress on it as a response to the unrest is to create a simplistic picture of an extremely complex question.

Role and Function of Higher Education

The most fundamental issue to be addressed is the role of the university. It is not uncommon today for many within the university to confess to not being sure what a university is or should be —the extent to which it should be devoted to the accumulation and transfer of knowledge or the degree to which it should be involved in providing services to the larger society. Historically, the university has had as one of its functions the integrative role of nurturing the values of society and transmitting them to succeeding generations. But in recent years the university has become part of the adaptive system of society and has assumed a more active role in determining the course that society will follow. The question now is whether the university can or should do both. And if it tries to do both, can the various clients be equally well served by the same type of institution? They probably cannot because the demands of some clients will conflict with those of others. One does not need to delineate the elitist tendencies of some institutions in order to spot the potential conflict between the demands of those who seek certain credentials or vocational training and those who desire specialized and advanced work.

This conflict between client expectation and institutional performance is widespread and will increase, traditional myths about higher education in this country notwithstanding. The university in the United States has long been described as multi-functional, but a candid examination of the distribution of resources within institutions and within the collectivity of institutions would show that there is a concentration in activities of interest to relatively few. Despite our protestations about pluralism and multi-functionality, we tend on the whole in higher education to do essentially the same thing with quite divergent degrees of quality. In general, we have not adapted either institutional structure or curriculum to the large and increasing varieties of needs of the individual or the society.

Although the argument is persuasive for a greater differentiation among programs or for a greater number of options for students in

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different kinds of institutions, it is a good deal more difficult to suggest exactly how such curricula or programs would look. But it is possible to set forth for the sake of discussion some functional objectives of a restructured or non-structured educational environment.

Certain objectives or elements of the higher educational experience should be common to any option or curriculum. Of these, the most important would seem to be cultivation in the student, the institution, and the society of a respect for learning; an appreciation and knowledge of the contemporary social and political environment; a facility in communication; and an appreciation of non-material values—religious and artistic.

If it is accepted that certain educational objectives, such as those noted above, should be common to any higher education program, the task remains to define the variety of vocational objectives or levels of preparation that are appropriate. Obviously there is no set list. The thesis here is simply that there should be greater variety and that not every student who pursues higher education should have as an objective the present baccalaureate degree or even the associate in arts or science.

In working toward this objective, we should start searching out the needs of potential clients and servicing those needs in a variety of institutions that are related to one another more systematically than at present. This approach offers at least two advantages: First, it would tend to decrease tension within institutions, especially the larger ones, which try under various pressures to be all things to all men; second, it would enable individual institutions to accomplish one goal well rather than many poorly.

What functions, other than those noted above, need to be performed by higher education today? Can they fit into the existing structure, or do significant changes need to be made? And, most important, who (how many) are to be educated for what? We assume that the vast majority of the relevant age cohort in the years ahead will be seeking some form of education beyond the secondary school. The goal of a majority of these students will probably be acquisition of skills or credentials that promise to lead to gainful employment and participation in a series of social and educational experiences that enhance their growth as individuals. A minority of students in formal higher education will seek more sophisticated intellectual objectives, and some will turn to professional training of one sort or another.

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(Of course, the whole process is not so simple: A statement *about* goals does not tell us *how* goals are formed in the mind of the individual. For many, such a neat definition of goals does not occur at one point in time—it just happens; and institutions by their expressed sensitivity to the desires and needs of their students can help ease the difficulties that accompany the process.)

A large proportion of students should, within the stated goals, be able to fulfill their formal higher education within two years in a community college in certificate (less than two full years) or associate degree programs. Such programs can be designed to satisfy individual intellectual needs as well as to provide necessary skill training. For some, the two-year college experience will lead to the baccalaureate degree or more advanced training. Still others, more sure of their objectives, will begin pursuit of the baccalaureate education in a four-year college or university—at least as most universities are now organized. The most serious question of structure as it will be related to function in the years ahead involves the university as it has come to be. Although one would hesitate to prescribe uniformity, an argument could be made for confining the work of the university to upper-division undergraduate, graduate, and professional training.

Where an attempt has been made to devise structures related to function—for instance, in some of the community colleges—the value system of those who dominate educational policy and other forces external to the college (for example, transfer policies) have tended to pull the institution back into a conforming position. This is particularly true with respect to curriculum content and mode of instruction.

This raises the question of how best to develop institutions for higher education which, although functioning parts in a coordinated system, nevertheless retain a separate integrity of function and purpose. More concretely, the difficulty here is to guard against the possibility of institutions with more limited intellectual goals becoming inferior carbon copies of those with the highest intellectual aspirations. The most difficult task in the creation of such a system, of course, is to avoid attaching the label of inferior to institutions whose goals are different.

One thing more should be said of the functions of the modern university. Increasingly, the research function has become entwined with the adaptive function so that, especially in the physical sciences, the application of knowledge to technological problems

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has become the dominant institutional orientation. The inseparability of theoretical and applied knowledge cannot be denied; in the social sciences, one would sometimes wish they were more closely allied. But concern with technology and applications has had a mixed, if not adverse, effect on the instructional function broadly conceived. To the extent that "teaching versus research" adequately described the tension problem in the university heretofore, increased concern with applied research has simply intensified the difficulty.

This suggests the need for new organizational forms separate from, but closely related to the university—what in other systems have been called research or technical institutes. Not only would such institutes or laboratories relieve certain strains now occasioned by direct linkages; they might also provide more responsive and organized vehicles for the application of knowledge to fields presently without a sound cognitive base. One thinks immediately of the major social problems with which we are faced. It may very well be that the state of the art in applied research is not sufficiently developed in certain fields to make a different mode of organizing effort attractive or useful. But surely effort at experimentation in this area is necessary, if only as a first step toward an alternative to the present trickle-down method of unfocused and basically irresponsible consultancies.

We are moving in the direction of a national system of higher education, a movement that is likely to be accelerated as public funds come to be an even more important part of the resources available to higher education. While not axiomatic, it is fairly certain that the various elements in a system are best assured the freedom to maneuver and change when the goals and functions of each are clearly defined. Regardless of how functions are cut or to which institution they are assigned, it is crucial that a greater differentiation of function be introduced into higher education and that individual institutions within a framework decide what they are going to do and then proceed to do it well.

Curricula and the Mode of Higher Education

Of equal importance and directly related to the definition of function in contemporary higher education is a critical examination of the way the education process is currently conducted. To a great extent, it appears that curricula and modes of instruction are

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inordinately influenced by the traditional regimes of graduate instruction. These may or may not be adapted to the particular educational function being performed and, at times, do not even reflect an understanding of the manner in which learning occurs. One wonders, for example, what the objective of a modern language sequence at the undergraduate level should be. For a few students, a detailed knowledge of the syntax and literature of the language undoubtedly is desirable because they will either become a specialist in the language itself or use it as a research tool. But for the vast majority, if it has purpose at all, it is as a mode of communication. A reasonable level of skill in speaking and reading is essential, but this is not reflected in most undergraduate curricula today.

The situation is similar in the sciences. The tendency is to stipulate a "lab science" as a requirement for an undergraduate degree whether or not anything is learned either about science generally or about the particular field. For the student, such a course often becomes a "credit hurdle" and not even an intellectual one; and for the professor, a burdensome and boring chore to be avoided if at all possible.

To argue for curriculum reform is not to advocate an unconditional surrender of standards or a facile reliance on warmed-over high school material. More serious attention must be given to presenting material and guiding study so that substantial and meaningful educational experience occurs.

While reference here has been made to undergraduate education, where the need is most apparent, there is no doubt that reform is in order at *every* level, including graduate and professional training. Here, too, curriculum reform should be evaluated in relation to the function being performed by the institution in question and to the contribution made by a particular academic regime to the professional growth of the individual.

Credential Madness

Probably the most serious barrier to a rationalization of the higher education structure as we know it in the United States today is the extent to which credentials—degrees, certificates, credits—have come to be accepted as a measure of intellectual or skill attainment. There is no doubt that any large and complex society will always require commonly accepted and meaningful measures of attainment. The difficulty now posed is the vested interest that

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present certificate holders have in retaining traditional requirements, whether or not they are relevant to contemporary needs.

This self-interest, no matter how understandable, carries high costs. In the short run, the student is frequently short-changed; in the long run, institutions of higher education find themselves unable even to ask, let alone act upon, questions concerning the most pressing needs of the potential clients of higher education and the adjustments that must be made to meet these needs.

The brunt of our concern should be placed on the "madness" of the present system, rather than on the existence of the "credentials." If credentials placed the professional stamp of approval on qualities that were important to the higher educational process, we would be delighted with them. The problem with credentials, in other words, is not that they exist, but that they are irrelevant in too many cases.

The present madness takes two forms, the first of which is the absence on our campuses of men who teach well. This can be due to any of several causes: pressures to obtain the next certificate, which make it impossible for aspiring faculty to spend adequate time either with students or preparing for classes; a general de-emphasis on teaching which convinces younger faculty that this is not an important goal; the screening out of those who have demonstrated a high capacity for teaching, but who do not measure up because such talents are not considered significant; and the willingness of those in power to overlook bad teaching when it appears.

The second form is the persistence of courses that do not speak to the needs and interests of students. Many courses have over the years simply grown irrelevant—if, indeed, they were ever worth offering in the first place. And yet for every course that should be stricken from the catalogue, there are many faculty members who see such a change as a threat to their livelihood and status.

Some professional groups have been notable in their efforts to modify or differentiate the kinds of preparation needed to perform certain tasks within the profession. For instance, among mathematicians there is a school which holds that not every teacher of mathematics in college need be prepared in the same manner or complete the traditional requirements for the Ph.D. in order to do a superior job as a math teacher. But for every profession that takes such an enlightened and rational view, there are ten that move in the opposite direction. Last year when the deans of graduate schools in the United States agreed upon the need for another professional de-

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gree different in its requirements from the Ph.D. for candidates who intended to pursue a career principally devoted to teaching, they also rapidly concluded that the strongest opposition to such an innovation would be encountered in their faculties.

Those within the higher education system are not the only ones perpetuating the credential mania. On the consumer side of the equation, one finds that employers of all kinds have taken the easy route and use the certificate or degree as a preliminary screening device. Although most sophisticated managers admit that a certificate establishes little in terms of adequate performance, they have contributed greatly to the present irrational scramble for what turns out to be the key to economic and social position.

This is indeed a problem, but perhaps the employer's role is less significant than it might seem. The employer has, out of convenience or the absence of a more valid screening method, taken his cue from the credentialers. If the latter were to start offering a range of credentials that made more sense, the former might be forced to respond accordingly. The employer will always seek those who appear to be the best candidates. But his reliance on irrelevant paper credentials would fade if other credentials were made more relevant.

People, Rewards, Tenure

This and other problems will endure until some change is effected in the attitudes and values of those who make the system work—the faculties. Little differentiation of function and no significant change in curricula can occur without at least tacit faculty support. And critical to an examination of their susceptibility to change are rewards and tenure.

It cannot be doubted that faculty members as individuals want what is best for higher education, but neither can it be denied that little within the system suggests much pressure for change. In most disciplines, higher education in recent years has been a seller's market. Faculty salaries have risen, although not uniformly at all institutions. Federal research funds have provided additional inputs, and reductions have been made in teaching hours. Improved economic conditions in the profession caused one university president to observe recently that if faculty salaries "continue to rise, we will be increasingly subsidizing a strange kind of leisure class." He went on to observe that he was not sure that this was to the social

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good at all. Whether or not his observation has merit, it does raise the question of what would induce anyone to change the present rules of the game.

The academic profession is no different from any other in the need of its members to be well rewarded for the vital functions they perform. It also requires a system of tenure that gives its members job security as well as protection against ill-informed or unwise attacks on the freedom to teach and investigate. The question is how, within these essential borders, the system can be made to work so that it truly rewards quality and insures dynamic growth within the profession.

The difficulty of adapting the present mechanism of promotion and tenure to anything resembling an adequate system is great indeed and is made more complicated by the increasing bureaucratization of all elements of university life. Present procedures probably worked moderately well when the numbers involved were small enough to permit truly humane and personal evaluations, and when institutional and professional loyalties were important factors in the process. But this is not generally the case at the present time. Even in relatively small institutions where the number of faculty members is not so large as to preclude careful individual judgment, the feelings of institutional and professional loyalty seem increasingly to run less deep. And they will probably dry up altogether as the apparently inevitable trend toward unionization of faculties gains momentum.

What kinds of solutions can one devise to these problems? The major elements of a modified system are easy to sketch and terribly hard to sell. Most would agree on the need to develop a range of minimum salaries appropriate to various faculty ranks. There is no compelling reason why we need preserve the existing pattern of academic ranks, however, and one can bring forward good arguments for increasing by several the number within such a structure. This having been done, appointments and promotions could be made much as they are now with perhaps more emphasis placed on faculty-wide responsibility in decision-making and less on departmental and administrative judgment.

The important element suggested here is to append a flexible compensation mechanism to a basic or minimum scale, thereby permitting competitive forces to operate more effectively. Such a discretionary system of compensation would permit what is impossible in many institutions today—a discriminating judgment about

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the actual performance of individuals. The process of deciding when and to what degree to employ the discretionary power of rewards would involve faculty and senior academic administrators, but theirs should not be the final power of decision. The necessity to pinpoint responsibility and accountability is increasingly apparent in the modern university. In no area is such accountability more important than in the selection and rewarding of principal faculty members.

Closely related to the compensation system is the tenure or employment security arrangement. There is no doubt that academic tenure still plays an important role in insuring basic academic freedom. But by the same token it has—without any reference to academic freedom—assumed an equally or more important function as a guarantee of job security. It is this latter aspect of tenure that deserves re-examination. We need to devise alternatives to the existing tenure system that will continue to protect academic freedom and introduce more competition, thereby insuring continued vitality and productivity in the system.

One alternative might be a contractural arrangement granting tenure for a set period of years—say, ten—renewable at the option of the institution. In order to protect a professor who had given his best years to the institution, lifetime tenure would attach to the second contract. Under the present system the advantages all go one way, and the institution is powerless to protect itself or its non-faculty constituents.

Unless the present system of compensation and tenure is altered, pressures will continue to convert all colleges into universities, for it is research that is rewarded regardless of its quality or relevance. Similarly, the pressures within the present system—reinforced by bureaucratization, numbers, and trade union egalitarianism—will eventually price the academic out of the market or reduce the bulk of the profession to a relatively low level of uniformity. And of overriding importance is the threat that the present rigid system poses to real innovation in curriculum and modes of instruction and to the continued existence of the university as a dynamic institution.

How realistic is it to suppose that the university has within itself the capacity to examine itself systematically and rigorously and to make, in a timely manner, those adaptations that are reasonable and necessary? Posing this question does not presume that the university should be a great weather vane oscillating at the whim of one or another of its constituencies. But in order to survive in this pe-

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riod of change, the university will clearly have to make reasonably rapid responses to urgently needed reforms.

Faculties have been described as a collection of individual entrepreneurs who enjoy complete market control. While it pains one to extend the economic market analogy too far into the world of the intellectual, there is no reason to believe that academicians or intellectuals are any more or less selfish, conservative, or cantankerous than other human beings. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to imagine that faculties unperturbed by any force other than their own perceptions are likely to push for a radical change in the *status quo*.

Administrators, particularly those who view themselves or actually behave as agents of the faculty, find themselves in a weak position to exert leadership in situations requiring radical change, especially in a period of expanding faculty power. Students by and large are not and probably will not be strategically located in the decision-making structure of universities. Moreover, students as a group do not share so common a point of view on reform issues as is usually assumed, and their transitory status tends to militate against the development of a sustained and consistent effort.

While the foregoing is a vastly simplified picture of the major components of the university community, the fact that major reforms in education have occurred in the past predominantly as a result of external stimuli suggests that there is only limited capacity for internally generated reform and that such actions as are taken come at an agonizingly slow pace.

In the effort to focus attention on a few key issues that need to be addressed before progress can be made on subordinate questions, this essay has left a good deal unsaid about many important problems facing the university today. For instance, it should be a matter of great concern to all whether, apart from problems of curriculum already mentioned, the traditional modes of instruction facilitate or obstruct the transfer of knowledge. Obviously, no single answer exists, but it is clear that there should be more experimentation with directed self-study, off-campus instruction, interrupted instructional cycles, and the like.

We need also to be more forthright in saying that the university dedicated primarily to high-level academic pursuits is not, as such, the appropriate institution to make up for the frequently appalling deficiencies of the elementary and secondary public school system. But at the same time higher education as a whole has a most

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pressing responsibility to assist those who have been denied an opportunity to attain their full potential. If this means a shifting of resources and a slackening in other activities, or the creation of other institutional arrangements, so be it.

Institutional structures and mechanisms, informal as well as formal, must be adapted to the social functions to be performed. The undergraduate college and the research-oriented, graduate-training institute both perform distinct and honorable functions. Both deserve the best support we can give them. But it is clear that there are more functions to be performed in higher education than these and other institutions presently acknowledge, and that norms in certain key areas—compensation, job security, credentials, and curricula—should not be the same in each. We jeopardize the health of all educational institutions if we do not make the effort to match their functions, with adjusted modes of operation, to the most urgent social and educational needs.

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ERIK H. ERIKSON

Reflections on the Dissent of Contemporary Youth

I

It is not without diffidence that one undertakes to write yet one more paper on youth. The literature on contemporary "unrest" is growing by the week, the day, the hour. Much of it reflects a profound unrest among adults—a traumatized state, in fact, that seeks catharsis in hurried attempts to reassert intellectual mastery over a shocking course of events. The conclusions reached, therefore, tend to become outdated during the very period of publication. At this point, then, only the double promise of some systematic clarification of the divergent phenomena of dissent and of some gain for the theory of development justifies writing about dissent at all. My reflections will concentrate on what we have learned about the place and function of youth in the human life cycle in all its historical relativity, and about the fateful role of childhood in historical change.

In writing for a professional journal, one can take the assumption for granted that there is, there must be, a pervasive irrational involvement in any attempt on the part of adults to reorient themselves in the face of youthful challenges; for youth, almost by definition, has a presence that defies theorizing. One may also assume agreement that a historical self-critique of psychoanalysis as well as other schemata of human development must include an assessment of the role that their discoveries are playing in the ideological tensions of our time. If rebellious youth in the second part of this fast-moving century must manage and transcend the revolutionary changes of the first part, the influence of Freud's insights into unconscious motivation are now part of that burden. True, some young people can accept the new depth only by displaying it, sometimes passionately and often mockingly, on the very surface, or by

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challenging it precipitously with experiences induced by drugs, as if the new generation had already faced up to all the inner dangers as well as the outer ones. But if in this stance—as also in that of much of modern literature and drama—we detect an attempt to assimilate the insights of psychoanalysis by means of overt enactment of previously repressed urges, then psychoanalysis is faced with new Hippocratic tasks.

One such task is defined by the fact that today we can no longer, not even in clinical literature, write *about* youth without writing *for* youth. And while a systematic critique of contemporary and controversial behavior is always beset with grave methodological problems, I do not see how we can take either our students or our field seriously without stating what *prophecy* and what *retrogression* we are able to discern with our methods in today's patterns of dissent. By this I mean that youthful behavior, where it arouses ambivalent fascination, always appears to be both prophetic—that is, inspired by the vigor of a new age—and retrogressive insofar as it seems to insist on outworn simplicities and to display astonishing regressions. I am speaking, then, of the emotional charge of certain patterns of dissent, not of their political utility or detriment. The young reader of a discourse concerned with such alternations, however, will always find himself responding to open or hidden indications as to whether the author seems to be for or against what he attempts to clarify; and if the methodology of the discourse is based on the application of clinical observation, every reference to developmental fixation or retrogression is apt to be understood as a suggestion of weakness, wickedness, or morbid pretense, and thus as an expression of a generational or political prejudice on the part of the author. These difficulties, however, cannot be shunned if and when we concern ourselves with contemporary phenomena, convinced as we are that psychoanalytic insight has a role to fulfill in the critique of the wasteful aspects of cultural and historical change, which mankind as a whole can ill afford. It would seem, in fact, that a few of the leading young revolutionaries of today are aware of some emotional regressiveness in radical undertakings which are already marked by historical retrogression.

In attempting to clarify the emotional roots of youthful dissent, we must concede from the onset that even psychoanalysis—like other once-revolutionary movements—has let itself be drawn into modern attempts to neutralize powerful inner and outer forces by making man more superficially and more mechanically adjustable.

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Some of the more prophetic concerns of today's youth may, in fact, serve to renew—or, at any rate, to remind us of a liberating vision inherent in the beginnings of psychoanalysis.

II

Before selecting some circumscribed phenomena of active dissent for psychoanalytic scrutiny, I, too, must present a few speculations on the changing ecology of youth in the present stage of history. To the older generation, of course, historical and technological change always seems to be a matter of degree until many related differences have come to amount to a frightening change in over-all quality.

Adolescence has always been seen as an interim stage between an alternately invigorating and confusing sense of an overdefined past that must be left behind and a future as yet to be identified—and to be identified with. Even in a period of rapid change, adolescence seems to serve the function of committing the growing person to the possible achievements and the comprehensible ideals of an existing or developing civilization. In our time, the new requirements of disciplined teamwork and programmed rationality in organizations living in inescapable symbiosis with technological systems seem to offer a satisfying and self-corrective world-image to many, if not most. Most young people, then, see no reason to question "the system" seriously, if only because they have never visualized another.

In every individual, however, and in every generation, there is a potential for what we may call an intensified *adolescence*—that is, a critical phase marked by the reciprocal aggravation of internal conflict and of societal disorganization. Psychoanalysis, for obvious reasons, has primarily studied those more malignant kinds of aggravation that are the result of unresolved infantile conflict and of adolescent isolation. Yet, from Freud's patient Dora on, the case histories of neurotically aggravated young people have also demonstrated a relationship between the epidemiology of a given time and the hidden conflicts of the generations—and thus to history itself. If, on the other hand, another sector of aggravated youth becomes militantly agitated and sets out to agitate on a large scale, it often succeeds way beyond its numerical strength or political foresight because it draws out and inflames the latent aggravations of that majority of young people who would otherwise choose only

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banal and transient ways of voicing dissent or displaying conflict—and about whom, therefore, psychoanalysis knows so very little. From this point of view, our patients often appear to be the inverted dissenters—too sick for the modish malaise of their time, too isolated for joint dissent, and yet too sensitive for simple adjustment.

What, then, are the quantitative changes that seem to change the quality of adolescence in our time? It is said that there are simply more young people around than ever before; that they now generally mature earlier; and that more of them are better informed about world conditions—and informed both by a common literacy and the common imagery of mass communication—than ever before. But while these shared vocabularies and imageries convey simplified ideals of identity, personality, and competence, such promise becomes forever illusory because of the daily vagaries of technological, legal, and bureaucratic complexities—themselves a result of a variety of quantitative changes. Often, therefore, only to be intensely "with it" and with one another provides a sense of individuality and communality in otherwise paralyzing discontinuities. This, it seems, is expressed vividly and often devastatingly in songs of shouted loneliness underscored by a pounding rhythm-to-end-all-rhythms in a sea of circling colors and lights. Such active and joint mastery of a cacophonous world can be experienced with an emotional and physical abandon unlike anything the older generations ever dreamed of; and yet—especially where compounded by drugs—it can also camouflage a reciprocal isolation of desperate depth.

III

But perhaps an observer learns most as he becomes aware of what social change is doing with (and to) his own conceptualizations of youth. We have, for example, postulated within the stage of youth a psychological moratorium—a period when the young person can dramatize or at any rate experiment with patterns of behavior which are both—or neither quite—infantile and adult, and yet often find a grandiose alignment with traditional ideals or new ideological trends. A true moratorium, of course, provides leeway for timeless values; it takes the pressure out of time—but it must end. If in the past young people (and creative adults) have often mourned the end of the moratorium as an irrevocable loss of potential identities, today young leaders, transient as they are, declare the world beyond youth to be totally void and faceless. But

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a moratorium without end also disposes of all utopias—except that of an infinite moratorium. The large-scale utopias that were to initiate a new kind of history in the postwar period—the war that would end all wars, the socialism that would make the state wither away, the thousand-year Reich, or the advent of militant nonviolence—they have all been followed by holocausts as coldly planned as were the gas chambers and Hiroshima, or as shockingly planless as mass riots; and they have been superseded by bureaucratic-industrial systems of negligible ideological differentiation. Thus also ended the unquestioned superiority of the fathers whether they had obeyed and died, or survived and thrived. If then, as it always must, rebellious youth borrows roles from past revolutions, it must now avoid the temptation to settle for any previous consolidations. The mere thought of what form the world might take after the next revolution seems in itself counter-revolutionary.

A moratorium without some kind of utopian design, however, can lead only to an ideological promiscuity that both adopts and disposes of the old revolutions. There is, of course, the Marxist model. Some of today's activists like to resemble Marxist revolutionaries in appearance and in vocabulary, but cannot possibly share either their erstwhile hopes or, indeed, their intellectual discipline and political skill. They need a proletariat to liberate, but few groups of workers today could be led for long by intellectual youths with no blueprint. Thus, youth must appoint *itself* a kind of proletariat—and "the people" often comes to mean primarily young people.

Another model is the Gandhian one, anticolonial and nonviolent. There is hardly an item in the arsenal of modern protest—from card-burning to mass marching—that Gandhi did not invent as part of the revolutionary method of militant nonviolence. Originally a revolt of those who happened to be unarmed, it came through him to mean above all the method of those who *chose* to remain unarmed. Yet today's youth (except for such devotional groups as the civil rights marchers and the draft-resisting dissenters in America) has lacked the continuity that could elevate nonviolent protest to the level of national campaigns. Nor is there much likelihood that the remaining victims of colonialism care to count on the youth of affluent countries. Therefore, youth has appointed itself also the corporate victim of colonialism; and the mere dependence on an older generation comes to symbolize a despised colonial heritage.

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Gandhi was by no means unaware of the cathartic function of violence; the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon was its spokesman. By emphasizing the therapeutic necessity of revolutionary violence, he forms an ideological link between anti-colonialism and the "Freudian revolution," which has counterpointed the methods of political liberation with a systematic exploration of man's psychological bondage. Some of our young people, combining emotional license with alternately violent and nonviolent confrontation and with both intellectual and anti-intellectual protest, attempt to combine the gains of all revolutions in one improvised moratorium and often succeed only in endangering and even mocking them all.

Out of the combined revolutions of the oppressed and the repressed, of the proletarians, the unarmed, and the mental sufferers, there seems to have now emerged a *revolt of the dependent.* That to be dependent means to be exploited is the ideological link between the developmental stage of youth, the economic state of the poor, and the political state of the underdeveloped. This, at least, could partially explain the astounding similarity of the logic used in the patterns of confrontation both by privileged youth and by the underprivileged citizenry. And has youth not learned from psychoanalysis to look at man's prolonged childhood dependence as an evolutionary fact artificially protracted by adults in order to subvert the radiance of children and the vigor of youth and to confirm the molds of adult self-images?

The revolt of the dependent, however, directly challenges all those existing institutions that monopolize the admissions procedures to the main body of society. These confirmations, graduations, and inductions have always attempted to tie youthful prophecy to existing world images, offering a variety of rites characterized by special states of ceremonious self-diffusion. All this, too, dissenting youth now seeks to provide for itself in newly improvised and ritualized self-graduations, from musical happenings to communal experiment and to political revolt.

I have now indicated a few aspects of the revolutionary inheritance which past generations and especially the charismatic leaders of the postwar period have bequeathed to youth. In the meantime, however, industrialization has changed all basic premises; and the majority of young people remain engaged in the invention and perfection of techniques that by their immense practicality could assure safety, rationality, and abundance, even as the exploration of space promises a new type of heroic adventure and limitless ce-

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lestial leeway. But even technological youth respond at times to the prophetic quality of the two questions aggravated youth seems to ask: When if not now, in this post-ideological period in history and before cosmic technocracy takes over altogether, will man attempt to combine his timeless values, his new insights, and his coming mastery in one all-human outlook and planning? And who if not they, the young people assembled in the prolonged moratorium of academic life, will live and rebel for the sake of that outlook?

IV

Freud at one time stressed that society must of necessity act as a suppressor of individuality, genitality, and intellect, and that far from wishing to overcome human violence as such, societies merely insist on the right to control the means and to stipulate the targets of violence. Freud stood for the primacy of insight, but he took state and civilization for granted; he faced the specter of totalitarian societies only toward the end of his life. Since then, psychoanalysis has found a mutual accommodation with societal systems that can claim to offer a maximum of opportunity to the greatest number of their citizens and that promote, together with the comforts of expanding technology, the pursuit of learning and of health—even of mental health. Psychoanalytic ego psychology, in turn, has come to study those adaptive social processes that must protect and support ego development in childhood and give strength and direction to adolescent identity. But while the complementarity of individual and societal processes has been acknowledged and studied, questions in regard to the potential arbitrariness of all systems of power have remained. This questioning has, in fact, been vastly intensified in recent years with the increasing awareness of the use (or misuse) to which large-scale organization puts individual inventiveness and valor. Even the most affluent and progressive systems seem to thrive at the expense of individual values: Their costliness may become apparent in the restriction of spontaneity in the midst of a system extolling individual freedom; in the standardization of information in the midst of a universal communications industry; and, worse, in new and numbing denials in the midst of universal enlightenment.

Modern youth has grown up with the fact that an affluent civilization can learn to become relatively peaceful and neighborly in large areas of its existence and yet delegate the greatest destructive

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power that ever existed to nuclear monsters scientifically created and loyally serviced by well-adjusted experts and technicians. Not that most young people any more than most adults can keep this paradox in the center of attention for any length of time; but was it not, again, psychoanalysis which taught that man is responsible for what he represses or attempts to remain unaware of? Yet much as we have learned about the consequences of sexual repression, we do not yet possess systematic terms and concepts adequate to deal with the split in human awareness that makes the coexistence of consumer affluence and of minutely planned "overkill" possible, nor with the emotional price exacted for this split.

And yet we must realize that the specter of nuclear war changes the whole ecology of what we have come to view as the over-all instinctual economy of man. As long as wars can (or could) provide ideologically convincing reasons for the massive deflection of hate on external enemies, much interpersonal and intergenerational conflict could live itself out in periodic states of war. As communication makes the enemy appear human, and as technological developments make war absurd, unrelieved self-hate as well as the hateful tension in families and communities may well cause new and bewildering forms of violence.

No wonder, then, that the *legitimacy of violence* becomes the greatest single issue in the ideological struggle of youth today. It can come to sharpest awareness in those young men who must be prepared to see themselves or their friends inducted into a "service" that legitimizes what appears to be the senseless continuation of colonial wars. Most of them decide to fulfill traditional expectations of duty and heroism. Some object conscientiously, and—if they must also conscientiously admit that they do not believe in the prescribed kind of God—must face jail under conditions that negate even a traditional sense of martyrdom. A few turn furiously against the system; but if they seem totally committed to a negative utopia in which the existing world must come to an end before anything can live, one should remember that they have grown up in a setting in which adult happiness-as-usual did not exclude the minute-by-minute potential of a nuclear holocaust—and an end of mankind as we know it.

V

If I should now attempt to throw some methodological light on the range of reactions which youth exhibits in the face of the con-

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ditions just sketched, I must begin by clarifying some terms which I have used over the years. Instead of using *identity diffusion* (or ego diffusion) and *confusion* alternately, I would now wish to take account of the fact that the adolescent ego *needs* a certain diffusion. I would, therefore, use this term for experiences in which some boundaries of the self are expanded to include a wider identity, with compensatory gains in emotional tonus, cognitive certainty, and ideological conviction—all of this occurs in states of love, sexual union, and friendship, of discipleship and followership, and of creative inspiration. Such states can, of course, occur within culturally sanctioned affiliations or in self-affirming groups usurping a place on the fringe of society. The question is always whether the cumulative state of diffused selfhood adds up to a potent new vision or to a retrogressive delusion of acting meaningfully. *Identity confusion* would then characterize those states in which there is an impoverishment and a dissipation of emotional, cognitive, and moral gains in a transitory mob state or in renewed isolation—or both.

The difficulty of classifying such states and, above all, of assigning them to given classes of individuals with particular personalities or similar backgrounds is, of course, compounded where the same young individuals and the same groups seem to demonstrate an alternation of prophetic and retrogressive states, being at one time heroically committed and at another cynically disengaged, at one time devastatingly logical and at another quite deliberately irrational, at one time planfully affirmative and at another quite carelessly destructive. The defensive aspects of such alternation are inherent in the mechanisms described by Anna Freud in her classic characterization of puberty. But one could probably take up these mechanisms, one by one, and make explicit the complementary nature of the inner needs of the adolescent individual and the inducements offered not only by spontaneous group formations, but also by ideological movements. The cognitive facts established by Piaget make it plausible enough that youth *thinks* ideologically—that is, with a combination of an egocentric, narcissistic orientation determined to adapt the world to itself and a devotion to idealistic and altruistic schemes and codes, whether or not their feasibility can be proved or disproved with adult logic. Correspondingly, in ideological world images (and I am, of course, not speaking only of the totalitarian kind) such logic is rendered superfluous; the "self-evident" truth of simplistically overdefined

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alternatives and the omnipotence promised in a radical course of action permit the young to invest their loyalty and to offer their very lives. At decisive moments in history and in the hands of leaders of genius, such prophecy, up to a point, fulfills itself; but in the long intervals of minimized revolutionary potential, youth is led into beliefs and actions in which the borderlines between prank and delinquency, adventure and political drama, are often hard to draw—even as it is often difficult to discern where in the personalities of ideological leaders, hysterics and histrionics blend with true charisma.

All this is well known; but there is much to learn about the developmental position of youthful enactments midway between the play of children and the ritualized aspects of adult society. Infantile play, among other accomplishments, re-enacts experiences and anticipations of a traumatic character in the microcosm of the toyworld, and the promises of its make-believe provide a necessary balance against the combined pressure of an immature conscience, a vague drivenness, and a bewildering social reality. The need for such a balance is multiplied in adolescence when the grown-up body, the matured genital equipment, and a perceptive mentality permit actions on the borderline of mere playfulness and utterly serious reality, of passing prank and irreversible deed, of daring pretense and final commitment. In negotiating these borderlines together, young people may be able to share transient conflicts that might otherwise force each individual to improvise his own neurosis or delinquency, but they obviously also can lead one another into permanent involvements out of line with their self-image, their conscience—and the law. Most "grow out" of this; but it is important to visualize how much the adult world, too, with its ceremonial habituations in areas of the greatest and most lasting relevance continues to express the need for ritual make-believe.

But we are concerned here with the retrogressive aspects of youth re-enactments. I avoid the term *regression* here because of its ontogenetic and clinical implications. Transitory regression can be part both of creativity and of development, as is implied in Kris' term "regression in the service of the ego" and in Blos' "regression in the service of development." Blos, in fact, considers the "capacity to move between regressive and progressive consciousness with . . . ease" the unique quality of adolescence.

And, indeed, I would submit that some of the adolescent processes described so readily as regressive have the distinct adaptive

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function of reviving and recapitulating the fragmentary experiences of childhood for the sake of recombining them actively in a new wholeness of experience. Such unification must obviously count on the workings of the ego. But it is accompanied by a new sense of "I," as well as a new experience of "we." The fate and function of such a sense and such an experience in the sequence of life stages have so far eluded conceptualization in psychoanalytic terms. At any rate, that a specific wholeness of experience may be irretrievably lost once adolescence has passed is the fear which gives much of adolescent behavior a certain desperate determination. And this, too, is a source of identification with the underprivileged, anywhere, who have missed their chance and must be offered a new one.

VI

I will select for more detailed discussion one strand of development little discussed in psychoanalysis—namely, that of moral and ethical orientation. I will speak of *moral learning* as an aspect of childhood; of *ideological experimentation* as a part of adolescence; and of *ethical consolidation* as an adult task. But as we know from the study of psychosexuality, the earlier stages are not replaced, but—according to the epigenetic principle—absorbed into a hierarchic system of increasing differentiation. If the child learns to be moral, by which I mean primarily to *internalize the prohibitions* of those significant to him, his moral conflicts continue in adolescence, but come under the primacy of ideological thinking. By ideology, in turn, I mean a *system of commanding ideas* held together more (but not exclusively) by totalistic logic and utopian conviction than by cognitive understanding or pragmatic experience. This ideological orientation as well as the moral one are in turn absorbed, but never quite replaced by that ethical orientation which makes the difference between adulthood and adolescence—"ethical" meaning a *universal sense of values assented to* with insight and foresight in anticipation of immediate responsibilites not the least of which is a transmission of these values to the next generation. Such development guarantees to this whole value structure a gradual synchronization with economic-political realities, but it also results in a persistent liability that can always lead to partial retrogressions. In youth, this can be seen in an arrest on the ideological level or a backsliding to infantile conflicts over moral interdicts, wherefore aggravated and especially agitated youth alternately re-

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enacts a *premoral* position that denies any need for morality; in an *amoral* position that flaunts accepted norms; in an *anti-moral* position that militantly negates all authority; and finally, in an *anti-authoritarian* and yet *moralistic* position that condemns the adult world with righteous fervor—all in the context of an insistence that the stubborn vitality of youth must not be surrendered to the existing system.

To begin with the ethical orientation: On October 16, 1967, at the Arlington Street Church in Boston, Harvard student Michael K. Ferber was one of the leaders of an anti-draft ceremony at which he made a statement entitled "A Time to Say No." He concluded it thus:

> But what I want to speak about now goes beyond our saying No, for no matter how loudly we all say it, no matter what ceremony we perform around our saying it, we will not become a community among ourselves nor effective agents for changing our country if a negative is all we share. Albert Camus said that the rebel, who says No, is also one who says Yes, and that when he draws a line beyond which he will refuse to cooperate, he is affirming the values on the other side of that line. For us who come here today, what is it that we affirm, what is it to which we can say Yes?

If Ferber was speaking so ethically for the young who were acting like himself, there were at his elbows a most affirmative university chaplain and a famous pediatrician who had used psychoanalytic insight to make more people say Yes to more babies with more practical awareness than had any doctor before him. Such company, however, only emphasizes the fact that the most ethical sentiments of the young are often synchronized with the most youthful sentiments of concerned adults. Most of all, however, Ferber's statement must serve here as a motto for the ethical leadership of a new generation of *young adults* who, with exhortation by song or slogan, by dramatic action or quiet resistance, have in recent years introduced a new ethical orientation into American life—an orientation already well visible in the concerns of a new generation of students.

I have begun with the Boston Resisters because a group retrogression is least likely to occur where a disciplined civil resistance to a circumscribed nationwide grievance dominates action. I have heard an equally clear Yes by students at Capetown University who reiterated their and their teachers' determination to open the universities to black countrymen. If one should single out a retrogressive danger in this whole area of ethical dissent, it is the

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arbitrary choosing of rebellious gestures that do not add up to a sustaining Yes, and of methods uncoordinated with the actions of others.

In turning from a consideration of the ethical position to that of the re-enactment of earlier moral conflicts, I will follow the usual method of outlining the childhood stages first subsumed under the theory of pregenitality. In some analogy to the principles of that theory, we will proceed on the assumption that the process of adolescence includes a re-enactment of all the pre-adolescent positions, from infancy on, in order to integrate all the gains of childhood in an individual as well as a collective style of adolescence consonant with the needs of the historical period. On the way, however, each part position can make itself independent in conjunction with an adolescent subculture which specializes in some utopian promises of the position in question and attempts to contribute them to an emerging world order. Such a *totalization* of one set of human potentials can eventually become both regressive and destructive for the person, the "sect," and society at large.

Infancy contributes to all later life, together with some fateful vulnerabilities, an undaunted orality and an unbroken sensory eagerness. What in clinical discussion we have habitually called, for short, "oral" has always been more than a zonal or libidinal emphasis; the original modes of incorporating both food and sensations form a vital basis for an active acceptance of the world. Any clinical or developmental assessment, then, could begin with each of a number of themes and lead inescapably to all the others. I will emphasize here the infant's *mutuality* of responses with the *maternal person,* which leads to the introjection of a benevolent and reliable mother image and thus helps to appease primal anxiety. This, in turn, works for a favorable ratio of *basic trust* over *basic mistrust* that assures that *hope* becomes the fundamental quality of all growth. All this combines to form a first *developmental position* that will become a contributory element to all later stages as it reaches on each stage a higher level of differentiation. This developmental timetable is, of course, also a map of transient and partial regressions in states of crisis, illness, or fatigue, and of an irreversible withdrawal to delusional fulfillment in malignant states.

In adolescence, the quality of fidelity, the capacity to be loyal to a vision of the future, now incorporates infantile trust, while the capacity to have faith emerges as a more focused hope tuned to an ideologically coherent universe. The corresponding totalization we

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know clinically in the form of massive regression in isolated, addictive, or psychotic individuals. We know it biographically as the special state of a creative recapitulation of sensory awakening in some medium of artistic representation. And we know it sociologically as a utopian or revivalist community life of a markedly childlike, trusting, and mystical spirit.

Returning to today's patterns of dissent, it must be obvious that the group style generally subsumed under the term "hippiedom" is such a totalization of the first developmental position. In the midst of our technocratic world, young men and women encourage one another to live like the proverbial lilies of the field, with trusting love as their dominant demand and display.

In the scheme of moral stages, such a return to the logic of both infancy and paradise can be seen as a re-enactment of the *premoral stage*. These young people seem to convince themselves (and sometimes us) that the fall from grace and the expulsion from paradise were overexertions of divine rigor and that basic mistrust is superfluous baggage for a "human being." This return can be a reaffirmation of the indispensable treasure of experience that our technocratic world is vaguely aware of having sacrificed to the gods of gadgetry, merchandise, and mechanical adjustment; and, up to a point, the world is grateful to or, at any rate, fascinated by this tribe from "another world." But, alas, an existing technology has its own methods of absorbing and neutralizing utopian innovations, and the flower children, too, have suffered—precisely because of their repression of the necessary minimum of mistrust—from combined exploitation by microbes, drugpushers, and publicists.

VII

There could be no greater contrast than that between the ethical and the premoral positions just sketched and the amoral one to be considered next. And yet dissent unites, and the hippies and the motorcycle gangs have on occasion been seen to dwell together like the lambs and the lions. I have also heard of at least one instance when draft resisters linked themselves together around a conscientious deserter with chains handed them by a black-leathered gang. If the amoral position has more obviously sinister trends than the premoral one, however, it is because it champions a sincere belief in the goodness both of physical violence and of "obscenity."

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The amoral position is clearly related to the second stage of infantile development (that is, about the second and third year of life). In dogmatic brevity, *anal-urethral* and *muscular* development had a psychosocial corollary in the sense of *autonomy* which in turn outweighed the danger of excessive *doubt* and *shame*. The new, rudimentary strength to emerge from this stage is a sense of free *will*—seasoned with the acceptance of a mutual delineation with the will of others. The psychopathological counterpart of all this is, in fact, a malfunction of the will, either in the form of inner *over-control* manifested in *compulsive* and *obsessive* trends or in that of a willful *impulsivity*.

Identity development in adolescence calls for a revival of the second developmental position too. Tested once more, will can then be subordinated to some order acknowledged as a higher will and willful impulse to communal experience, while blind obedience can become self-chosen discipline—the subjective emphasis always being that the individual chooses freely what proves inescapable. In totalistic rebellion, however, the negative re-enactment of this position can lead to a complete reversal of positions. Far from exhibiting any embarrassment, the dissenters sport shamelessness, obedience becomes defiance, and self-doubt, contempt. These deliberate challenges, in turn, arouse the worst in others, wherefore the militant amoralist finds himself, sooner or later, confronted by uniformed men, paid to do the "dirty work" for nice people, and apt to oblige the amoral phantasy-life by behaving like the externalized version of a brutal conscience while being at times—in terms of their task and training—amoral themselves.

It is well within developmental logic, then, that the retrogression to an amoral state recapitulates—no less compulsively for seeming so obvious and deliberate—such infantile patterns of protest as the deft deposition of feces in places to be desecrated and the use of excrement as ammunition. In this context also belongs the indiscriminate appellation of dirty names to authorities. In the case of "pigs," this certainly shows a strange lack of respect for an innocently muddy animal, and in that of sexual four-letter words, a blatant retrogression from sexual freedom.[1]

This may be the place to discuss briefly the often-heard simplistic assumption that such retrogressive acts on the part of privileged youth are simply overgrown temper tantrums due to their parents' "permissiveness." Authentic permissiveness can probably not be learned in a few generations. In the meantime, there is,

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rather, an excessive inhibition of parental anger and even of genuine indignation. This leaves the rage of both the parents and the children untested and untrained, and survives as a residual anxious expectation as to when the parents will dare to vent their suppressed rage and prove that they, indeed, can manage their own violence. But problems of child-rearing are always part of an intergenerational climate; and it may not be childhood experience alone that compels young people to test the limits of the dispassionate fairness claimed by authorities as well as by parents. Where such challenge is met with the deployment of a hired force that does not hesitate to vent all the frustrated anger shunned by the privileged, the ethical weakness in delegating violence immediately arouses the solidarity of those larger numbers of students who would not otherwise be attracted by amoral stratagems.

VIII

In the third stage of childhood—that is, the fourth and some of the fifth year of life—the imaginative *anticipation of future roles* is played out with toys and costumes, in tales and games. This, too, is recapitulated after puberty, when youth meets economic reality and historical actuality. What is reawakened, then, is the claim to the right to wield *initiative* of imagination and action—and this without the oppressive sense of *guilt* which at one time deepened the propensity for repression and made the child so amenable to moralistic pressure. In the boy this initiative was (and now is again) *intrusive* and *locomotor,* with an emphasis on invading the domain of the fathers; and it was (and is) for a while intrusive as well as locomotor in girls, sometimes with a competitive fervor surprising to the boys. If the repression of sexual and aggressive thrusts toward parent figures was the negative heritage of the third stage—and this with a marked fear of damage to the executive body parts—it becomes only more plausible that young people should be attracted by charismatic leaders and utopian causes which will sanction and give direction to the re-emergence of vigorous and competitive imagination.

To ward off the worst, the older generation tries, not without condescension, to assign to the young an area of boisterous, promiscuous, and rebellious re-enactment of phallic pursuits for the purpose of "sowing wild oats" or of "blowing off steam" before adult "reality" will force all sportive exuberance back into obedient channels. Higher education, especially, has always cultivated its style of

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genteel boasting and sportive competition. But in the long run it has also conveyed the power of ideas as embodied in rebellious men and periods of the great past, and it has thus helped to thwart the readiness of aggravated youth to be made subservient to technical and bureaucratic regimentation.

Among the retrogressive trends associated with the revival in adolescence of infantile guilt, there is the *anti-authoritarian, hypermoralistic* stance which is sometimes even stranger to behold than the name I am here attaching to it. Here is a simple and mild example of what I mean. In a college paper, a student took a truly distinguished professor to task for an allegedly illogical and unethical point of view. The issue is not so important here as the stance. The writer scolded: "What truly bothers me is the quality and logic of your justification . . ."; "I find thoroughly naïve your attempt to distinguish between . . ."; "Still more ludicrous is the characterization in your letter . . ."; "Even if I were to grant you this point for the sake of argument . . ."; "What most . . . experts lack is a discernible sense of responsibility. . . ." This total kind of turning against the "authority" of a legendary schoolmaster's posture is typical of the tone sported by many self-appointed revolutionaries, who declare a given man or group to be "guilty" with a fanatic use of the "guilt-by-association" logic. Some young people with the clearest intelligence and the most ethical intentions can talk one another into such retrogression, unaware of the probability that they are hastening the time when they will use it against one another for reciprocal moral liquidation.

In the meantime, fanaticism "dared" by agitators can lead to dangerous confrontations precisely because they are staged in the center of adult male prerogative. Perhaps the re-enactment of the third developmental position is nowhere more obvious than in the emotional and behavioral side effects of those confrontations that center in the occupation of buildings as seats and symbols of established power. The acquisition of a *territorial base* in the heart of the Establishment is, of course, an old revolutionary technique which is as strategic as it is symbolic. In the occupation of a center in the alma mater, however, the retrogressive aspects are underscored because the conquerors claim and count on the protection of academic *extraterritoriality.* And, indeed, their subsequent moodswings seem to vary from an undoubted sense of having accomplished a historically valid communal deed to excesses clearly dramatizing themes of a degradation of father figures as guilty usurpers and

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of the right of the young to claim license and amnesty, almost before the deed is consummated. And, indeed, faculties tend to make family affairs of such revolts; so that it becomes equally ludicrous to demand or to grant amnesty or to insist on severe punishments for deeds that, in fact, do manage to arouse guilty doubts in the confronted adults and force them to confront one another in prolonged and overdue debate.

IX

We must now, at last, look at that majority of the young who, without such provocation, would be aggravated only latently and would probably never join a revolt. Not that the majority has not always cultivated periodic pranks, raids, and riots which in various cultures have come to be taken for granted. But even though in some countries occasionally lives are lost, these youthful disorders rarely assume the nature of a concerted rebellion, except where most students have reason to feel that the system does not give them their due place *within* it. Students are not necessarily alienated from an industrial world or even a military-industrial complex so long as their studies promise them active participation and advancement in it, and a style of leisure utilizing all the comfort of modern mechanization. It is difficult to ascribe to this majority a tendency to re-enact a previous developmental position, because their aspirations are to a large extent only an extension of the fourth stage, the *school and play* age, into a prolonged period of apprenticeship. In our continuum from premoral to expressly ethical orientations, this great middle range cultivates a post-moral and pre-ethical *pragmatism.* This dominates, above all, the students of occupational specialties which attempt to come to grips with the concrete complexities of modern life, be they production or distribution, transportation or communication, medicine or law: For them, *what works is good,* and it is man's fate to be in motion and to set things in motion in league with a divine engineering power. Teamwork justifies man's trust in the eventual manageability of all modern complexities, including poverty and race relations, war and the conquest of space.

According to this general orientation, morality, ideology, and ethics can all be fitted into the acquisition of techniques, problems of sin or salvation being delegated to a Sunday religiosity which is never in conflict with habit and reason and which rewards those who

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help themselves. The result is a new technical-cultural consolidation analogous to those that have dominated all previous periods of history.

If there is retrogression in this orientation, it is an all-too-early, all-too-complete adjustment to the dominant modes of production and of success; and while those who can feel at home in it are apt to escape the more disturbing forms of identity confusion, they also must live by a dissimulation of emotions, the cumulative and corporative fate of which in inner or interpersonal life is hard to gauge. The patterns of dissent displayed by those in tune with "the system" differ in countries of different degrees of economic development; and even where the pragmatists occasionally permit themselves to be aggravated or led by radical activists, the latter cannot always foresee whether their temporary supporters want a different system or a more profitable identity within the existing one; for the pragmatists are closer to the power struggles within the political structure than they are to ideological issues as such.

Do moral pragmatists, too, feel "alienated" in a technocratic world? It is hard to say. But increased contact with humanist intellectuality is apt to breed radical dissent. Otherwise, a retrogression within the logic of the school age takes the form of "dropping out" for the sake of doing "my thing." Such avoidance of an early submission to the narrow techniques of limited competencies can (where the draft laws permit) be of great value especially when joined to enriching experiences and exercises. But sooner or later dropouts are apt to erect a communal pretense of superiority over all those who work and serve—a superiority often only covering that exquisite *sense of inferiority* which is the subborn shadow of the school age.

X

One could condense all that has been said about the various types of dissent by claiming that group retrogressions originate in the incapacity or the refusal to conclude the stage of identity on the terms offered by the adult world. But the generational barrier is always one between future adults and erstwhile adolescents. Today it is reinforced on the adult side by a pervasive sense of deficiency in ethical and religious orientation such as would be consonant with an identity development still promised a generation ago. In fact, many of the adults most effective in modern transactions have had

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the least time to complete, or indeed to renew, their identity development—not to speak of their sense of intimacy or generativity—under the pressure of technological and historical change. (Is this the reason why some bearded young men and severe young women manage to look and act like veterans of life compared to their successful and boyish-looking fathers and their happy and girlish-appearing mothers?)

Some militants, of course, refuse to concede any need for identity; to them the very concept is only another attempt to force youth into roles prescribed by the Establishment. Whether or not this is partially true, it is important to realize that there is a hidden ideological connotation to all theories concerning man's nature; even the most carefully verified observations will prove to have been subject to the ideological polarizations of their historical period. This certainly has been the case with the theory of psychosexuality. Today, when (to paraphrase McLuhan) the mask is so often the message, we face young people who hide their true identity—in every sense of the word—behind dark glasses and ubiquitous hair, while flaunting a negative identity often way beyond their emotional means. This, too, can be part of courageous living; but it can also go together with a negation of the three developmental necessities marking the termination of adolescence: an identity tied to some competence; a sexuality bound to a style of intimacy; and the anticipation of becoming, before long, responsible for the next generation.

We should acknowledge in passing the advances on the part of many young people in making genital freedom a central aspect of greater communal honesty. A vigorous genital culture, however, depends among other things on contraceptive methods; and while their invention was fervently anticipated by Freud, it may be necessary today to be vigilant in the face of an all-too-ready belief that genital and procreative instinctuality can be divided so neatly without new kinds of emotional strain. On the other hand, the freedom of choosing parenthood with a fuller consciousness of what mankind can and must be able to promise each newborn child, *anywhere*, could well become the *sine qua non* of a future ethics equipped with a clearer knowledge of the all-around needs of a human being.

The future, so I would submit in conclusion, will force on young adults not only new styles of parenthood, but also the responsibility of being, indeed, their younger brothers' and sisters' keepers. After

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all the remarkable service which some of our young people have rendered to the underprivileged and underdeveloped on the periphery of their lives, they may have to learn that to be a young person under conditions of rapid change means to assume responsibility for younger persons nearby, and this in ways impossible to perform by older people and least of all by parents. This, too, is prophetically anticipated in the transient brotherhoods and sisterhoods of today—even if such caring for one another is at times only a sporadic and romantic phenomenon.

In this mostly "diagnostic" paper I should like to make this one "therapeutic" suggestion which (luckily, as so often) relies on the prognostically obvious: If the older young people could find the courage in themselves—and encouragement and guidance from their elders—to institutionalize their responsibility for the younger young, we might see quite different images of both youth and young adulthood emerge than those we now know. New models of fraternal behavior may come to replace those images of comradeship and courage that have been tied in the past to military service and probably have contributed to a glorification of a kind of warfare doomed to become obsolete in our time; and they may come to continue the extraordinary work, both inspired and concrete, done in the last few decades by pioneering youth groups on a variety of frontiers. This, in turn, would make it possible for adults to contribute true knowledge and genuine experience without assuming an authoritative stance beyond their actual competence and genuine inner authority.

In the definition and defense of such a new generational bond I also see a new role for (well, relatively) young men and women with psychoanalytic training. Beyond their function as healers, they could well serve as interpreters of the conflicts that are aroused in those who—on either side of the barrier—cannot let go of the images and impulses of the "classical" generational struggle. But in supporting this trend, one must also emphasize the Hippocratic obligations implied in it: Diagnostic and therapeutic insights cannot, beyond a certain amount of professed partisanship, be subservient to ideological counter-transferences. In a post-Freudian world, psychological insight must assume a significance and an ethical power of its own.

For adults, too, retrogress under the conditions described. Or rather the manifestations discussed are already the result of acute and yet hidden adult retrogression. We who know so much about

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the child in the adult know so much less about the fate of the adolescent in him; and yet it is eminently clear that adults of ethical stature retain their irrational ideological involvements as well as their punitive moralism and can fall back on both. That adolescent remnants endure can be seen in quieter times in the ritualized retrogressions of such groups as alumni or veterans; and they are often obvious in the peculiarities of people whose occupation forces (or permits) them to spend their lives with and for youth, not to speak of the adolescents-in-residence on every faculty. Acutely confronted by challenges of aggravated and agitated youth, the adult is apt to suffer a kind of emotional paralysis caused by acutely roused remnants of his own unfulfilled identity fragments and a certain irresistible—punitive or self-punitive—identification with the new brand of youth. Whether the result is generational surrender or renewed generational isolationism, it must sooner or later lead to a display of that brittle dignity which is supposed to protect occupational identity and status. To this, again, the majority of young people react negatively; to them a career that is not worth sacrificing for professed ideals is not worth having.

To share true authority with the young, however, would mean to acknowledge something that adults have learned to mistrust in themselves: a truly ethical potential. To study the psychological foundation of this potential may be one of the more immediate tasks of psychoanalysis. As we have already passed the "century of the child" and are now experiencing, with a vengeance, that of the adolescent, we may well be entering a period in which we must dare to ask: What, really, *is* an adult?

A new generation, for us, always starts again with Oedipus. We take it for granted that King Laius knew what he was doing—for could he not count on the authority of the Oracle when he left his baby boy to die, taking no chances with the possibility that a good education might have proven stronger than the oracular establishment? From what we know today, however, we might be inclined to ask: What could you expect of a little boy whose father felt so bound by phobic traditionalism? Yet theory has confirmed the oracle: Each new child appears to be a potential bearer of the Oedipal curse, and parricide remains a much more plausible explanation of the world's ills than does filicide.

And yet it must be clear that all puberty rites and confirmations as well as all inductions and (yes, all) graduations, besides estab-

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lishing a reciprocity of obligations and privileges, also threaten with an element of mutilation and exile—if not in the crude form of surgical covenants, then in the insistence that a person's final identity must be cut down to size: the size of a conventional type of adult who knows his place and likes it. Thus we continue to institutionalize generational identifications that serve as built-in solutions for childhood conflicts and yet also guarantee their recurrence from generation to generation.

The discovery of the Oedipus Complex made amenable to conscious critique a generational fate grounded both in phylogeny and ontogeny. Such fate does not become altogether relative through historical change. But it may well be that different periods of history and different epidemiologies open new aspects of man's tragic involvement and of his rare victories to psychoanalytic insight. In this wider sense, it may well be that some of the confrontations in actuality which rebellious youth insists upon and the inner confrontation which is the essence of our method are highlighting the inner and outer consequences of patriarchal moralism and the present necessity for a world-wide new ethics supported by the informed choices of young men and young women.

References

1. I cannot discuss here the different significance which deliberate obscenity and profanity assumes among the militants of racial minorities, who for generations and all their lifetimes have been exposed to extralegal "law enforcement."

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STANLEY HOFFMANN

Participation in Perspective?

In almost every instance, university crises in the United States and abroad have led to a quest for institutional reform. The *loi d'orientation* adopted by the French Parliament in the fall of 1968, the changes that have been carried out at Columbia and Princeton, and those being discussed at Harvard result from the following assumption: One of the reasons for the crisis must have been the inadequacy of the institutions of the university, for they have been unable to cope with the new pressures and strains, and indeed their flaws have often been the targets for, or the detonators of, the explosion. Structural reform should make the university more able to face its problems and remove some of the major causes of trouble.

It is, of course, true that the contours of each crisis are drawn by the peculiarities, including the institutional ones, of the university in trouble. But the diversity of institutions affected has been enormous, whereas the similarity in the students' revolts has been remarkable. Every kind of university government has been in difficulty. To look for even a partial solution in institutional engineering reminds one of those French politicians or political scientists who, throughout modern French history, have seen in constitutional reform the answer to France's problems. The result has been a rich and varied constitutional history and a fascinating demonstration of the way in which the underlying issues are affected by, yet survive, shape, and doom the institutional innovations. True, some institutions are better than others for dealing with certain kinds of problems. Discussions on governance, in a nation or a university, are therefore not only legitimate but necessary; for if the setup is both ineffective and drained of support, only chaos will result. Yet to focus too exclusively on "governance" is doubly dangerous. First, a new system of government must

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be discussed in the light of those substantive issues that have led to the crisis of the institutions; "who governs" may well be one of the key questions of politics, but "what for" is the other one. The wrong "who" cannot reach the right "what"; but depending on the "what," the right "who" will not be the same.

Secondly, the discussion of "governance" risks becoming one more way of evading the substantive issues; it would thus not only breed dangerous illusions about how far structural reforms can go in solving the crisis, but also prolong one of the most important aspects of the crisis: the total lack of agreement on the "what." It is as if the academic Emperor had decided to build himself a new clothes closet so as not to face the fact that he has no real clothes to put in. He wears the tattered remains of his old, frayed, and shrunken garments and cannot make up his mind whether to buy new robes, or a business suit, or blue jeans, or a mod outfit, or a mixture. And while it could be argued that his old closet was so small, and dark, and empty of hangers that he was never forced to realize his plight, and while it is certainly true that the best closet would be one that could accommodate any combination of things, what good would a modern closet be if there were no clothes left to hang in it?

There are good reasons why academics flee from the storm of substantive disagreements on the future of the university to the (relative) shelter of structural reform. What is more unsettling than realizing that the institution to which one has committed one's life is adrift, that the foundations on which one built one's career are shaky, that the idea of a university which one thought common to most of one's colleagues and students has in fact been repudiated by many, that there are deep contradictions between resilient old ideals and irresistible new realities, or that grandiose recent ideals such as, say, Clark Kerr's "multiversity" breed their own quota of troubles? Most striking is the tendency to push such divisions and dramas under the rug or to deal with crises that result from the breakdown of the old order piecemeal—so that the underlying issues, untouched, keep producing new turmoil. To a considerable extent, it is the present generation of students that has, rudely, raised the questions, and we should all be grateful. But both the tactics they have often used and their tendency to be more critical than constructive or, when constructive, more utopian and confused than consistent and realistic (a tendency for which it would be foolish to blame them) have helped academics evade

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these issues or have diverted them into narrower debates on discipline or on "student power," which provoke strange alignments of men deeply divided on all the other issues.

It is not my intention to produce a capsule treatise on the crisis of the university; but I want to stress the seriousness of the problem of ends. The university is the place where some of the most important contradictions and tensions of modern society are at their most concentrated and explosive. The tendencies of this society, which has reshaped other institutions easily, meet special resistance here, both from the traditional nature of the university and from its constituents; and the university is especially vulnerable to the conflicts that this contest creates. Being the arena of greatest strain, the university becomes the stake of the deepest divisions. Depending on the purposes one assigns to it, different forms of government would be appropriate. The objective of institutional reform, therefore, cannot be merely the detailed realization of even so worthy (and universal) a catchword—or demand—as "participation." By itself, participation may fail to solve the bigger problems, or may even aggravate them if the wrong models are adopted. The key question of institutional reform remains—participation in and for what? As long as there is no agreement, the first order of business is to devise temporary institutions designed to provoke a great debate on ends, to facilitate an eventual agreement, and to keep the university going in the meantime.

Among the many features of advanced industrial society—features that transcend the diversity of political regimes, yet are of course affected and shaped by them—we can single out three that are of special importance for an understanding of the crisis of the university.[1] The first one concerns the form of social organization. In our societies, it is *bureaucratic*—that is, human activity takes place in large, hierarchical organizations, which tend to be run with general, impersonal rules, defined and applied by officeholders in charge of managing the organizations. The second feature concerns the method of recruitment of the elites: It is *meritocratic*—that is, access to positions of power is obtained through certified accomplishments, the certification being itself obtained through education. This is in contrast with societies in which the elites were recruited through heredity or wealth. The third feature concerns the basis of power: It is *technocratic*—that is, power tends to go to those who have the skill to apply modern science and

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technology to the practical problems of society. History has known bureaucracy and meritocracy without technocracy; but the latter is impossible to imagine without the first two features.

All three have been celebrated as liberating forces that enlarge the possibilities of human action far beyond what was conceivable in societies marked by scarcity, inequalities of birth, and rigid classes, or fragmented, small-scale, or relatively undifferentiated social organization. The combination of the three features has been hailed as the triumph of rationality applied to human affairs. Two sets of contradictions, however, have resulted in advanced industrial societies, especially in the non-Communist countries.

First, there is a contradiction between these features and the residues of the earlier forms of power and social organization. Sometimes the old perverts the new. Far from achieving a hierarchy based on skill, which would allow any competent person, whatever his origin, to reach a position appropriate to his talents, modern society often merely consecrates and hardens pre-existing inequalities, for it selects mainly among the reasonably well-off and well-placed. Far from assuring the broadest application of science and technology to human problems, modern society often merely concentrates this application in areas for which there is a strong market demand, determined by the vagaries of the government and of a capitalist economy—that is, by what is profitable to a few, or necessary for defense or prestige, rather than useful to most. Hence the revolt of underprivileged groups, who for economic or ethnic reasons remain shut out of the social elevators, and who see how the continuing power and concentration of wealth distort the benefits that the three features of social rationalization are supposed to bring forth. Sometimes the old and the new coexist incoherently. This is particularly the case in two realms: culture, where the old reservoir of general education, with its aristocratic background, profound individualism, faith in the possibility of synthesizing knowledge, and orientation to the past, stagnates surrounded by the mass culture of the present mass media; and politics, where institutions built in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries continue to operate in a world to which they are increasingly less appropriate, and where new institutions more adapted to the political needs of industrial society keep multiplying.

Secondly, there is a contradiction between what might be called the liberating potential of the three modern features and their oppressive implications. With respect to social structure, these features

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threaten to establish their own patterns of inequality and inequity—not only because the new elite, like all past ones, tends to protect its positions, to harden its hold, and to perpetuate its power by restricting access and renewal, but primarily because of the imperialistic tendency of the three features to extend to every segment of society. What made life bearable, and inequality breachable, in past societies was the diversity of forms of social organization, methods of recruitment, and bases of power. They varied from sector to sector (in seventeenth and eighteenth century France, a *roturier* could gain power through commerce, or in the state bureaucracy, or in the republic of letters). If the trend, first announced by the sociologists of industrial society ever since Comte, toward universal uniformity should prevail, not only in theory but in social practice, the relatively unskilled individuals at the bottom of the great organizations would find themselves, despite their affluence, at least as dependent and impotent as in past social systems, and even more deprived of remedies. Moreover, by themselves, the three features provide no clue about the kinds and degrees of accountability which the elites might tolerate as checks on their management and corrections of their abuses.

With respect to the political system, the combination of the three features risks spreading the myth of a "scientific" handling of political issues through techniques that may be adequate for the choice of the best means toward a given end (at least as long as "most economical" and "best" are equated), yet are unfit for the choice among ends or unable to determine the social validity and human value of any end. This pseudo-objectivity could squeeze out of political action not only one of the essential functions of politics—the assessment of social purposes, now taken for granted or deemed determined by the splintered drift of technology—but also the kinds of politicians whose only skill was the subjective and largely intuitive management of conflicts, a skill for which no formal educational process can provide the technical certification and whose essence is profoundly anti-bureaucratic, anti-meritocratic, and anti-technocratic.

Finally, with respect to the individual, the new social order enhances both personal insecurity and alienation (in the sense of non-commitment). The need to succeed in order to reach the top, to keep being a success in order to remain on top despite the challenge of the young (with their up-to-date education and training), the difficulty of rescuing one's own future if one is not on

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top, the hardship of finding a new future if one's organization becomes a victim of technological progress—such are the sources of insecurity. The concentration of power at the top, the lack of a system of public values beyond the act of faith in science and in the social order itself, the relegation of ethics into the realms of privacy, emotions, or aesthetics (that is, social irrelevance if not irrationality), and also the difficulty, quite new in history, of finding a legitimate principle for revolting against a social order that claims to foster progress and rationality—these would be the sources of alienation. This is a problem which those prophets of the new order, Saint Simon and Comte, had anticipated; yet the only remedy they sought was one that this order undermines: a new religion.

Hence a fundamental conflict arises between the rationalizing pretenses of the new order and what might be called its multiple irrationality. The new society is one in which, supposedly, the hierarchy is based on individuals' differing skills in applying their reason to modern science and technology. Collective social organization is said to oblige men to calculate the consequences of their actions—that is, to behave as responsible citizens and not as capricious masters or hapless subjects. The combined resources of science and large-scale organization are assumed to multiply man's choices and free him from the inhibitions and constraints of traditional or early capitalist societies.[2] On the other hand, it is easy to point out that the application of methods of rationalization to complex choices among conflicting ends and rival systems produces pseudo-rationality. In areas as important as the world political and military competition, the "rational" logic of the contest leads, at best, to the mad momentum of the arms and space races and, at worst, to the recurrence of wars. The very size and complexity of modern organizations, by depersonalizing decisions and by making immobility, or minimal changes, or ambiguous compromises easier than imaginative or drastic measures, often entail irresponsibility, generalized impotence from top to bottom, and a lack of sufficient regard for long-range consequences. It is the clash between, on the one hand, the engineer's and social engineer's hubris, his vision of an increasingly conscious, controllable, and planned society, run by "the most effective techniques for the rational exploitation of social talent,"[3] and, on the other hand, the increasing lack of control over one's individual and collective life, the accumulation of waste and the destruction of nature, the replacement

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of the old oppressions of personal dependence and misery with the new oppressions of impersonal dependence and life in urban blight, the disappearance of any yardstick of value above and beyond technological innovation, the triumph of instrumentalism. For new reasons, the old human dream of a society allowing for individual self-fulfillment is once again being frustrated, this time in a context of material fulfillment.

The protest against the three features of modern society is made both more bitter and more futile by the irrelevance of the solutions applied to earlier injustices. In the capitalist societies of yesterday, the assault on the inequalities left over by the feudal order or created by the accumulation of industrial wealth proceeded through two concepts: equality of opportunity and fair treatment. The hierarchies of status and wealth would be, if not eliminated, at least partly corrected by a legal order of equal chances and minimum standards and by the myth of the rational, self-governing individual. Man as citizen and as *homo oeconomicus* would be a free participant in the political and economic market, thanks to the legal order that would remove the obstacles to his full participation, and to a representative system of government that would establish and protect this order and define the standards of fair treatment. Thus, there was a close link between a horizontal view of the legal order—an order of competing equals—and a view of the political system, which was essentially legislative and whose purpose was the promotion of equal rights and the redress of those injustices that could have invalidated them and closed the market. The legislature was both a delegation from the legal order and a reproduction of it: a small assembly of equals. Self-government was equated with the opportunity to participate in the open market and in elections to the legislative bodies. Political and economic activity could be theorized, paradoxically, yet without any deep contradiction, both as a bargaining contest of rational individuals and as a balancing of group interests—for these groups were seen as mere sums of individuals.

The solutions of the old political liberalism and state-regulated capitalism have become obsolete, given the evolution of industrial society, the increasing differentiation of the social order, the dynamism of the economy. The present problems emerged once equal chances and humane treatment were no longer at stake. In part, the solutions of yesterday have even contributed to the difficulties of today. The attempt to correct injustices has meant the

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growth of centralized public bureaucracy and the gradual shift, in Daniel Bell's terms, from a system of distributive power in which all interests are represented to a system of aggregative power dominated by the executive.[4] Today's central issue is not participation in an open market and essentially legislative political system, but participation in the control of the specialized, hierarchical organizations that make up most of the government and the society. Everyone (or almost) has an equal chance to become a subordinate agent of such an organization; the legal right to go all the way to the top is not in doubt. Fair treatment, such as a minimum wage, was essential as a means to the end of allowing each individual to enjoy his legal rights; but today's problem is that of the ends of the organizations in which fair treatment is assured.[5] Self-government today would mean participation in the determination of their ends and in the control of their activities. The old conceptualization of political and economic activity has no leverage for the present: *homo politicus* and *homo oeconomicus* are not organization men. The large interest groups of yesterday—employers', labor, and farmers' unions, even the political parties, all horizontal associations cutting across the vertical lines of territory and work—seem irrelevant to the problem of control of hierarchical organizations. In a totalitarian system, the issue of participation does not even arise; in a non-totalitarian one, the central legislators seem incapable of doing more than ordering paper solutions, and the executive is in many ways the first and biggest organization in need of control. It is this inadequacy, and occasional nefariousness, of the traditional method of seeking remedies at the center which explains why today's rebels often look for them in schemes of community control. But notions of complete decentralization and disorganization inherited from Proudhon or Fourier are no answer: They merely consist in wishing the problem away.

The critique of modern society, in words and in acts, tends to come from three sources only. Yesterday's proletarians, the workers, having won the battles of equal rights and fair treatment, seem usually far more concerned with increasing the range of material benefits which the new social order can bring them than with exploring new possibilities of participation: Their concerns are quantitative rather than qualitative. Their place has been taken by today's underprivileged, those who have not yet gained equal rights, or who feel that they are not receiving fair treatment in a social order that tends either to treat them as an unskilled manpower reserve or to work toward their total elimination: America's

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blacks, the foreign and migrant workers in America's and Europe's industries, the peasants, shopkeepers, artisans, small factory workers who do not fit the "post-industrial" world. Then there are those intellectuals who look with dismay at the three features described above. They represent what Michel Crozier calls the "aristocratic intelligentsia." They see themselves as the guardians of cultural values; they are anxious to serve as prestigious critics and moral guides of society rather than as engineers and managers of limited social change. They are found, here and abroad, mainly in the humanities and in some parts of the social sciences. Finally, there are many students, on the verge of being absorbed into the new order. This rebellion against it is waged by its potential leaders and beneficiaries.

The university has been deeply affected by the three features of modern society. It is, of course, presumptuous to speak of *the* university, given the bewildering variety of institutions of higher learning. But we can take as our subject the traditional communities of scholars devoted both to undergraduate instruction (based on the classical conception of general education) and to graduate training for professional work in an established discipline (aimed at communicating a certain branch of knowledge rather than at teaching techniques with little intellectual content). In these universities, until recently in fact, and even until now in the minds of many academics, the three features had either no place or only a qualified one. Their introduction has turned the university into a battlefield.

The universities of the past were not heavily bureaucratic.[6] Indeed, they all prided themselves on the decentralized self-government by the faculty. This does not mean that there were no traces of authoritarianism, no distance between professors or students, but it was the distance and hierarchy of a feudal order rather than those of a modern bureaucratic, impersonal organization. Of course, within the university, student and teacher progression was largely "meritocratic"—hence the whole network of grades, examinations, and promotions; but as long as higher education in elite universities was essentially the privilege of the sons and daughters of the wealthy and well-born, the meritocratic principle was merely subsidiary and operated without the psychologically unsettling rigor which it has when a whole life's course depends on a few performances. Moreover, even when meritocracy played a large role (as it did within the faculties), the skills demanded

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and displayed were those of basic learning and research. In the pecking order of prestige, the more "disinterested" branches, the disciplines of pure science or the humanities, came before the applied sciences and the vocational fields. Power in the university itself either reflected the internal hierarchy of prestige or else was divided between academic internal self-government and a limited control by representatives of society, politicians if the university was public, or men from the world of business and the professions if it was private. (The structure of American private universities thus resembles a compromise between a mandarinate and an industrial enterprise.) As a result, there existed a curious relationship between the university and society. On the one hand, the university played an important social role, both in giving to the children of the elite a higher general education and specialized training which would enrich, mature, or mellow their future performances, and in providing a limited number of children of the less privileged with access to the elite. On the other hand, the university was a separate universe, largely autonomous and apart from society. Indeed, in order to conquer its autonomy from previous controls—religious, political, or economic—the university secreted a kind of ideal or mythology of itself as a temple of learning, far above the market place, distinct from the political world, both neutral as an institution and devoted to the normative function of evaluating human achievements. The professor was seen not as an employee of society, but as a high priest of truth, knowledge, and reasoned discourse; the student was there to learn from him, and the outside world was to finance and ask no questions.

Modern sociologists have characterized the university of today as if it were the equivalent of the church in the feudal order, of the factory in capitalist society. If knowledge becomes the basis of power, and education the condition for acquiring certified knowledge, then the triumph of the meritocratic principle in society should allow the university to cast its net far more widely than in the days of numerically and socially limited admissions, and the advent of a scientific and technological order should make of the university a key determinant rather than a mere reflection and gentle civilizer of society. "Knowledge becomes a tool of power," and the university is the knowledge factory. But there is a heavy price to pay for becoming "an intensely involved think-tank, the source of much sustained political planning and social innovation."[7] By turning from the myth and partial reality of the sanctuary to

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the myth and partial reality of the social laboratory and executive basement, the university has lost both its distance and its innocence. On the one hand, it is the microcosm of the contradictions described in the previous section. They are heightened by the strength of the contrast between the old academic order and the new: Here the new destroys the old, rather than merely coexisting with it or being subverted by it. On the other hand, by allowing the new features to reshape its structure and activities in a haphazard and unexamined way, the university legitimizes the new social order—hence another contradiction between its new mission and its old role and ideal.

The impact of technocracy on the university has been described and deplored frequently. The "knowledge explosion" has meant the fragmentation of knowledge, the triumph of specialization under the guise of professionalism, the undermining of general education, the subversion of the hierarchy of prestige, the establishment of a new pecking order that privileges what appears, rightly or wrongly, to be directly useful—that is, usable.[8] It has also meant a growing dependence of the university on the "knowledge market" outside, that is, both the industries and the government. It has turned the academics away from the university, made them over into men of affairs and entrepreneurs for whom the university is merely a base, a part-time employer, and a focus of partial allegiance. Whatever greater direct impact on social affairs may thus have been achieved by individual academics or teams, whatever strengthening of disciplines and of professional research cutting across university lines may have taken place, such functional gains have been made at the cost of a vital loss of substance for the university as a community, and of weakening its structure. The priorities are now set outside. The tradition of decentralized faculty self-government, the repugnance of old-style academics to grant full status to what many see as insufficiently scholarly and disinterested activities, have resulted in a proliferation of technical institutes, centers, programs on the margins of the old university. Hence there are uncertainties about who is truly included in the faculty, competition for time and allegiance between the old university and the new, and reluctance of old traditions and institutions to accommodate the new developments that is paradoxically responsible for that very splintering and disintegration of knowledge which they deplore and which technocracy fosters.

One of the consequences is, evidently, bureaucracy. The new

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research outfits and public or civic affairs enterprises of the university can function properly only if they have an extensive and hierarchical division of labor, and the management of their relations with the outside world—particularly the government—requires a growing administration. The multiplication and growth of the regular departments and the increasing number and heterogeneity of students recruited by the university have also contributed to turning it into a bureaucracy, especially in the United States. Here, as elsewhere, size and differentiation entail the need to develop a corps of administrators—professionals, or faculty members turned bureaucrats. The old core, teaching and scholarly research, is dwarfed and eroded by all the time spent on rule-making and executing, planning and adjudicating. The great advantage of bureaucracy is efficiency—but bureaucratization has not improved academic decision-making. It has contributed to the decline in the autonomy of the university as a social system, through the transfer of power from within the university to agencies outside: Administratively, the university's faculty and governing boards may propose priorities and allocations, but the decisions are often made by the bodies that actually sponsor and finance. With respect to the university's internal government, the old, largely pre-bureaucratic structures are being gradually undermined in two ways. The decentralized, faculty-ruled process of yesterday, with its limited functions, is being made more formidably complex and rigid by the increasing number of activities only marginally related to teaching and research with which the traditional units now have to cope. It is also being increasingly emptied of importance by the new bureaucracy, which grows either centrally, above those units, or peripherally, in the well-staffed research centers. The result is frequently paralyzing. The older units deal with trivia, at worst, or parochial subjects, at best; the new bureaucracy is either highly specialized or deprived of any coherent impulse, for the governing boards are not equipped to provide direction in a period of rapid and general change. The combination of time-eating processes that absorb the faculty, of bureaucracies that give the (false) impression of usurping decisions, and of central decision-making bodies that are good only at expediting run-of-the-mill affairs and bad at taking initiatives leaves the university with little or no capacity for concerted innovation, and re-enforces the sense of drift. Finally, for the individual student and teacher, bureaucratization means the intrusion of anonymity. For the tenured professor

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who used to see himself as the university, this is a fall from grace; for the student or untenured faculty member, it means the addition of impersonal distance to the personal hierarchy of academia.

The impact of meritocracy is more complex, but no less divisive. Universities are making a valiant effort to open their doors to young men and women selected exclusively for their previous achievements—that is, to apply the meritocratic principle not merely within the university, but as a criterion for admission. As a result, the scramble for success, both among students and in the junior faculty, has become more intense, for more is at stake. Hence a paradoxical consequence: Yesterday, the meritocratic principle at work within the university served as a corrective for the prevailing principles of access to positions of power—birth or wealth; it was, literally, a humanizing and equalizing force. Today, it often serves as a brutalizing force of harsh selection—which may explain both why tensions between students and junior faculty, on one side, senior faculty, on the other, have on the whole increased, and why the revolt against this permanent competitiveness has often received the endorsement of otherwise standard-conscious humanists.[9]

The university is a battlefield between rival meritocratic principles. A meritocracy is an elite recruited through certified achievement, but this does not tell us what is supposed to be achieved. There is a tension between what might be called a *mandarine* meritocracy, whose criterion of accomplishment is "cognitive rationality"—that is, a prowess in demonstrating, in acquiring, or in communicating knowledge—and a *technocratic* meritocracy, whose criterion of merit is one's capacity to contribute to the application of a certain body of knowledge to human problems or what might be called "pragmatic" or "service" rationality. The latter, of course, is a mark of the interpenetration between society and the university and of the domination of the former over the latter. It is also far more vague, at least in the sense of not being easily measured by the kinds of tests that have traditionally evaluated cognitive rationality. Thus, not only do we find a battle between young and old—the tested candidates versus the established testers—but also a debate among testers on the nature of the test and a dilemma for the tested as to which course of merit to select. In this contest, the new meritocratic principle has many assets, for the test is intellectually easier and success delivers more—not just academia but the whole world.

At a time when bureaucracy and technocracy raise the problem

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of governing so large an institution as the sprawling modern university, all the uncertainties of the meritocratic principle, when applied to the political sphere, trouble the university. For what may be a fine principle of selection into, and of advancement within, the university may not be an adequate criterion for the recruitment of academic "governors." The best mandarins are often the most reluctant, and least competent, to serve in such jobs. The best technocrats—even if their field of expertise is public affairs, and even if they serve not on the faculty, but on the university's governing boards—are not necessarily masters of the very special art of handling a university: an art that is both new and elusive. Mandarins know a lot about academic politics—the C. P. Snow world of appointments and allocations; and technocrats tend to be best at the specialized politics of their particular branch. Ideally, the task requires men of character and imagination, two attributes not necessarily connected with certified achievement. Nor are the character and imagination required to survive in the bureaucratic jungle of the government necessarily those for which the very different world of the university cries. Men who have the necessary qualities exist, but are normally discovered only in a crisis, when it is fairly late. Meanwhile, by another paradox, the meritocratic principle contributes to what might be called the governance vacuum of the modern university. Leadership, now essential, is obstructed.

As a microcosm of modern society, the university displays, consequently, the baffling but familiar feature of a loss of control over its own fate. For lack of a principle of integration and discrimination that could guide its growth and order its activities, it exhibits fragmented, low-level, instrumental "rationality," which usually consists of the rationalization of demands for more of everything, but no over-all rationality. This is particularly scandalous in a university, both under the old ideal of providing its members not only with knowledge but with standards of judgment for mastery and self-mastery, and under the new ideal of providing the locus and the tools for the "integrative planning" of modern society. Nor is the university's structure any more rational: a mixture of yesterday's oligarchy (academic self-government); yesterday's non-bureaucratic, church-like hierarchy (shown both in the powerlessness of students and in the key role played by a small number of influentials who are important less for their formal positions in the university's organization chart than for the personal authority they

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derive from the president's or governing boards' confidence); and, finally, today's bureaucratic hierarchy, growing capriciously in the interstices of the other two modes.

There is one final respect in which the university serves as a microcosm of society. The three features of modern society all tend to reduce politics to management, to concentrate decisions into the hands of "those who know," to neglect the definition of and choices among ends, and to reduce the selection of means to a choice of techniques—whether the ideology that covers the method be called global planning or incrementalism. As a result, established political parties become increasingly interchangeable and irrelevant, or else (like Western Europe's Communists) bloated collectors of protests condemned to perpetual and ineffective opposition. Those who oppose the whole system and want to fight it actively, whether on the far left or on the far right, in their fear and suspicion of being co-opted (or, as the French say, recuperated), tend to resort to an activist version of Marcuse's great refusal—to the politics of total challenge and direct action. Thus, between the prestigious and smooth managerial nihilism of piecemeal drift and the noisy and destructive nihilism of *contestation,* the political horizon shrinks. Even the tried and tested axioms of traditional "group theory" politics fail—in situations where those who accept the new social order tend to be disdainful of the time losses involved in consultation, log rolling, and group adjustment, and those who reject the present society refuse any adjustment or compromise.[10] The university seems to be the laboratory of so bleak a political future. In recent years, it has displayed the bizarre dialectic of countless, reactive, and inevitably contradictory responses emanating from faculties and officials—"disconnected discussions of discrete demands, i.e. . . . the kind of pragmatism in which what is truly important gets subordinated to what appears urgent"[11]—and of disruptive tactics focused on symbolic issues, yet unappeasable by specific concessions precisely because of the global discontent and totalistic aspiration that move the militants.

This discontent would perhaps not have taken the university so directly as a target had the university not appeared as legitimizing what is obnoxious in modern society by letting the outside world invade its own inner sanctum. Here, there is a contradiction both with the university's past role and, even more, with its past ideal. Yesterday's university could not really be accused of sanctifying the feudal or the capitalist order. It did not challenge it directly,

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and the restricted nature of the student body indicated a kind of tacit acceptance. But this limited access was the result of things beyond the university's control—inequality in society, consecrated by the secondary school system. Moreover, the university, as we have seen, did its best to temper the privileges of birth and wealth, both through scholarships for pure merit and through a scholarly selection based on merit among the privileged. The whole ideology of knowledge as virtue and power had a revolutionary impact. The university, by virtue of its distance from society, succeeded in being both "integrative" and "adaptive": integrative directly, in transmitting a cultural heritage and in helping recruit an elite; adaptive indirectly, in providing a critical examination of society—that is, in laying the intellectual groundwork for a slow change of its cultural base.[12] Today's university, by becoming more like industry or the government, and through its very efforts at direct social innovation, acts as if it endorsed the way in which such innovation takes place in modern society (whether this way be called gradualism or tokenism, progressive or repressive, foreign aid or imperialism), especially as its new role can be carried out only by accepting external financing, priorities, and controls. An ideology of neutral and critical detachment blurred the inevitable connection between university and society (and helped isolate the university from the battles between defenders and challengers of the social *status quo*). The ideology of service developed by the champions of the multiversity helps turn the university itself into a battleground between the moderates (conservatives or reformists) and the *contestataires*. Yesterday's claim to neutrality was hailed as the protection of a sanctuary; today, the same claim is often resented both as a Pilate-like acknowledgment of the established order's rightness and as a hypocritical demand for immunity from criticism of the university's overt activities as a promoter of that order. The modern universities' expansion and the resulting urban problems symbolize the clash between the "ins" and the "outs" of the new order and demonstrate both its inexorable march and its human costs. In other words, knowledge, instead of being celebrated as the explosive force that destroys Bastilles through enlightenment, is often denounced as a corrupt force that consolidates the power of the educated few at the direct, physical expense of the others. It is still power, but more visibly for evil than for good (whereas in yesterday's society, power for evil was associated with wealth or birth); and it is certainly not virtue.

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The university is not just a good place to study the impact of the new social order. It is also particularly vulnerable to the tensions that follow. Solving its problems would, in any case, entail nothing less than straightening out all the kinks of modern society. The claims presented, imprudently perhaps, by the celebrators of the post-industrial age on behalf of the university should allow one to expect it to try for nothing less. But it is not realistic to be too hopeful.

The university is vulnerable, first of all, because of all the institutions of society it is the only one that has both deeply submitted to the new forces described and is least naturally made for them. Some institutions, like the family and, to some extent, the churches, have not yet been deeply affected. Others have been, but they are single-purpose institutions, openly at the service of society—such a service being their *raison d'être:* I refer to the professions. The debate among their members is about whom to serve rather than about whether and how. Other institutions have been greatly helped, revived, perpetuated, expanded by the three contemporary features. For instance, the large modern corporations have revolutionized industry, and the armed forces have been given the most advanced gadgets and the most appealing glamor by technological modernization. Some institutions have, in fact, developed in response to the new features, such as the modern state bureaucracy and many of the services of the so-called tertiary sector. But the university, whatever its past ideology, was never a single-task organization with simple ends. There was, to be sure, a hierarchy of functions (and of prestige), but there were always enough vocational aspects, especially in the United States, to explain why contemporary proliferation and fragmentation could occur so easily. Despite the attempts by defenders of the new order to show how it grows out of the old and continues an old tradition of service, however, there is a hiatus between the new activities—multiple involvements and involvement with multiple co-workers—and what used to be the quintessential educational relationships: the dialogue (unequal, to be sure!) between teacher and students, the lonely confrontation of the scholar or apprentice scholar with his material. A thorough remodeling of the university along the lines of a technocratic bureaucracy and meritocracy might literally destroy what has been its traditional core; a partial remodeling perpetuates the inner conflict.

The university is vulnerable, in the second place, because it shelters the three groups most opposed to the new order. True, it admits very few children of this order's underprivileged, and many

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of those who get in prefer, to the buoyant pleasures of *contestation,* the absorbing demands of trying to make it, so as to escape from their background and to enter the elite (thus choosing the new and more vocational features of the university instead of the old, humanistic ones). But this does not apply to America's black students, representatives of an ethnic minority that (like the European workers of the early nineteenth century) opts for collective ascent rather than ascent through individual escape. As the perpetual proletarians of the social order, old or new (at a time when the workers, yesterday's proletarians, have become largely integrated and—sometimes in fact, although not in theory, but at times most emphatically in both ideology and practice—opt for individual ascent through "the system"), they challenge the new order. They try to pressure the university into letting more of them in, thus attacking its meritocratic aspects, and try to divert it from consolidating the established elites.

The same is true, of course, of the sons and daughters of the affluent, who question the values, or lack of values, of the social order which they will be asked to lead. For the young blacks the university is both a powerful elevator and an instrument to be used for radical change. The behavior of the more privileged young *contestataires,* on the other hand, is difficult to explain by their social background, but understandable in terms of the conflicting psychological pressures to which they are subjected while at the university. During those years of protracted adolescence fostered by industrial society, they are in a state of suspension from society; yet they are being, so to speak, prepared for it. Adolescence has always been a period of reluctance toward adulthood, a time for the "redefinition of internalized culture."[13] This reluctance used to take the form of antiparental rebellions. With more permissive parents and in universities that have lost their distance from society, it is normal that the rebellion turns against society itself—and against the university, insofar as its emphasis on fixed curricula, grades, concentration, and specialization seems to force the young to make decisive commitments, to narrow their perspectives, and to limit their experience long before they are ready for such closure. The drive of adolescence is one of integral spontaneity. It conflicts with what they feel to be the multiple sterility of much of their education. The language of adolescence is easily that of liberation—through "imagination, direct perception and fantasy"[14] or through political militancy. It clashes with what they feel to be society's overt or covert

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repression, manifest in and sanctioned by the university. Moreover, at the same time as the students are being trained to become self-reliant, self-directed, and adapted to society, they are also kept in a situation of dependence within the university. They rebel both against the contradiction between their status and the purpose of their presence in the university, and against a dependence that is easy for them to interpret not merely as the reflection of academic hierarchy (the traditional relation between novices and initiates), but also as the translation within the university of the hierarchical relations of modern society. Placed in the position of underlings while they are trained for mastery, they are led to reject the very notion of hierarchy and the criteria on which it is based.

Thus they react because both their thriving for being treated as adults and their clinging to adolescence (which today means also their solidarity as an age group, distinct from the adult world and distrustful of the de-energizing procedures invented by the adults) are being thwarted by the university. Nostalgia and impatience merge in the grand fantasy of a counter-adult world, in which they would have the same rights the adults have now, but so as to reject what the adults have done to the world. They would not enter the adult's world, even as equals; it would be up to the adults to get admitted into the world remade by the young. It is not surprising if they do not, on the whole, show much enthusiasm for the old notion of the ivory tower, for they know it to have been highly hierarchical, and the mass media, from which they have learned so much, have blasted all the tower's walls. Moreover, brought up in a climate hostile to enclaves and oases and favorable to social integration, brought to a university that has become penetrated by society, their natural reaction is not to return, but to overturn—to turn the university both into an instrument of social change that would save the world from bureaucracy, meritocracy, and technocracy, and into a laboratory of non-directive relations. With few models in the real world, they have to improvise life styles or to draw from the real world not examples but mythic approximations such as Mao, Ho, or Che.

As for the academics dissatisfied with the new order, some of them are self-professed revolutionaries whose goals are similar to those of the rebelling students. But most of them, in the humanities especially, have in the back of their minds the model, often highly idealized, of the university of the past—what might be called the Barzun model. Theirs is a protest against the fragmentation of

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knowledge and the cheapening of the university through "servicing." Theirs is a plea for restoring the unity of learning and upholding the principles of humanism. Insofar as contemporary meritocracy has contributed to fragmentation, cheapening, and dependence on the outside market, they are often willing to soften its rigors with respect to grades or exams. But precisely because of their attachment to the old ideal, they are sharply critical both of student demands for "relevance" (which strike them as the mirror image of the instrumentalism they deplore) and of student claims to power. In their eyes, students come to learn, not to rule; considerations of power are already a mark of intrusion of the outside world into a sanctuary that should deal only with matters spiritual; and problems of curriculum and appointments should remain in the hands of the wise. It is an aristocratic notion, not devoid of noble and self-serving delusions. Rebel students want to turn the university into a counter-society; dissenting academics would prefer it separate from society. They agree on the condemnation of the new order, but their agreement is not the outcome of identical analyses: It is the momentary convergence of a basically anti-elitist, communitarian, anti-institutional radicalism, and of an elitist and slightly parochial defense of a threatened institution (both from outside enslavement and from inside student disruptions).

Thus, the number of dissenters is great, but there is really no common front among them. The university appears doubly condemned to remaining the battleground of a protracted war. The young children of established parents object more to the notion of the university as a service station for the Establishment than to the idea of the university as a service station, which appeals to their idealism. The academics who criticize the present state of affairs object to the notion of the service station, partly because the Establishment it works for is one in which the traditional ivory tower intellectual becomes an uninfluential relic. The convergence against the present Establishment is not sufficient to eliminate the profound divergence about the status of the student within the university. Indeed, since most of the university crises have been initiated by student activists, it is around the single issue of reacting to their disruptions that alignments have been formed in the university. One finds on each side of the barricade men otherwise in deep disagreement over all other issues. In particular, resistance to student agitation and to demands for student power has often thrown together humanists or historians deeply hostile to the modern

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multiversity and pragmatic managers who are its spokesmen. All they have in common is the desire to defend authority, while they disagree as to where it should reside and how it should be organized. On the other side, impatience with obsolete institutions and irrational hierarchies has often thrown together student militants, who want a counter-multiversity, and academic reformers, who play with the tantalizing notion of a more communitarian (although not necessarily fully democratic) ivory tower.

There is a third reason why the university is vulnerable. It is a delicate machine that can be paralyzed by a grain of sand. "Our social Waterloos are being fought out in match boxes."[15] A handful of disrupters can "close it up," simply by forcing all the constituencies into turmoil and through the agony of choosing between equally unsavory courses of action. It is easier here than almost anywhere else for a very small group to move. In a factory (as was shown in France last year), a disruption has a chance of succeeding only if it is endorsed—willingly or reluctantly—by the unions, which provide a kind of disciplining straitjacket. There is no equivalent in the university, whose members have never thought of themselves as part of a political institution (hence the pitiful weakness of student government in those times when it ought to be most effective). In a city or in the countryside, would-be terrorists hesitate to launch a campaign unless there is at least an incipient network of support; in a university, they can count on provoking such support by acting first. A campus is a better trial ground for Debray's theories than Bolivia. On the side of "law and order," a university—again by contrast with industry or with cities—has no secular arm. The commitment to "reasoned discourse"; the reluctance either to develop an internal police or to call on the external one; the physical difficulty of protecting every possible building, classroom, or facility against harassment or guerrilla tactics; the slowness and frequent (and inevitable) arbitrariness of disciplinary procedures—all of these make it difficult for the university to find a middle ground between the peace and order of self-discipline, the voluntary practice of commonly accepted rules of civility (barely breached by a few individual violations), and the return to the state of nature, whereas most institutions have found some way, Hobbesian or Lockean, to live in the middle.

True, the university is not the only institution vulnerable to conflicts. But it is uniquely unfit to manage them, for several reasons. It is probably the only institution that recoils before the

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notion that it is a political system. To me, an institution is a political system as soon as there is a conflict over ends and over how power should be arranged to reach them. Yet most academics and university administrators reject the idea with indignation (and thus resist the notion and practice of leadership), partly because of the hallowed but false notion that the business of the university is truth, and truth and power are incompatible; partly because of the fear of external manipulation and internal chicanery which the word politics evokes. Knowledge, alas, has not only its sociology but also its politics. As long as there is unwillingness to recognize reality, there can be no realistic way of preventing the conflicts from wrecking the university; for the task ahead is not the suppression of conflict, the achievement of the seductive dream of total harmony in community, but the management of conflict and its channeling in such a way that it can gradually be resolved.

As anyone who has lived through a university crisis knows, the university tends to be a total institution that absorbs not merely part of the personality of its inmates, but most of it; students, often denounced as transients, behave as totally committed occupants who, even when they attack the university, do it as if it were "their" thing and from an ideal of perfection. Professors, it is true, increasingly play various public roles (which is part of the trouble); but for most of them, all the other roles are rooted in their academic status. As theories of cognitive dissonance would make one expect, they convince themselves that there is no conflict among their roles, so long as the university is redefined in a way that embraces and enshrines them all. There are divergences as to what the total commitment entails, but not as to whether it is total. As their physical involvement shrinks, their psychological one grows—and it is intensity, not quantity, that matters here. Now, it is easier to devise a workable political system when it involves only certain roles, functionally *and* psychologically. (This also allows the participants to select representatives who will defend their interests and who are, so to speak, more or less full-time delegates of those roles.) In the political system properly so-called, elected representatives and executives look (supposedly) after the people's interests *qua* citizens; in factories, workers' efforts have consistently aimed at minimizing the impact of the work relationship—that is, at limiting their stultifying role as workers, short of being able to realize the early dreams of a total take-over of the workshop by the workers. Only military services display a total commitment comparable to that

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which exists in the university—but for obvious reasons the problem of conflicts in the armed forces does not have the same urgency, except in times of split loyalties and civil crisis, and the problem of managing such conflicts is a problem for the over-all political system.

There is a final reason for the university's plight in handling conflicts. At the turn of the century and almost until World War II, the industrial world was the focus of maximum tension, largely under the impact of ideologies (both economic liberalism and all the varieties of socialism) that pointed to the factory as the center of decisive power in society. Moreover, there was considerable, although not exclusive, truth in this. Today, academics and *contestataires*, heralds of the dawn of the post-industrial age, believers in the university as the guardian of culture, *gauchistes* who see in it the linchpin of the industrial-military-scientific-Establishment complex—all elevate the university to a symbolic height at which compromises become degrading. Hence an unleashing of hyperbole and hysteria ensues whenever trouble begins, helped by the flocking of mass media hipsters to the trouble points. But here the analogy with factories stops: A general strike or even a strike in key industries can bring a nation to *its* knees, whereas the disruption of universities only closes *them*. Society can find ways to have those functions they perform directly for society carried out in extra-university research centers or laboratories, and as Japan has been showing with a fine mixture of savagery and indifference, the indirect service that the university performs for society by promoting knowledge and educating its elites can be disrupted for years without any noticeable collapse of society. For those who want to learn the tools of the trade which they will need either just to earn a living or to succeed in positions of technical expertise *and* social influence, there always are other channels.

Thus today's university stews in the heat produced by passionate involvement on behalf of conflicting beliefs. If each member's commitment to his notion of the university were more limited, a resolution of the conflict would be easier. But its intensity is equal to, and aggravated by, its scope: There is a most extensive disagreement on ends.

There is a basic antagonism between those who think that the university can be an adequate instrument of social action and those who remain skeptical or suspicious of the new functions unrelated to teaching, basic research, and training through the communica-

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tion of substantive knowledge. In one direction, this disagreement extends into a debate on the relations between culture and praxis: on the degree to which what a university offers ought to be determined by its own ideals of education, or by society's often conflicting vocational needs, dominant demands, or minority claims. In another direction, this disagreement carries over into a conflict over the proper size of the university, which the skeptics would like to cut back to the core functions. It also leads to a conflict over structure, which one group would like to adapt so that the new functions could be fully integrated or absorbed into the old ones, and the other group would like to disconnect—partially or totally—from the university.

Among those who favor an activist university, there is, of course, a clash between those who would like the university to be the agent of society (so as eventually to improve it), and those who would like it to subvert society (so as to transform it radically). There are tensions within each group—divisions in the second over the degree and direction of activism (should it aim at a radical reorientation of the university or at a preliminary, purging destruction?); there are divisions in the first group over research priorities.

There is discord over the degree to which the university should be made into more of a community. The alignments are not the same as over the first issue. Those who see the teaching-research relationship as the essence of the university, and as fundamentally noncommunitarian (so that all efforts at community-building are seen as anti-intellectual diversions or perversions) are skeptical or hostile. But they are joined by those who favor the trend toward diversification, promote functional rather than university involvements, and believe that decisions ought to be made in "a broad systems context" rather than on a community basis. And they are also joined by those student activists who see in the idea of an academic community an elitist and parochial distraction from drastic social change.

There is a disagreement over standards of admission. For example, should there be a special effort at accommodating minority groups? Alignments here cannot be predicted in the light of attitudes taken over the first three issues.

There is also a complex disagreement over curriculum reform, which involves both a debate on the nature of the subject-matter appropriate for academic teaching and research (here one finds, of course, a reflection of alignments over the first two issues), and a

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debate on the best methods of learning. Thus, *what* is to be taught and *how* one is to learn are the issues at stake; and through those issues, the relations of teachers and students are being questioned.

There is a disagreement over the usefulness of preserving the notion (or myth) of academic neutrality. Those academics who rebel against the new order are divided: Some see this idea as a delusion that facilitates degradation; others raise it as a banner against further involvements. The whole concept of academic freedom is being scrutinized in this debate, which raises the question of how far the corporate will can regulate and curtail the activities of individual members.

Finally, there is a bewildering range of discord over every aspect of governance: the role and composition of the governing boards, the nature of the presidency, the appropriateness of a more representative system, the respective virtues of formal versus informal channels of authority, of larger versus smaller or professional versus amateur bureaucracies, the proper role of and institutions for students, and so forth.

The crisis of the university is thus far more than an institutional crisis. But institutional reform is essential and cannot wait—not only because one cannot afford to keep the present procedures until a new agreement on fundamentals has somehow been reached, but also because no such agreement can come out of discredited procedures. The task ahead can be defined as follows: to devise broadly acceptable institutions rapidly enough so that energy shall at last be focused where it should—on ends—rather than diverted to the poisons and delights of constitutional arguments, and so that the university may cope with the continuing crisis. It looks like the search for the formula to square the circle.

There is a crisis of legitimacy, which has undermined the existing institutions. No amount of muttering about a mere handful of youthful demagogues and willful faculty fools (or tools) can make reality disappear. A crisis of legitimacy develops in any political system when its members feel that the institution is no longer effective and that part of the reason for inefficiency is not just technical miscalculations or ignorance, but also insufficient responsiveness to the needs or desires of the members, even if those needs and desires are widely different. In the case of the university, the piecemeal way in which issues have been raised and handled, a consequence of substantive discord and procedural deficiency, has weakened the institutions further. A coherent approach to the crisis

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has been made impossible by two kinds of institutional fragmentations: horizontal and vertical. On the one hand, there has been a rather rigid separation of constituencies along status lines, resulting in a large amount of authoritarianism—each stratum is partly ruled by the one above it. The students' government has usually dealt with trifles; what most affects their lives in the university—studies, discipline, even extracurricular activities—has been largely determined without their participation. The faculties have enjoyed considerable autonomy over educational matters, but the financial framework of their freedom is established from above, and the transformation of the university through direct involvement with society has mainly taken place as the result of decisions made by the governing boards, whose main concern, indeed whose constituency, is society at large. These boards, in turn, have often reacted to initiatives and pressures that come from society and the government. On the other hand, there has also been a vertical fragmentation along the functional lines of departments, institutes, and established schools.

The consequences have been destructive. Fragmentation has bred misinformation and distrust. The governing boards are theoretically the only bodies empowered to deal with the whole, but their composition, priorities, and fitful mode of operation—"absentee government"[16]—also made them less than effective. The student constituency, long treated as irresponsible, has often tended to behave irresponsibly, by taking apocalyptically vague and sweeping positions, of great peril to the delicate balance of the university, or by showing no concern above and beyond their academic performances. The faculty, having enjoyed considerable but parochial self-government, has tended to behave parochially, digging in for the defense of its traditional trenches or splitting under pressure along every conceivable line. Moreover, each of the constituencies below the top of the pyramid could not help but feel victimized by those placed above it, since the latter had a part in determining their fate with almost no input from below. This was a perfect recipe not only for trouble, but also for the kind of conspiratorial mythology that worsens it. Those above are resented as powerful and malicious groups, not as fragmented or haphazard assemblages of men. At the same time, the paternal existence of the bodies above removed from each group below the necessity to think through, and do something about, the problems that affect it, but over which it has no legal authority.

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Given these tensions, an impossible burden has been put on those unfortunate men who, formally or informally, were supposed to be the links between constituencies, especially the deans and the president. Like hinges in a burning building, they became unstuck, unsure of which piece of the carpentry to fall with. They find it hard to rule and often impossible to lead. A dean is supposed to be able to report to the president and to the governing boards what his faculty wants. But if he considers himself to be first of all the president's administrative aide, both his influence over the faculty and his effectiveness as a spokesman for it—that is, as the president's chief of intelligence—will be impaired. As for the president, if he feels closer to the internal constituencies (students and faculties) than to the external ones (alumni, government, and foundations), he may end in trouble with his trustees. If he tries to represent or to appease the external constituencies, he risks losing the support of the internal ones. The present setup makes any kind of over-all leadership unlikely in normal times and impossible if matters come to a crisis. But it thereby contributes to bringing about a crisis, for the men who have to make the key decisions are isolated, which partially blinds them; they are overworked, with little time left to anticipate and to listen, which largely numbs them; yet they are endowed with extensive powers over their subjects, which makes them easy targets. It is hard to imagine a more bizarre melange, although it was perfectly "functional" in the days when the university was seen primarily as a center for learning and scholarly research. How often do we find, in the history of institutions, that the bodies most appropriate for one particular phase were also quite incapable of preventing—indeed they sometimes accelerated—the passage to another phase in which they would prove both ineffective and illegitimate?

Efficiency and legitimacy today go together. Efficiency requires the capacity to take an over-all view of the university's problems so as to redefine its purposes. Legitimacy requires a less authoritarian and oligarchic structure, in which the constituents have a greater sense of responsible involvement (by contrast with mere emotional commitment without corresponding responsibilities). Broadening and democratization should not be separated. On the one hand, given the need for a new global view, there is a growing recognition of the need for bodies that cut *across* the existing lines of division, horizontal and vertical. Democratization *within* each of those lines could easily make the university more rigid and para-

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lyzed than it is now, just as "community control," even if it is genuinely democratic and not merely the control exerted by local elites or special interests, can often result either in stultifying conservatism or in a chaotic mosaic of conflicting experiments. On the other hand, without responsible involvement of all the parties, the present mixture of parochial fragmentation and over-all irresponsibility would persist, the new bodies becoming mere arenas for the paralyzing confrontation of vested claims. Democratization is the precondition for a true raising of sights that will result not merely from a breaking up of the barriers within each constituency, but also from the mutual prodding of delegates from all.

The notions of broadening and democratization give us a direction, but not much more. They indicate only that the university must now be studied and handled as a political system; and in advanced societies that are not run by totalitarian cliques, a political system cannot be governed from the top down. But what are the democratic procedures adequate to so complex a system—one so different from other institutions and also so diversely divided over its goals? Can one even find an adequate scheme of governance to facilitate the debate on ends as long as the range of discord is so huge? The truth of the matter is that the notion of participation—which implies both democratization and, logically, involvement in the making of decisions affecting the university as a whole (that is, *more* of a voice on *more* issues)—this notion, which has been embraced both by students and by faculty in their revolts against decisions from the top, runs into obstacles and objections that cannot be dismissed.

Albert Hirschman has studied the two ways in which ineffective organizations can recover[17]: They can be forced to do so by the *exit* of their members or customers, who leave in order to join or patronize more efficient rival organizations; or they can be improved by giving a *voice* to their dissatisfied clientele. The university is both a further example of his theory and a very special case. In the university, as elsewhere, the demand for "voice" grows as the possibility and the attractiveness of exit diminish. Academic mobility, especially among the top universities, has lost some of its appeal; and the students, of course, all want in, not out. In the university, as elsewhere, the effectiveness of "voice" is increased if exit, while not so easily available to the discontented as to be deemed by them preferable to voice, is still usable as a threat: It is, in fact, still available to many academics and effective as a

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threat if they are of considerable reputations. But there are some very special circumstances here.

First, there is the phenomenon of conflicting clienteles within the same institution. The professors are often hostile to giving students a voice, even while they claim more of a voice for themselves. Should the students gain too much voice, many professors would prefer to exit. Should students and faculty gain too much voice, it is the alumni (or the legislature) who might exit—that is, drain the university of resources. The students' demand for voice is to a large extent a protest against what they see as a partial exit of the faculty—that is, the part-time absenteeism of the consulting academic. Secondly, there is a division within some of the clienteles. Hirschman notes that when one has paid a high price for entry into an organization which one then finds disappointing, either one will protect one's investment by self-deception, or one will try to vindicate it by active demands for reform. Some students react in the former way, others in the latter. The same is true of the faculty. There is a notable reluctance of many professors toward voice even for themselves, precisely because they have had the opportunity of *partial* exit—not only to raise their salary and status, but also to rise above academic parochialism. As Hirschman points out, the greater the number of involvements, the smaller the appeal of voice. Their reluctance is, of course, also due to their impatience with the costs of voice—that is, with the diversion from scholarship and teaching which participation implies; one might call this a preference for *internal* exit from the vicissitudes of management. Rather than gaining voice, many faculty members would rather exit completely, toward research institutions other than universities where the problem would not arise. Hirschman has noted the power, in organizations, of those who have nowhere else to go—that is, those who cannot exit and who often prevail precisely because of their capacity to spend all their energy on controlling the organization, even at the expense of its long-term interests (for instance, the most doctrinaire members of a party in a two-party system). In the university, those who have nowhere else to go, both in the faculty and in the administration, are mostly the enemies of voice.

Thirdly, it is particularly difficult to obtain in a university that correct mix of alertness and inertia, of loyalty and dissatisfaction, which Hirschman deems essential to the recovery of damaged organizations. He points out that loyalty is functional (that is,

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contributes to reform) when it prevents the premature exit of worthy members or clients to similar organizations; dysfunctional when there is no similar organization to which one could flee (that is, when abstaining from voice means thwarting improvements, as is frequently the case with national loyalty). Now, the university resembles the nation-state in this respect, for the kind of exit that is still most easily available and attractive to academics and university administrators is exit toward different organizations: not from Harvard to Yale—if only because no university is really safe from conflict—but from Harvard to Rand or to an industrial laboratory. Those kinds of exits, when they do take place, as well as many of the demands for voice, may be counterproductive from the viewpoint of university reform: the former because they are less jolting for the university than the increasingly rare exits to rival universities, and the latter because, when they take the form of violent protests, they are clearly nefarious. In one case, one never reaches reform; in the other, one courts destruction.

Hirschman has incisively commented on the general American reluctance toward voice. This is a nation where success has been based on exit—first from Europe; then, through individual ascent, from one's own milieu. What is true for this largely democratic people is even more true in nations whose neglect of voice is due not to any cult of exit, but simply either to a preference for authoritarianism (as in much of Europe) or to a preference for noninvolved independence (as in France). These attitudes toward voice are reinforced in the case of the universities not only by the special circumstances just described, but also by the weight of traditional authoritarianism and by the burdens of academic participation. Those burdens are not inherent in the notion of participation. They result from a double mistake. We tend to think of a more democratic university as if the job consisted of transplanting into it the institutions of political democracy, without reflecting whether they are at all appropriate. Just because the university is *a* political system, the institutions we have devised for *the* political system are not necessarily relevant. Moreover, the members of the university tend to base both their judgments on new academic institutions and their estimate of their fitness for these institutions on their estimate of and performance in the existing ones, thus forgetting how deeply behavior can be affected by new institutions, as long as they are well devised.

There are three models of political democracy. None of the

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three is suitable. One is the model of so-called participatory democracy, whose intellectual foundation remains Rousseau's *Social Contract*. It assumes that one's interest as a member of a community is qualitatively superior to all one's other interests and cannot be delegated: Each member must contribute to the general will. It is a fascinating ideal-type, but it does not work. True, the present generation of students leans toward participation in the sense of total involvement. But in real life, participatory democracy means, at best, the triumph not of the will to the common good, but of sheer majority rule and, at worst, not even the victory of "the people," but the rule of the manipulators—those who have the vision to define the general will and the energy to coax and coerce assemblies into "recognizing" it. In real life, it also means not, as Rousseau wanted, the discovery and declaration of a general, legislative will, but the improvisation of *ad hominem* and special measures, often either partial or fatal to minorities. The model of the small nation is especially useless for the university. On the one hand, the university has the special problem of its relation to society. Is its general will to be that of the university members *qua* citizens, in which case any university autonomy disappears; or is it to be that of its members *qua* participants in academia, in which case we will return to the ivory tower? Surely not all of its members, when they want the common good, agree on whether it is the first kind of will or the second. On the other hand, whatever the answer to this question, the notion of the single and homogeneous legislative will—general in origin and essence, but limited in scope "to impersonality and to fairness toward all"[18]—while helpful in underlining the need for a common spirit and a minimum of corporate rules, provides inadequate guidance for a complex system in which the joint commitment grows out of highly differentiated enterprises and constituencies. The "governance job" is to reconcile and balance their interests rather than either to fuse them or to leave them out of the body politic. The general will either leaves the problem of university government unsolved, or else it means the usual perversion—in this instance, the destruction of the university through total politicization—and hence the demoralization, sooner or later, of all of its members and their withdrawal from the general will.

A second political model is that of nineteenth century representative government: government by parliaments and boards or councils or committees, in which the diverse interests of the constituents

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are represented by delegates. Two kinds of objections arise instantly. On the one hand, in order to function properly, representative government everywhere requires political parties that offer competing programs to their constituents. Politics being a specialized activity, the citizens, while split along party lines, can ordinarily cooperate in their other activities or else, in those activities, conflict in non-partisan ways. This is much more difficult in a university. If there is to be not merely corporate representation along functional lines, but also representation based on general opinions about university purposes, what will prevail will be not a genuine consideration of the issues over which people disagree—that is, a political resolution in the highest sense—but the political game itself: the arcane intricacies of caucuses, elections, jobseeking, and bargaining, a mixture of ideological polarization and personal accommodations in which the basic issues will be lost. The advantage of representative government, when it works, is that it relieves the citizens of the necessity to be full-time politicians; the disadvantage of such government in a university is that it might turn students, professors, and alumni into politicians. In a total institution, parliamentarism, instead of allowing for the representation of political views, risks degenerating into the politics of representation; and the definition and enhancement of the university's specific functions may get drowned in the all-pervading function of politicking.

On the other hand, even in the state and its subdivisions, parliamentarism has not worked well. Nothing would be more paradoxical than the adoption by the university of a method of government that has, in effect, become obsolete where it started. There has been a marked shift from legislative to executive preponderance. Whenever a constitution has tried to interfere with this evolution by preserving legislative supremacy, as in France's Third and Fourth Republics, two sets of disastrous effects appeared. One was paralysis through sheer inefficiency. Large bodies of men simply cannot cope with the overwhelming number of essentially executive decisions which any modern government requires. The other was paralysis through corporatism—the conservatism of log rolling, of compromises based on the mutual protection of established positions. Translated into university terms, one can easily see what might result: There would be a continuing absence of leadership, dissolved into a multitude of anonymous committees. There would be so much government that, as one university president has

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put it, there would be none[19] (or rather there would be innumerable conflicts without adequate resolution, splintered impotence but no center of power, energy lost on jurisdictional contests but missing for the important issues). Only the most unimaginative outcomes would result, for even in committees of broader scope than the present ones, accommodation might most easily be reached not on innovations or around the university's critical function or by a transcending of departmental or functional interests, but on the basis of a kind of pan-protectionism that would consecrate the reassuringly vocational aspects of the university.[20] Bureaucracy would triumph, given the amount of paperwork involved; and technocracy at its most capricious would triumph, since each technique would be enshrined, and each unit's own idea of "service" would be endorsed. The necessary redefinition of ends would elude us once more, and the incremental or immobilist approach of so many committees would feed the impatience and apocalyptic tendencies of the *contestataires.*

A third political model is that of most contemporary democracies: a powerful executive, based on the consent of the public, and operating between elections with very few formal checks, although under the control of the legislature and the obvious need to keep the trust of his constituents. There are evident advantages over the previous formula in terms of initiative and leadership. But there are, again, two drawbacks: This model entails the growth of a very large and autonomous bureaucracy, which ends up not merely initiating and executing decisions, but also actually making them, and thus limits considerably, in fact, the margin of freedom of the men who are theoretically its political leaders. In a modern state, while the disadvantages are well known, the social services often performed by bureaucracy tend to be sufficient to stifle protest, and the capacity of the constituents to do something about it short of costly, negative insurrection has so far remained limited. The bureaucracy, as Tocqueville had foreseen, is anonymous and distant enough to discourage revolt. In a university, however, the presence of a bureaucracy responsible only to the president and governing boards (whether its members are professional administrators or faculty "in-and-outers") would provoke shrill demands for voice or accountability—especially as such a bureaucratic outcome would appear to thwart the hopes for democratization. The administration would be close and visible enough to become the target of all the tensions and conflicting demands, and at least

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some of its accomplishments would always be judged contrary to the "true purposes" of the university or to the goals some of its members would like the university to serve.

The second drawback of this model lies in the fact that both the representative and the executive model require a large, full-time political class in the broadest sense—legislators, governors, judges, or bureaucrats: more or less closely controlled, more or less directly representative delegates from society for the handling of its collective affairs. The citizen recognizes that he can be only *indirectly* and *partially* involved, and he chooses men who will be directly and completely involved for him. But the student or the faculty member is directly and almost totally involved. The management of the university is the management of most of his life at the moment, and he does not want someone else to handle it full-time for him. Neither professors nor students would respect or trust a specialized corps of academic or student governors; they would quite rightly see these as an inferior or at least external caste, alien to all the (contested) purposes of the university and threatening to at least some of those ends. The qualities needed for full-time political management are not those on the basis of which students and professors are recruited. Moreover, a full-time legislator, cabinet member, or party leader usually still manages to preserve the kind of perspective that come both from being a professional in politics and from working for a distant or general public. A full-time academic politician risks putting into his performance the peculiar passion and acrimony that comes from seeing himself on a mission rather than in a profession (his profession is to be a professor, if he is a faculty member) and from his immersion in his "public." The politician's involvement is full-time, but (fortunately) not complete psychologically in most cases; the academic governor's involvement would be full-time and total in intensity. To sum up, the division of labor between the political class and the citizenry is essential to the existence of a nation, but a division of labor between a political class and the rest of the university is antithetical to the existence of a university. Being a complex organization with conflicting aims and diverse constituencies, it needs political institutions—institutions that serve, rather than detract from, those purposes for which the organization exists.

The university is *sui generis*. On the one hand, it is an organization with limited, special purposes, and thus is distinct from the

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national community. What those purposes are, how far they reach, is presently in doubt. But there is a core that, vague as it is, represents the essence of the university—an essence that has to be redefined and made precise and operational from time to time: The essence of the university is the accumulation and transmission of knowledge. To be sure, the university has no monopoly either on the creation or on the communication of knowledge; nor does this description of the essence tell us what constitutes knowledge, how it is to be passed on, or whether transmitting it entails all that the enthusiasts of the university as social laboratory would like to see the university undertake. Were there a consensus on what the essence means today, there would be no crisis. But were the essence to disappear (were it, for example, to be submerged by the attempt to apply knowledge to the solution of current problems; by the attempt to limit the knowledge to be transmitted to what is immediately and thus passingly relevant; or by the attempt to turn the university into a soapbox from which students and society are to be indoctrinated), then there would be no university. This notion of a core provides us with both a point of departure and a thread; at the end of the labyrinth, we hope that the meaning of the essence for the future will have been discovered. But there will be a future only if the essence is saved.

On the other hand, the members of the university have been and are being trained for intellectual mastery and personal autonomy. By virtue of its striving toward the ideal of an association of educated men, and by virtue of the commitment of its members to this ideal (without which, as we have just stated, there is no university), the university is unfit for the kind of voluntary (or implicitly accepted) and recurrently renewed abdication that is the lot of the citizenry in, and the mark of, the all-inclusive political system. Although the ideal is assumed to be shared by all, the nature of the involvement in the university is different for each constituency.

The boundaries of structural reform are thus clarified. Its purpose must be to preserve the essence and to facilitate the great debate on ends which has been avoided so far. "One of the real lacks in our institutions now is . . . a matter of never saying what they are really about."[21] The function of the new ones would be to remedy this lack and to define what the university will be about. If the new functions kept proliferating haphazardly, the university would risk destroying whatever autonomy it still has, both by

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drowning its core functions and by ditching the ideal (and possibilities) of self-government. Becoming undifferentiated from the rest of society, it would have to develop a specialized political system, like the all-inclusive society, and it is easy to guess that between the political system of the nation and that of the university the relation would be uncomfortably close and hierarchical. But if the goal of the enterprise is to give a new, clearer, and more coherent meaning to the essence of the university, then the institutions to be set up for the debate must be such as to maintain the university during its present time of troubles. Total commitment entails the participation of all the constituencies; but the limited purposes of the university and the different forms the commitment takes oblige one to define carefully what participation should imply.

The general nature of the institutions needed today can be deduced from their functions—to reconsider the aims of the university and to keep it alive in the meantime. This means that the institutions needed now will be temporary. A final, grand exercise in "restructuring" makes sense only once the debate on ends has been held and resolved. (Resolution does not mean a full substantive agreement, but a consensus on a broad range of substance and on procedures for channeling remaining disagreements.) Institutions must be flexible and open. They must be flexible for several reasons. The behavior and beliefs of the various constituencies have been shaped by the responsibilities, roles, and institutions they have had in the past. These attitudes are doubly dangerous: insofar as they are conflicting and insofar as they are (for different reasons) non-participatory—that is, badly prepared for cooperation and compromise, torn between apathy, parochialism, desires for exclusive control, impatience, and the itch of total *contestation*. The new, temporary institutions must be capable of coping with and accommodating these unpromising but unavoidable attitudes. Moreover, only if the institutions are flexible enough will the attitudes change fast enough. Most importantly, since the debate on ends has barely begun, rigid institutions would become an overwhelming, diverting, and irritating battle stake. They must be open because the outcome of any debate on ends is largely determined by the nature of the participants. If one wants a full and thorough debate, the only way to play fair is to have all viewpoints expressed. This means, at one end, that student voices must be heard, however crude or shrill, and, at the other end, that not only the viewpoints of the rich, the successful, and the established should be present in the governing

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boards which try to bring society's concerns into the university. The underprivileged too have their claims, and there is no reason to leave them or their spokesmen out, either because they represent "failures" or because introducing them would add to the demands that pressure the university. Those demands are made anyhow and might as well get full hearing.

Finally, there can be a true debate on ends only if procedures are established. The present generation of students and many young faculty members see in procedures either a form of "repressive tolerance" or an alibi for inaction. This is often the case, but a debate without procedures and rules of discussion and resolution is an instance of the state of nature. The respect for orderly procedures is a substantive requirement of any civilized society and quite particularly of an educational institution. In a democratic society and in an institution devoted to the ideal of individual autonomy, those rules should be based on broad consent, but they must exist and be enforced.

Concerning the basis of authority or principle of legitimacy, participation will have to be a compromise between democracy and other considerations. That a university cannot and should not be a full democracy, with all members equally sharing in all decisions, has been often and persuasively asserted. But that assertion, by itself, does not consecrate the *status quo*. Because the nature of economic activity rules out total democracy in a factory, boss dictatorship is not thereby the only form of rule. Many of the arguments against democracy in the university overshoot the mark and are not valid against a large measure of democratization. In matters of broad, non-professional judgment, it is legitimate to state that continuity and experience must be somehow weighted, but impossible to argue that students are incompetent to participate in decisions on subjects that affect them or incapable of knowing what their true interests are. Any university crisis demonstrates that the capacity to lose balance and perspective is not any more widespread in the student body than in the faculty.

Full democratization, in the sense of either an exclusive or a shared power to make the final decision, is impossible in two areas. First, there are issues in which professional judgment must remain decisive. (This does not rule out compulsory consultation insofar as non-professional judgment may be relevant, such as on teaching talent.) Appointments to faculty positions and the granting of degrees must remain a faculty preserve not because existing spe-

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cializations and credentials are sacred cows, but because education is a serious business. Professionalism has its claim, for it means disciplined culture. (This is not synonymous with culture in a discipline, but it distinguishes the professional from the amateur and from the demagogue.) With respect to curriculum reform (which often extends to changing the way in which knowledge is being sliced or the way in which it is acquired), while the professional expertise and experience of the faculty must carry weight, the claim for exclusive decision-making power by the faculty is excessive. The faculty is entitled, indeed it has the duty, to see that whatever subject is taught and whatever method is used to teach it have intellectual substance, for the purpose is learning, not happiness or direct utility. But exclusive power only breeds sterility and *rigor mortis*. Secondly, the power of the purse will inevitably claim respect, and while there is little to be said for trustees thoroughly divorced from academic life setting all the priorities by themselves, faculties will have to remain within the often frustrating limits of financial responsibility.

Concerning the organization of authority, a great deal of imagination is required. Each of the constituencies—students, faculty, alumni, administrative staff—has its own separate interests and must therefore have its own institutions. But there are many decisions that affect several constituencies. Insofar as the conduct of one of them (or rather of its members) has an impact on the others and on the university's capacity to perform its essential functions, there is a need for joint institutions in which decisions on such matters can be either prepared for submission to the constituencies or actually made. Thus, there is no need to put students and faculty members on boards of trustees or students with voting rights into full faculty meetings. But there is a need, especially during the crisis period, for a minimum code of rights and duties—a sort of sketchy social contract—listing the freedoms and the responsibilities of each category of university members, so as to protect its essence from destruction either through the activists' disruptive "voice," or through faculty "exit" to more profitable or less demanding sidejobs, or through administrative highhandedness, or through a governing board's inroads into academic freedom. This legislation on matters of concern to all, even if they are initiated by one segment only, should be devised by joint procedures cutting across all constituencies.[22]

The temporary institutions to be devised will have to be a mix

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of limited direct democracy and limited representation. Some direct democracy is indispensable—in the form of occasional student referendums (such as on social rules and on extra-academic services provided by the university, for example, for future employment) and of regular faculty meetings for legislative purposes—precisely because of the differences between the over-all political system and a university. No student nor faculty member can, by entering the university, be assumed to have abdicated his right to take a direct part in basic university legislation. As for representation, it must remain part-time. No member of the university is competent to be a "ruler" (except in administrative positions that are not truly policy-making ones) unless he is still, primarily, a student, a faculty member, or an active alumnus. A violation of this precept can only perpetuate the crisis of legitimacy. Thus "the administration"—this recent product of the exuberant growth of bureaucratic activities—would mean either student, faculty, and alumni part-time delegates to executive decision-making functions or full-time professionals of office management. To be sure, it will continue to be difficult to recruit able students and faculty members for "governance." But one should not judge the future by the past. Student distrust of student government is tied not only to the anti-leadership bias of the present student generation, but also to the folkloric functions meagerly granted to such government in the past. The more responsible the positions made available to the students, the more likely it is that they will attract not "campus politicians," but responsible students—especially if their new functions are neither so time-consuming nor so dull as to conflict with their desire "to live and learn up to the hilt and to . . . develop their capacities by trial and error in pursuit of personal enthusiasms."[23] Faculty reticence toward "voice" is based either on the utter sense of waste induced by the proliferation of committees on trivia or on the legitimate fear of becoming (or developing) a special permanent caste of academic politicians increasingly divorced from teaching and research. But if the institutions are flexible enough and aim at broadening the professors' horizon, those fears should wane.

Nothing is more important in this connection than restoring the distinction between general rule-making and executive decisions. There has been both a tendency to entrust the latter to "a quasi-legislative process in the name of representation"[24] and a neglect of rule-making in the name of academic freedom. As a result, obsolete rules are still being maintained on paper (and honored

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in the breach), whereas in important matters, especially those concerning relations with society at large (such as guidelines for the faculty members' research and outside consultancies, and sometimes even for discipline) decisions are made *ad hoc* and case by case—or result from the very absence of formal decisions. Participation should mean the involvement of the constituencies, through direct legislative consultation, in the adoption of general rules prepared by representative bodies. But the application of those rules must follow two precepts: It must be thoroughly decentralized, so that valuable time stops being lost at higher levels on subjects that could be settled at lower ones; and it must be entrusted to specific individuals with clear-cut responsibilities. Large committees cannot play executive roles. Since so much of modern political action is of an executive sort, these individuals must be representative—that is, selected by, or at least with the formal consent of, the legislative bodies. For even if ultimate power rests with these bodies or the constituencies from which they emanate, both instant and intermediate power is in the hands of the executives; and short of wanting a caliphate, in Daniel Bell's phrase, one must see to it that the men who exert power are both entitled to and responsible for its use. But participation here cannot mean more than selection by and accountability to; the executive agent is obligated to listen, to disclose fully his decisions and his reasons, and to submit himself to the judgment of his constituents. Only in this way can democratization be reconciled with leadership. Given the need for flexibility, the multiplication of formal procedures of mere consultation (that is, advising) can only be harmful. When a decision is of great importance (for example, on how to handle a disruption), the man in charge obviously has a stake in consulting broadly with the representative, rule-making bodies. But, on the whole, the setting up of purely consultative committees with no genuine responsibilities either for rule-making or for execution only breeds those twin calamities, radicalization and disenchantment.

These suggestions are certainly neither original nor far-reaching. But their object is limited: It is to force all the constituencies into a re-examination of their relations and of the goals of the university, and to allow for the kind of leadership that is indispensable both for short-term survival and for the resolution of the debate on ends. Should fragmentation and the present mix of authoritarianism and oligarchy persist, most of the energies will be wasted on the battle

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of legitimacy, and the university will remain trapped in the vicious circle of incremental paternalism and mock revolutionary nihilism —two forms of self-indulgence it cannot afford. Broader, more democratic institutions geared to action will not only have the chance to face the bigger choices; they will also have the duty to handle the specific issues (or demands) as they arise over the relations of the university and its professors with the government, over its duty to the local community and to the blacks, over curriculum reform, discipline, or the governance of a particular unit. The main point is to make it possible for those issues to be discussed in relation to a deepening debate on over-all purposes and handled with a minimum of institutional congestion and emotional upheaval.

The present crisis is both a warning and an opportunity. It tells us that what might be termed the unguided university explosion of recent years leads indeed to internal explosion, to an outburst of all the tensions that had long been contained under a crust of civility and professionalism. But the crisis is not merely the outcome of centrifugal forces at work; it also shows that all the participants—except for tiny groups that would rather close down the university than improve it—are eager to have a fresh look at the institution, to take stock, to examine at last what has happened to it, and to suggest new designs. It can therefore be seen as a crisis of growth, on condition that the conflict of designs be channeled, that the confrontation be orderly, and that, through debate, the contours and consequences each of the designs be clarified—an indispensable prelude to accommodation. For much of the current debate is strikingly unrealistic. No society ever tolerates a university dedicated to its subversion—indeed, to the making of its future elites into grand agitators. No university can be the commune; nor, in George Kelly's apt phrase, can it be either Mount Athos or the Hotel de Ville. Many of the critics of the technocratic university have only offered us, as a substitute, a "new cultural synthesis" that would restore the unity of learning, a "resurgent humanism" left undefined and abstract. Many of the champions of new university trends have denounced this vague program as intellectual *poujadisme*[25] and its proponents as modern Luddites, but they, in turn, have failed to see how the contradictions between the ideals and practices of the multiversity and those of the old university could tear the university apart. They have often talked with the overconfidence of men who, projecting present trends at their happiest into the future, offer as a forecast what is in

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fact a preference, thus forgetting that "the profile of the future, drawn merely with those technical lines which intuition, even associated with mathematical models, can forecast with maximum plausibility, is thoroughly informed by today's values: the options inspired by tomorrow's technological imagination are inseparable from today's ideological realities."[26] Between a humanism of angry nostalgia and the cheerfully overextended drift of scientism, there is little to choose from.

The normative concern of the "Luddites," however, will have to be saved and made useful by applying it not to the denunciation of modern society, but to its reform—by which I do not mean *ad hoc* tinkering but, literally, giving a new shape. Only in such a way can the claims of humanist rationalism and the pretenses of scientific and technocratic rationality re-enforce and correct each other. There can be no return to the ivory tower; but there will be no university if it gives up the greatest service it can perform: that of questioning and challenging the very knowledge it creates, collects, and communicates, of clarifying values, of showing how value choices do indeed lie behind not only the ways in which we apply scientific knowledge, but also the way in which we acquire it. At a time when the vocational graduate schools themselves recognize the need for this function, it would be absurd for the "humanists" to yield to bitterness and to strike poses. If the university cannot serve as the normative light of a society that staggers in the dark, if it merely provides each traveler with a flashlight for his own stumbling course, it will be of little use—especially if the indifferent production of flashlights for any purpose as long as it is in public demand keeps being sanctified, and the corporate attempt at occasionally throwing the light of moral standards for action on vital issues keeps being shunned, all in the name of academic neutrality. A university as distant from society as that of the past could invoke neutrality as a defense against dependence; a university as inevitably tied to society as today's should not use neutrality as an excuse for not performing the normative function this society needs most.

This function is hard enough to perform. The reinjection of standards of value into technological society is no easy task. It will be performed only if the university is first capable of putting its own house in order and of ceasing to be the microcosm and legitimizer of society's own drift; it must do the kind of imaginative, creative, long-term thinking that has been lost under the

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pounding pushes of the crisis and the permanent pulls of daily professional work. The students with vocational blinders and the students intoxicated by *contestation,* the humanists at war with the modern world and the scientists or social scientists too much in love with it, the professors who ask themselves no questions beyond their specialty and their servicing of it, the administrators concerned only with managing the unmanageable, the alumni whose loyalty to the university of their idealized youth obfuscates how they see the very different university of their present indignation—all must be forced to reflect together on the shape and destination of what, even in their most hostile moments, most of them still see as a common enterprise. They must all be forced to become, at least for a while, social philosophers, as a first step toward restoring, if not the "unity of knowledge," at least a sense of purpose in the university. Participation is necessary, both because the future university *cannot* be built without the involvement of all its constituencies, and because the society of the future *ought not* to continue to be one in which the gap between material choices and self-mastery, affluence and influence, keeps getting bigger. Whether one wants the university to shape the society of the future or wants it to stay apart from a world beyond repair, it ought to be there as a model, or as a recourse, or as a remorse. But since in any organization there can be a pluralism of chaos as well as a pluralism of conciliation, and since the sheer procedural mechanics of making sure that it be the latter risk becoming all-absorbing, the institutional modesty recommended above should be observed.

Given the purpose of the enterprise, and the danger for any executive or any rule-making body of becoming trapped by the short-run, by the pressing rather than by the essential, nothing would be more useful than the selection of a small council of what might be called futurists from among the university's executives and legislators (for their practical experience in "governance" is needed to prevent this from becoming a disembodied exercise of "imagineers" without either baggage or impact). Their role would not be to forecast, but to clarify choices; not to plan, but to propose; not to project trends and call them the future, but to remember that "the spatial language of probabilities does not give one a more rigorous vision of the long range than the intemporal language of preferences."[27] They would attempt to define common preferences and their implications; to show how

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probable trends could be turned toward preferred outcomes, and to see how new trends could be made possible by the determined promotion of essential values. They would be concerned centrally with the long-range future of the university; but precisely because it is inseparable from that of modern society, their normative role, essential for the university, would be useful for society as well. We know more and more what we do not like, and we know rather well what we are likely to get. (For many of us this is the same.) The time has come to think about what we want, about how to achieve it, and about how the inevitable evils that accompany any good can be kept limited. For every possible reason, it is in and with the university that we should begin.

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3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronicage" (Occasional paper, Columbia University School of International Affairs, 1967), p. 9.
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7. Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronicage," p. 9.
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MORRIS B. ABRAM, born in 1918, is President of Brandeis University. Mr. Abram has served as U. S. representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and as a member of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity. He is the author of "The Eleven Days at Brandeis: As Seen from the President's Chair" (*New York Times Magazine*, February 16, 1969) and "Is Liberalism Dead: A Response to the Campus" (*Southwestern Law Journal*, October 1969).

PETER J. CAWS, born in 1931, is professor of philosophy at Hunter College and executive officer of the Ph.D. program in philosophy at the City University of New York. Mr. Caws is the author of *The Philosophy of Science, A Systematic Account* (Van Nostrand: Princeton, 1965) and *Science and the Theory of Value* (Random House: New York, 1967).

JILL CONWAY, born in 1934, is assistant professor of history at the University of Toronto. She is the author of "Jane Addams: An American Heroine" (*Dædalus*, Spring 1964) and of biographical essays on nineteenth and twentieth century American women for the forthcoming *Dictionary of Biography of Notable American Women.*

RALPH A. DUNGAN, born in 1923, is Chancellor of Higher Education for the State of New Jersey. He had formerly served as legislative assistant to Senator John F. Kennedy, special assistant to President Kennedy, and U. S. Ambassador to Chile.

ERIK H. ERIKSON, born in 1902, is professor of human development and lecturer in psychiatry at Harvard University. Mr. Erikson's publications include *Young Man Luther* (1958), *Childhood and Society* (2d ed., 1963), *Insight and Responsibility* (1964), *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (1968), and *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence* (1969).

EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG, born in 1921, is professor of education and sociology at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is the author of *Vanishing Adolescent* (Boston, 1959), *Coming of Age in America* (New York, 1965), and *The Dignity of Youth and Other Atavisms* (Boston, 1965).

STANLEY HOFFMANN, born in 1928, is professor of government at Harvard University. Mr. Hoffmann is co-author of *In Search of France* (1963) and author of *The State of War* (1965) and *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (1968).

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CLARK KERR, born in 1911, is Chairman and Executive Director of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and professor of industrial relations in the School of Business Administration at the University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Kerr was President of the University of California at Berkeley from 1958 to 1967. He is the author of *The Uses of the University* (Cambridge, 1964) and *Labor and Management in Industrial Society* (New York, 1964).

SALVADOR EDWARD LURIA, born in 1912, is Sedgwick Professor of Biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of *General Virology* (1st ed., 1953; 2d ed., 1967 with James E. Darnell, Jr.) as well as numerous articles for scholarly journals. Professor Luria shared the 1969 Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine.

ZELLA LURIA, born in 1924, is associate professor of psychology at Tufts University. She is the author of seventeen articles and book chapters in the fields of psychology, moral development, and child psychology.

MARTIN TROW, born in 1926, is professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Mr. Trow is currently Director of the National Survey of Higher Education for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and was formerly editor of *Sociology of Education*. He is co-author of *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, 1956) and *The British Academics* (forthcoming).

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Contributors: D. Wilfred Abse, James MacGregor Burns, Henry Steele Commager, John Conway, Lucie Jessner, David C. McClelland, Robert S. Morison, Henri Peyre, Don K. Price, Adam Yarmolinsky.

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Contributors: Hannah Arendt, James Baldwin, Ernest van den Haag, Oscar Handlin, H. Stuart Hughes, Stanley Edgar Hyman, Randall Jarrell, Leo Rosten, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Edward Shils, Frank Stanton, James Johnson Sweeney, and others.

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Contributors: Lotte Bailyn, Jill Conway, Carl N. Degler, Erik H. Erikson, Joan M. Erikson, Esther Peterson, David Riesman, Alice S. Rossi, Edna G. Rostow.

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Contributors: Achille Albonetti, Raymond Aron, Frank Bowles, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Fabio Luca Cavazza, William Clark, Michel Crozier, Ralf Dahrendorf, Charles Frankel, Oliver Franks, Stephen R. Graubard, Alfred Grosser, Stephane Hessel, Alexander King, Max Kohnstamm, Eric Larrabee, Seymour Martin Lipset, Richard Mayne, Alessandro Pizzorno, Ernesto N. Rogers, Manlio Rossi-Doria, Alain Touraine, Eric Weil.

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Contributors: Bruno Bettelheim, Reuel Denney, S. N. Eisenstadt, Erik H. Erikson, Kenneth Keniston, Robert Jay Lifton, Kaspar D. Naegele, Talcott Parsons, George Sherman, Laurence Wylie.

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